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INTRODUCTION

The remedial process in public law litigation' is a practice in search of a
theory. Courts are actively engaged in attempting to remedy violations of
constitutional and statutory norms in complex organizational settings. The
traditional adversary conception of adjudication has proven inadequate to
the task of structuring remedies and promoting compliance in these settings.
In response, lawyers, judges, and litigants are employing a variety of innovative roles and processes that do not conform to the accepted adjudicative
ideal. Remedial activity in public law litigation frequently entails negotiation, informal dialogue, ex parte communication, broad participation by actors who are not formally liable for the legal violations, and involvement of
court-appointed officials to assist in implementation.
Courts have exhibited an uneasy acceptance of continued judicial involvement in implementing public norms necessitated by the remedial process in
public law litigation. Trial courts now oversee compliance efforts in a wide
range of public law cases. 2 With prison populations soaring throughout the4
continue.
nation,3 judicial intervention in prisons and jails is likely to
1. The definition of public law litigation varies. The term is often used interchangeably with
structural or institutional reform litigation to refer to a class of cases involving public institutions
and policies, such as school desegregation, prison and mental hospital conditions, environmental
management, housing discrimination, and electoral reapportionment. See Special Project, The Remedial Processin InstitutionalReform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 788-89 (1978) [hereinafter Special Project]. Abram Chayes identifies the public nature of the legal claims--"the
vindication of constitutional or statutory policies"-as the dominating characteristic of public law
litigation. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1284
(1976). Chayes also defines public law litigation structurally, identifying as distinctive characteristics such features as the "sprawling and amorphous" party structure; the forward looking, ad hoc,
negotiated character of the relief; and the activism of the judge. Id. at 1302. Owen Fiss employs the
term "structural reform" litigation to emphasize the significance of the bureaucratic character of
the targets of the litigation. See Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2
(1979). Rather than attempt to provide a universal definition of public law litigation, this article
identifies four characteristics that predispose courts to depart from the traditional adversary process
in the course of developing remedies for violations of public norms in complex organizational settings. These characteristics both necessitate and define the boundaries of the normative theory of
public remedial process developed in this article. See infra text accompanying notes 116-23.
2. A recent study of the patterns of remedial decisionmaking by Republican judges in prison
cases suggests "that contrary to the fears of some or the hopes of others, more 'Republican' judges
on the federal bench does not spell the end of judicial activism in this area; such background characteristics of judges are powerful predictors of neither judicial intervention nor the extent of that
intervention." DiIulio, Introduction:EnhancingJudicialCapacity, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND
THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON PRISONS AND JAILS 8 (J. DiIulio ed. 1990) [hereinafter COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION]; Bradley, JudicialAppointment and Judicial Intervention: The Issuance of Structural Reform Decrees in Correctional
Litigation, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 260-62.
3. According to the most recent Bureau of Justice statistics, the increase from mid-1989 to mid1990 of more than 80,000 inmates was the largest annual growth in 65 years of prison population
statistics. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON POPULATION GROWS SIX PERCENT DURING
FIRST HALF OF YEAR (Oct. 7, 1990) (press release). As of January 1, 1990, the average prison was
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School and housing desegregation litigation is also likely to persist. 5 New
types of public law litigation are also emerging in areas such as union governance and disabilities. 6 The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
the legitimacy and importance of the federal judiciary's role in achieving
compliance with constitutional norms. 7 State courts are facing similar remedial challenges in what appears to be a growing docket of public law cases. 8
The courts, however, lack a normative theory to structure and legitimate the
role of remedial process in public law litigation.

The courts' public remedial activity has provoked a critical response from
the academy. The debate over the judicial legitimacy of this activity has not,
however, produced a coherent normative theory of public remedial process.
Both sides of the debate proceed based on a conception of the proper judicial
role that was developed to address the court's role in determining liability.
This conception rests on the assumption that the adversary process is the

only means of preserving the norms of judicial legitimacy. Public remedial
practice's departure from the adversary model prompts both critics and supporters to question the legitimacy of the court's role in enforcing public law
operating at 16.2% above its designed capacity. CRIMINAL- JUSTICE INSTITUTE, THE CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK: INSTANT ANSWERS TO KEY QUESTIONS IN CORRECTIONS 28 (1990).
4. As of January 1, 1990, eight states and Puerto Rico were operating their prison systems under
either a court order or consent decree; thirty-three states and the District of Columbia were operating a major penal institution under court order; and nine states had major prison litigation pending.
NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT, STATUS REPORT: THE COURTS AND PRISONS (1990).
5. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S.Ct. 630, 636-37 (1991); Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S.
Ct. 1651 (1990); Department of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 871-74 (11th Cir.
1990); Walker v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 912 F.2d 819, 826 (5th Cir. 1990).
6. See United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 905 F.2d 610, 612-13 (2d Cir. 1990)
(describing a civil RICO suit alleging racketeering activity of the Teamsters union and the subsequent consent decree that radically altered the union's elections and governance); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (providing "a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities").
7. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1663-66 (1990) (although district court may not
directly impose a tax increase to finance court-ordered desegregation, it may require the school
district to levy taxes in excess of the limit imposed by state law if necessary to vindicate constitutional guarantees); Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625, 632-34 (1990) (although district court
abused its discretion in holding individual council members in contempt, imposition of contempt
sanctions against the city for violating desegregation decree was proper).
8. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 290-91, 495 A.2d 376, 387-88 (1985) (substantial
disparities in per-pupil expenditures among school districts violated state constitution); McCain v.
Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 113-14, 511 N.E.2d 62, 62-63 (1987) (state court has power to issue affirmative injunction mandating specific conduct to meet minimum standards in housing that city provides for homeless families); C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 436-82 (2d ed. 1985)
(case study of housing reform litigation in state courts); OF JUDGES, POLITICS AND FLOUNDERS:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CLEANING UP OF BOSTON HARBOR (C. Haar ed. 1986) [hereinafter OF
JUDGES, POLITICS AND FLOUNDERS] (analysis of City of Quincy v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n,
Civ. No. 138477 (Mass. Super. Ct., Norfolk County, filed Dec. 17, 1982), state litigation involving
cleanup of Boston Harbor).
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9

The absence of a legitimate model of public remedial process presents
more than a purely theoretical problem. It enhances the potential for the
abuse of judicial power and contributes to the perception of the impropriety
of judicial intervention in public law cases. This perceived illegitimacy fuels
attacks on the court's role as guardian of constitutional and other public
values. A normative foundation is crucial to developing, sustaining, and,
where appropriate, criticizing public remedial activity.
This article provides a normative framework to guide the practice and
evaluation of the evolving public remedial practice. It identifies the distinctive characteristics and goals of public remedial process and shows how the
debate regarding its legitimacy fails to account for these differences. The
article draws a set of norms for public remedial decisionmaking out of the
existing legitimacy debate, and adapts these norms to the particular requirements of public law remedies. It then develops a normative theory of public
remedial process, building on the teachings of public consensual dispute resolution and other process theories that emphasize participation and dialogue.
By testing this normative theory against existing public remedial practice, the
article constructs a model of public remedial decisionmaking that accounts
for the particular demands of the remedial process while complying with the
requirements of a legitimate judicial role.
Part I of the article describes public remedial practice and the distinctive
characteristics that prompt courts and parties to depart from the traditional
adversary model. It provides examples of the various forms of public remedial decisionmaking to lay the groundwork for the subsequent evaluation of
their legitimacy. Part II exposes and attempts to bridge the gap between the
theory and practice of public remedial decisionmaking. It identifies four major categories of criticism and response to the court's public remedial role:
(1) the process critique; (2) the allocation of governmental power critique; (3)
the competency critique; and (4) the abuse of power critique. This section
demonstrates that although the discourse on legitimacy provides a normative
framework for the public remedial process, each category of the debate rests
9. See D. HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 17-19 (1977) (questioning the capacity

of courts to engage in social policymaking); Diver, The Judge as PoliticalPowerbroker:Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 103-06 (1979) (contrasting judge's
legitimate role in adjudicatory proceedings with the "political" nature of the judge's role in institutional reform); Fiss, supra note 1, at 44-46 (arguing that the judge's role in the development of
structural remedies endangers judicial independence); Fletcher, The DiscretionaryConstitution: InstitutionalRemedies andJudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 637 (1982) (arguing that trial court
remedial action in public law litigation is "presumptively illegitimate"). But see Eisenberg &
Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinaryin InstitutionalLitigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465,
466-67 (1980) (institutional reform litigation has analogues in other types of litigation and presents
little that is truly novel).
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on a conception of the judicial role that is derived from the liability stage.
Part II concludes by grounding the norms identified by the legitimacy debate
in the goals and demands of the public remedial process. In Part III, the
article summarizes the normative framework for public remedial decisionmaking and applies this framework to current remedial practice. Finally, in
light of this evaluation, Part IV develops a deliberative model of remedial
decisionmaking that casts the court in the role of structuring and evaluating
the adequacy of a participatory process designed to produce a consensual
remedial solution.
I. PUBLIC REMEDIAL PRACTICE AND ITS DEPARTURE FROM
TRADITIONAL FORMS OF ADJUDICATION

Critics and supporters of public law litigation generally agree that the
court's role in formulating and implementing public law remedies departs
from traditional conceptions of the adversary process. The scholarly debate
over the judicial legitimacy of public law remedies proceeds from this shared
assumption. Yet, the standard expositions of public remedial practice fail to
reflect the range of forms and procedural innovations that have recently
emerged. A fair evaluation of the legitimacy of the court's role must begin
with an accurate description of current public remedial practice. This section first explains the factors predisposing courts to depart from traditional
adversary processes in the public remedial context. It then describes the nature of public remedial practice, drawing on examples from a variety of public law cases.
A. THE ROOTS OF PUBLIC REMEDIAL PRACTICE'S DEPARTURE FROM
TRADITIONAL ADVERSARY PROCESS

The remedial process begins when the court finds that the defendants are
liable for violating the plaintiffs' rights and must remedy the harm caused by
their unlawful conduct. 10 Traditionally, damages and negative injunctions
have been the remedies of choice." 1 The court's role in determining these
12
remedies fits comfortably within established conventions of adjudication.
10. Many public law litigation cases are resolved by agreement prior to an adjudication of liability. In these situations, the parties proceed directly to the remedial stage. Many of the processes
used to develop postliability relief are also used to negotiate consent decrees reached without liability determinations. The consent decree presents particular challenges for a theory of judicial legitimacy, however, because the court's remedial power in the consent decree context is not grounded in
its duty to remedy established legal violations, as it is in postliability remedial determinations. See
infra text accompanying notes 456-457. This article focuses on postliability public remedial
process.
11. See 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RiGHTs INJUNCTION 38-39 (1978); F. MAITLAND, EQUITY 318
(1949); Fletcher, supra note 9, at 649.
12. As Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen Yeazell have shown, the court's role in enforcing tradi-
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Damages are typically awarded by the jury based upon evidence of the plaintiffs' injuries presented at trial, with the court providing the legal parameters
of the jury's deliberations. 13 Courts derive the content of negative injunctions from the wrongful conduct that is the basis for the defendants' liability,
again based on proof presented at trial. 14 The remedial determination generally adheres to the traditional adversary model.' 5 The parties, through their
lawyers, frame the issues and submit evidence and legal arguments to the
court through adversary presentation. The court rules on the legal issues
submitted by the parties and submits the factual disputes to a jury for
resolution.
Remedial decisionmaking in public law cases frequently differs dramatically from the traditional, dispute resolution model of adjudication.' 6 In the
public law context, the affirmative structural injunction' 7 tends to be the
remedy of choice, rather than damages or a negative injunction.' 8 Public law
cases concern ongoing violations of general aspirational norms grounded in
statutes or the Constitution. 19 Courts generally consider the resulting injutional remedies frequently departs from the traditional adversary model. See Eisenberg & Yeazell,
supra note 9, passim. They note that the court's role in enforcing traditional remedies has evolved
to a point where nonjudicial actors perform many of the executive functions. Id. at 478-81. They
suggest that public remedial practice may simply be at an earlier stage of procedural development
than traditional remedial practice. Id. at 512-13.
13. This does not mean that there is necessarily a logical connection between the right and the
remedy in damages cases. It is acceptance of the convention of monetary relief as the remedial
currency that links the determination of liability and the remedy.
14. For example, the act of trespassing on plaintiff's land-the basis for the liability determination--also constitutes the conduct to be prohibited by the negative injunction.
15. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.2, at 4 (1985).
16. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1284; Fiss, supra note 1, at 17-28.
17. Owen Fiss introduced the term "structural injunction" as the category of injunction "which
seeks to effectuate the reorganization of an ongoing social institution." 0. FisS, supra note 11, at 7.
18. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1292; Shane, School DesegregationRemedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1041, 1046-47 (1984).
The difficulties of apportioning damages in the public law context may also lead courts to depart
from the traditional rules governing the assessment of damages. In some cases in which the defendants' wrongful conduct can only be shown to have affected a group of plaintiffs, it may be difficult to
identify the particular members of the group and the extent of injuries suffered by each member.
See Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "PublicLaw" Vision of the Tort
System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 916-24 (1984) (advocating remedial innovation in the form of
damages scheduling and insurance fund judgments to address the problems of identifying victims of
toxic torts and the expense of individualizing damages awards). In these cases, insistence on traditional remedial conventions, which require proof of individualized causation and injury, prevents
any monetary recovery. At least in the context of settlements, courts have played the role of orchestrating settlements involving multiple parties and interests, a role that departs substantially from
the traditional concept of adjudication. See P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 143-67 (1986)
(describing the judge's role, the use of masters, and the use of informal processes in overseeing
settlement negotiations in the Agent Orange litigation). The court's role in both pretrial consent
decrees and damages calculations are beyond the scope of this article.
19. Cf Shane, Rights, Remedies and Restraint, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531, 550-53 (1988) ("aspirationalism" views "the Constitution as a signal of the kind of government under which we would
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ries to be irreparable and refuse to allow the availability of monetary com20
pensation to justify judicial toleration of continuing public law violations.
Similarly, courts have generally viewed the negative injunction as an inadequate means of relief in public law cases. Although a prohibition of particular forms of conduct may be sufficient to eliminate certain discrete and
blatant illegalities, such as assigning schools by race 21 or using torture and
whippings as punishment, 22 negative injunctions are, as a practical matter,
both difficult to obtain and inadequate as remedies for most ongoing public
law violations. For example, judges rarely use release of prisoners as a remedy for unconstitutional prison conditions, 23 and in many public law contexts
the plaintiffs and the public have an entitlement to, or interest in, the defend24
ants' continued involvement in the activities targeted by the litigation.
General orders prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment of prisoners or unequal treatment of black and white school children provide no indication of
how to rectify the social conditions, behavioral patterns, and organizational
dynamics causing the harm. 2 5 Courts correctly perceive, either initially or
like to live, and interpret[s] that Constitution over time to reach better approximations of that
aspiration"). The aspirational character of constitutional norms refers to the notion that constitutional norms invoke broad and often vague normative purposes and represent "enduring values and
principles" toward which we continually aspire and which take on meaning in particular contexts.
Id.
20. See 0. FIss, supra note 11, at 87 ("The inadequacy [of cash payments as compensation]
stemmed from considerations much deeper than difficulties of measurement.... [It] stemmed from
the group nature of the underlying claim and a belief that only in-kind benefits would effect a
change in the status of the group." (emphasis in original)); id at 75 (rights should not be reduced to
"a series of propositions assuring the payment of money to the victims"); cf. Zepeda v. United
States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 703 F.2d 719, 727 (8th Cir. 1985) (injury to plaintiffs
from INS violations of fourth amendment rights, if proven, "could not be compensated adequately
by money damages").
21. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir. 1968).
23. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 650-51. Although courts have ordered limited releases of inmates
as a remedy for unconstitutional prison overcrowding, this usually occurs only after affirmative
injunctions have failed. See Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 573 F. Supp. 454, 457-58
(W.D. Penn. 1983) (ordering release of prisoners as a contingency plan if deadline for easing jail
overcrowding not met); Benjamin v. Malcolm, 564 F. Supp. 668, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (concluding
that denial of motion to modify order limiting population of city jail would not necessitate the
releasing of inmates, given the availability of practicable alternatives to release); cf L. YACKLE,
REFORM AND REGRET: THE STORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALABAMA

PRISON SYSTEM 95 (1989) (noting that the court in Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala.
1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part and remanded sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam), "enjoin[ed] state authorities
from 'accepting or permitting the acceptance' of new prisoners into the system until the population
of the four major institutions was reduced to the 'design capacity' ").
24. See Frug, The JudicialPower of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 726-29 (1978) (pointing
out that even after a finding of legal violations, "the states have no choice but to continue to operate
prisons and facilities of some sort for the mentally ill and mentally retarded").
25. See Kirp & Babcock, Judge and Company: Court-Appointed Masters School Desegregation,
and InstitutionalReform, 32 ALA. L. REv. 313, 319 (1981) ("A remedial [affirmative] decree neces-
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after years of noncompliance, that the underlying causes of the legal violation
disable the defendants from complying with a general directive to cease vio26
lating the law.
Consequently, in public law litigation the judge typically endeavors to de-

velop affirmative requirements to govern the defendants' efforts to eliminate
the illegal conditions and practices. 27 Because the judge is seeking to implement generally articulated, aspirational norms in highly differentiated con-

texts, liability norms do not dictate the content of the remedy. In public law
litigation, liability norms provide only the goals and boundaries for the remedial decision. 28 For example, a determination that violent and unsanitary
prison conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment delimits the types

of problems that the remedy must address. It does not, however, dictate how
those problems should be solved. Should the court order the defendants to
hire more guards, reduce the prison population, establish screening and
training programs for guards, eliminate the inmate trustee system, introduce
work and educational programs, improve the classification system, restrict

the movement of inmates in the prison or require unit management? There is

29
no single correct remedial approach dictated by the eighth amendment.
The choice of remedy is likely to be driven by goals that do not directly relate

sarily speaks less to a determinate outcome than to a change in fundamental attitudes that inform
the process of organizational decisionmaking."); cf Diver, supra note 9, at 50 ("From rules traditionally found in the Constitution... the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeal have
extracted the broad principle that an individual has a right to... humane treatment while confined
to a custodial institution. Pronouncing rights, however, does nothing to illuminate the remedy."
(footnotes omitted)).
26. See 0. FIss, supra note 11, at 14; Chayes, supra note 1,at 1295; Diver, supra note 9, at 53-59;
Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA.
L. Rnv. 805, 864-67 (1990).
27. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 9, at 512.
28. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1971) (noting that the
scope of the violation determines the nature and extent of the remedy and that federal courts have
broad power to fashion appropriate relief); Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1975) (describing "substructure of... remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions"); Rebell, Implementation of Court Mandates Concerning Special Education: The Problems and the Potential, 10 J.L. &
EDUC. 335, 344 (1981) (basic applicable legal standard in special education is right to an "appropriate education," a standard which provides little specific guidance concerning the remedy).
29. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 50, Feeley & Hanson, The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons
and Jails: A Framework for Analysis And A Review of the Literature, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS,
AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 29. Examples of a multiplicity of remedial options to
cure a legal violation abound in the public law context. In school desegregation cases, remedial
disputes have centered on "the relative importance of integration, financial resources, minority control, and ethnic identification in enriching school environments." Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class
Actions. 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1189 (1982). In special education, remedial decisions involve a
choice between mainstreaming and upgrading separate classes. Suits involving the disabled pose a
choice between developing community alternatives and upgrading existing institutions. Id. at 1190.
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to the liability norm, such as conceptions of good management or the proper
goals of punishment.
The facts produced to establish the public law violation frequently provide
little guidance concerning the appropriate remedy. Both the consequences of
the wrongful conduct and the steps necessary to remedy them are mediated
through a complex set of formal and informal relationships that may be irrelevant to establishing the legal violation but critical to the development of a
remedy adequate to eliminate that violation. The task of correcting the defendants' wrongful conduct raises factual and normative issues that do not
arise in the course of determining liability, such as the effectiveness and prac30
ticability of various remedial options.
Thus, the court cannot simply rely upon the processes used to generate a
liability decision to formulate a structural remedy. The trial on the merits
does not provide a sufficient legal or factual basis for adopting a particular
remedy. There are no established conventions, such as jury deliberations, to
fill this gap between right and remedy. The information and expertise
needed to develop the remedy are frequently held by actors who did not
participate in the liability determination. Therefore, the court faces the task
of crafting both the process and the substance of the remedy.
The process of developing a remedial order that details the steps required
to eliminate public law violations presents particular challenges for the adversary system. Remedial fact-finding is prospective, focusing on possible
approaches to correcting the target institution's illegal actions. 3 1 Any remedy that requires significant changes in the institution's conditions and practices will implicate diverse interests beyond those of the parties to the liability
determination. These interests often include officials not formally responsible for the legal violations whose participation is necessary for organizational
reform. 32 The remedy may also affect the lives of individuals or groups who
have no legal entitlement concerning the remedy but are in a position to
30. See Sturm, supra note 26, at 861-912 (analyzing the impact of a prison's norms, incentives,
and power structure on the effectiveness of various strategies of judicial intervention). For example,
the court is unlikely to consider the possibility of parental resistance and white flight in response to
a desegregation order in determining whether a school district intentionally segregated the schools.
These factors profoundly affect the effectiveness of a school desegregation remedy, however, and
courts frequently take them into account at the remedial stage. See Berger, Away from the Courthouse and into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 707, 716-17 (1978)
(describing special master's experience discovering and integrating parents' concerns into a workable school desegregation plan).
31. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1296; Special Project, supra note 1, at 792-93.
32. Prison and jail overcrowding litigation presents a clear example of this phenomenon. The
typical nominal defendants--correctional administrators and governors-lack control over the flow
of inmates in and out of the system, and are thus dependent on the legislature, sentencing judges,
prosecutors, and parole boards to reduce the population in a particular institution. See Sturm,
supra note 26, at 840-41.
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block or disrupt its implementation.3 3 Unlike the process of liability determination, the remedy's successful implementation depends on the cooperation of these diverse actors. Thus, the remedial stage poses the challenge of
achieving the understanding and acceptance of the remedy by those who
must live with it. 34 The process is further complicated by the fact that state
and local officials, who have political and legal concerns about preserving
their decisionmaking authority, are frequently the target of the court's
intervention.
B. THE FORMS OF PUBLIC REMEDIAL PRACTICE

Courts respond to the challenges of the remedial process in public law
litigation in diverse ways. Frequently, the judge and the parties perceive that
the traditional adversary process provides inadequate tools with which to
meet the demands of public remedial decisionmaking.3 5 Participants in the
public remedial process often employ methods of remedial formulation that
deviate substantially from the formal adjudicatory model.3 6 Fact-finding, for
33. For example, individual parents and community groups opposed to busing present perhaps
the most significant obstacle to school desegregation. They have dramatically limited the success of
court-ordered desegregation by using both violent and nonviolent resistance to court-ordered busing
and removal of their children from public schools. See Smith, Two Centuries and Twenty-Four
Months: A Chronicle of the Struggle to Desegregate the Boston Public Schools, in LIMITS OF JUSTICE: THE COURTS' ROLE IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 25, 52-72, 96 (J. Fishman & H. Kalodner
eds. 1978) [hereinafter LIMITS OF JUSTICE]. Communities opposed to siting prisons or group homes
in their midst play a similar role in prison and mental hospital reform. See D. ROTHMAN & S.
ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 180-81 (1984).
34. See Ekland-Olson & Martin, Ruir A Struggle Over Legitimacy, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS,
AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 74-76; Kalodner, Introduction, in LIMITS OF JUSTICE,
supra note 33, at 7-8; Sturm, supra note 26, at 807 n.3.
35. See, e.g., Amos v. Board of School Directors, 408 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (court
recognized necessity of appointing master to help formulate school desegregation decree); Hart v.
Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (court acknowledged need for
master to help formulate school desegregation plan, noting that the court itself is better suited to
presiding at an adversary hearing than to playing role of coordinator); Berger, supra note 30, at 71112 (special master decided not to hold evidentiary hearings based on his perception that they were
ill-suited to gain necessary information quickly, economically, and perhaps confidentially, and to
mobilize community consensus concerning the remedy); Janger, Expert Negotiation Brings New Approach to Prison Litigation In Hawaii, 6 NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J., Winter 1985, at 6-7 (parties
relied on expert mediators to meet court-ordered prison specifications, thus eliminating "the adversarial nature of the process"); Kirp, Legalism and Politics in School Desegregation, 1981 Wis. L.
REv. 924, 939 ("to some courts adversarial behavior [in formulating school desegregation remedies]
is itself thought inappropriate, inconsistent with the task at hand"). For a normative discussion of
the inadequacies of the adversary process in the context of public remedial decisionmaking, see infra
text accompanying notes 213-18.
36. Public remedial formulation is not the only area in which the courts routinely depart from
the adversary model. Judges play an active role in managing pretrial activities and promoting settlement. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 5-6; Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV.
L. REv. 374, 377-79 (1982). Courts overseeing Chapter 11 reorganizations in bankruptcy also engage in various administrative and managerial activities inconsistent with traditional adjudication.
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example, does not proceed primarily through party-controlled, adversarial
discovery and formal evidentiary hearings. Instead, the court plays an active
role in developing the factual record. 37 In some cases, the judge herself conducts an investigation, consulting with experts and other outside sources. Increasingly, courts have appointed third parties to investigate the status and
38
causes of the legal violations and propose a remedial plan to the court.
Although these court-appointed officials typically have the authority to hold
formal evidentiary hearings, 39 they frequently rely heavily on direct investigation by site visits, informal interviews with various participants in the system, review of institutional records and documents produced to the court,
consultation with outside experts who themselves investigate the target institution, and independent research. 4 In other cases, the parties collaborate to
See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 9, at 485-86. Unlike pretrial or public remedial judicial management, however, the court's role in bankruptcy is structured by statute.
37. Fact-finding at the remedial stage resembles in some respects the inquisitorial methods of
fact-finding employed in Germany and other European legal systems. See Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 823, 826-30 (1985) (the major difference between
German and Anglo-American civil procedure is that the court rather than the parties' lawyers
assumes primary responsibility for gathering and sifting through evidence). For a similar discussion
in the criminal context, see generally Damaska, EvidentiaryBarriersto Conviction and Two Models
of CriminalProcedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506 (1973); Damaska, Presentation of Evidence andFactfindingPrecision, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1083 (1975). Unlike the inquisitorial
model, however, the deliberative model of remedial decisionmaking proposed in this article preserves substantial party involvement in and control over fact-finding, and even affords the parties
some degree of control over decisionmaking. See infra Part IV.
38. See Feeley & Hanson, supra note 29, at 35-36 (masters used most frequently to formulate
detailed plans for implementing a general court order at postliability stage); Kirp & Babcock, supra
note 25, at 321-25 (discussing the use of masters in school desegregation cases); Kalonder, supra
note- 34, at 8-10 (courts increasingly turn to masters and experts in school desegregation cases because of the technical nature of the remedial problems and the presumed bias of the parties); Nathan, The Use of Masters in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 419, 420-22 (1979)
(masters are used when traditional litigation processes would not produce adequate information and
judge could not monitor compliance with a decree); Weinberg, The JudicialAdjunct and Public
Law Remedies, 1 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 367, 372, 386 (1983) (examining the role of judicial
adjuncts).
39. Masters are often appointed under rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
allows masters to hold hearings. FED. R. Civ. P. 53. Rule 53 does not, however, make any specific
reference to the remedial context. For a discussion of the source of authority for the appointment of
special masters in the remedial stage of institutional reform litigation, see Levine, The Authority for
the Appointment of Remedial Special Masters in FederalInstitutionalReform Litigation: The History Reconsidered, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 753 passim (1984); Nathan, supra note 38, at 434-36;
Silberman, JudicialAdjuncts Revisited. The ProliferationofAd Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
2131, 2134-36, 2161-68 (1989).
40. See B. CROUCH & J. MARQUART, AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE: LITIGATED REFORM OF TEXAS
PRISONS 130-31 (1989); Berger, supra note 30, at 711-12; Kirp & Babcock, supra note 25, at 339; La
Pierre, Voluntary Interdistrict School Desegregation in SL Lou&r" The Special Master's Tale, 1987
WIs. L. REv. 971, 1012-13; Little, Court-AppointedSpecial Masters in Complex EnvironmentalLitigation:L City of Quincy v. Metropolitan District Commission, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 435, 446-47
(1984). In Texas, as in New Mexico, Rhode Island, and numerous other jurisdictions, masters in
prison cases have conducted extensive investigations and filed lengthy reports on such topics as
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retain a panel of experts to investigate and make recommendations concerning the institutional practices and conditions that have been held to violate
4
the law. '
This informal, inquisitorial fact-finding involves individuals and groups
who are not parties to the litigation in the process of remedial formulation.
This involvement may be limited to providing information to an expert or the
court. Often, however, it extends to taking formal or informal positions concerning proposed remedies, negotiating with court representatives and parof the remedy,
ties concerning involvement in facilitating implementation 42
effort.
remedial
the
for
support
and
resources
providing
and
In addition to the mode of fact-finding and the involvement of nonparties
in the remedial process, the structure and method of decisionmaking employed by the courts in the public remedial process frequently depart from
the adversary model. 4 3 In the absence of legal standards justifying the adoption of a particular remedy, courts rely on expertise and agreement to guide
and justify remedial formulation.
1. Processes Attempting to Adhere to the Traditional Adjudicatory Model
Some judges ignore the challenges of the public remedial process and attempt to adhere to the traditional adjudicatory model." In some cases, this
entails delegating the responsibility of formulating and implementing a remedy to the defendants and intervening only in response to formal notification
by the plaintiffs of the defendants' failure to act. 45 The court used this deferrer approach in Holt v. Sarver,4 a prison case involving massive and systemic
augmentation of security staff, crowding, classification, medical and psychiatric care, access to the
courts, treatment of mentally and physically handicapped prisoners, occupational safety and health,
the use of trustee guards, and conditions on death row. Ekland-Olson & Martin; supra note 34, at

87-88.
41. See, e.g., Spear v. Ariyoshi, No. 84-1104, Consent Decree, at 3 (D. Haw. June 12, 1985);
McGovern, Toward a FunctionalApproach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
440, 464 (1984).

42. Diver, supra note 9, at 75-76; see Smith, supra note 33, at 91 (describing involvement of
universities and business community in desegregation effort).

43. These emerging remedial structures parallel similar developments in regulatory negotiation
and alternative dispute resolution. Participants in both of these areas are experimenting with col-

laborative forms of decisionmaking that directly involve the participants in the dispute. See infra
Part III.B.5.

44. See D. HOROWITZ, supra note 9, at 49 (courts often ignore social policy issues which arise in
cases that threaten the traditional judicial role); Burt, Pennhurst: A Parable,in IN THE INTEREST
OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 327 (R. Mnookin ed. 1985)
[hereinafter IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN] (judge in case challenging conditions in state mental
institution adhered to traditional role as "passive umpire" presiding over disputes that the parties
acknowledged between themselves and brought to his attention).
45. In a recent article, I refer to this judicial strategy as the deferrer model of the judicial role.
Sturm, supra note 26, at 849-51.
46. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
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constitutional violations. The court mandated general improvements in
prison conditions, and left it to the defendants to develop and implement
47
specific plans accomplishing those remedial goals.
Another strategy for maintaining the traditional judicial posture is to rely
on the trial record and formal submissions by the parties as the basis for
formulating and imposing a detailed remedy, and to rely on presumptions,
48
remedies in similar cases, logic, and personal judgments to fill in the gaps.
The court's approach in the Alabama prison litigation illustrates this strategy. 49 Judge Johnson unilaterally developed and imposed a detailed order
governing the conditions of daily life in the prisons, relying on evidence obtained at the trial on the merits and on his own conception of the steps necessary to correct the constitutional violations.5 0
2. The Bargaining Model
One method frequently employed by the courts to address the limitations
of the traditional adversary process in the public law context is to induce
bargaining between the lawyers for the parties in an effort to produce agreement on the terms of the remedy. 51 Courts may promote bargaining indirectly, by requiring the parties to submit proposed decrees and threatening to

impose an order unfavorable to one or more of the parties if an agreement is
not reached. 52 Or, the court may directly order the parties to meet and try to
reach an agreement, and actively oversee the remedial negotiations. 53 Courts
may also appoint third parties to supervise negotiations between the
54
parties.
47. Id at 383. See generally Sturm, supra note 26, at 851.
48. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1276-77, 1385-90 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd, 679
F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373,
379-86 (M.D. Ala. 1972). This approach is an example of what I call the director model of judicial
intervention. Sturm, supra note 26, at 851-54. Judges who employ a deferrer approach in the initial
stages of remedial formulation frequently turn to the director approach when the deferrer approach
fails to yield a workable remedial solution. Id. at 853.
49. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama,
559 F.2d 283 (1977), rev'd in part and remanded sub non. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)
(per curiam).
50. See L. YACKLE, supra note 23, at 101-04; Sturm, supra note 26, at 853-54.
51. See Diver, supra note 9, at 45-46. I refer to this judicial approach as the broker method.
Sturm, supra note 26, at 854-56. The broker role resembles the court's developing role in promoting
pretrial settlements. See Elliot, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CIii. L.
REv. 306, 322-26 (1986) (discussing judge's "managerial" role in pretrial settlement activity); Resnik, supra note 36, at 378 (same).
52. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1298-99.
53. See M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS 12 (1977) (judge in prison case required parties' counsel to
meet and "played a strong role in the process by exerting pressure on both sides to moderate and
compromise").
54. See La Pierre, supra note 40, at 995-1000 (describing special master's supervision of negotia-
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In Liddell v. Board of Education,55 the court appointed a third party to
oversee remedial negotiations among the parties to a St. Louis desegregation
case. Initially, the district court ordered the State, the Board of Education,
and the United States Department of Justice to develop both a voluntary and
a mandatory interdistrict school desegregation plan. 56 After these initial efforts failed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
clarified the framework for considering a mandatory interdistrict desegregation plan, the district court appointed a special master "for the purpose of
exploring possibilities of settlement."' 5" The special master met with attorneys for the parties involved in the case individually or in groups with common interests, shuttling back and forth among the parties with proposals,
counter-proposals, and suggestions. The initial meetings were used to gather
information, solicit and discuss suggestions about possible settlement, and
determine bargaining positions. 58
After the preliminary, indirect negotiations, the master arranged for direct
negotiations to be conducted by the lawyers for the parties. 59 The master
asked the attorneys for the interdistrict plaintiffs and the suburban school
districts to designate negotiating teams and excused representatives of the
6
Department of Justice, the city, the county, and the special school district.
The State participated in the negotiations on a very limited basis. An amicus
curiae appointed by the court to represent the public interest helped super6
vise the negotiations. '
After forty hours of negotiations conducted over a three-day period, the
participants reached an agreement in principle. 62 Attorneys then submitted
the proposed settlement to their clients who, with the exception of one suburban school district, accepted it.63 The district court then ordered the parties
to submit a detailed implementation plan within thirty days. A seventy-five
page, single-spaced settlement agreement was filed with the court by the ne64
gotiating attorneys prior to its submission to their clients for approval. The
tions in St. Louis interdistrict school desegregation); Rebell, supra note 28, at 349-51 (describing
negotiation process involving attorneys supervised by master in Jose P. v. Ambach, 79 C 270, 3
EHLR 551:245 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 1979), a special education case).
55. 491 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aff'd, 667 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1091

(1981).
56.
57.
(1485)
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 353.
La Pierre, supra note 40, at 986-87 (quoting Liddell v. Board of Educ., No. 72-100 C (4), H
82 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 15, 1982) (order appointing special master)).
Id. at 995-97.
Id. at 997.
Id. at 997 n.89.

61. Id.
62. Id. at 997.
63. Id. at 999.

64. Id. at 1000.
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State, the city of St. Louis, and the Department of Justice, none of whom had
participated in the drafting of the settlement agreement, filed objections to
the agreement. 6 5 The court held a fairness hearing, at which it considered
the arguments of proponents of the agreement, the position of the Department of Justice, a wide range of public comments, and the objections of both
the State and city of St. Louis. 66 The court also appointed a financial advisor
to submit a report concerning the financial ramifications of the proposed settlement. The court then approved the settlement agreement, supplemented
by the recommendation of the financial advisor to establish a budget review
and planning process to address quality education programs and magnet
67
schools.
3. The Legislative or Administrative Hearing Model
Another model of remedial decisionmaking resembles a legislative committee or administrative hearing, providing the opportunity for direct and
informal participation by a broad range of interested actors.68 An example of
this model is Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,69 in which Judge Edward Becker conducted extensive informal public hearings and negotiations concerning the implementation of a decree
designed to provide mentally retarded children with free public education.70
The purpose of these informal public implementation hearings was to "collect more information, to settle disputes, and plan and monitor the efforts of
the schools to establish appropriate educational programs." 71 Prior to the
first public hearing, Judge Becker issued an order creating the Special Education Action Committee (SEAC), an advisory committee composed of representatives of the various groups and organizations who had a stake in the
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1010-12.
67. Id. at 1013-16.
68. This type of broad, informal, and unstructured participation in remedial formulation has
been characterized as a town meeting approach. See Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on the Los Angeles School Case, 25 UCLA L. REv. 244, 259-60 (1977).
Yeazell characterizes remedial formulation in the Los Angeles school desegregation case, Crawford
v. Board of Educ., 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976), as a town meeting, based
on the broad participation of parties who would be affected by a school desegregation order. The
court in such a case becomes "the initial forum for the airing of views," resembling "the hearing
stage of a legislative and administrative process." Yeazell, supra; at 259.
69. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (per curiam), approved and adopted, 343 F. Supp. 279
(E.D. Pa. 1972) [hereinafter PARC v. Pennsylvania].
70. PARC v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. at 288-90; see Rosenberg & Philips, The Institutionaliza-

tion of Conflict in the Reform of Schoolv A Case Study of Court Implementation of the PARC
Decree, 57 IND. L.J. 425, 431-32 (1982). Although this case involves the enforcement of a consent
decree, the processes used have direct application to postliability remedial formulation.
71. Rosenberg & Phillips, supra note 70, at 431.
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participation in
outcome of the negotiations. 72 The court also provided for 73
attend.
to
chose
who
persons
the hearings by any interested
Judge Becker established guidelines concerning the conduct of the hearings. Although transcripts of the hearings were to become part of the court
record, the parties agreed that the rules of evidence would be relaxed and
that the transcripts would be inadmissible as evidence in subsequent enforcement proceedings. 74 As the negotiations proceeded, the court developed
the conduct of hearings and contacts with the court
guidelines concerning
75
public.
and the
The hearings served-as a forum for collecting information on the status of
compliance efforts, presenting complaints and opinions by interested participants, and producing agreement over the steps to be taken to implement the
decree. In situations in which agreement did not emerge, the judge issued a
directive concerning the disputed issue. 76 The court did not appoint an independent fact-finding body to inform the hearings or negotiations, and
77 The judge retained the role
SEAC had only informal, advisory authority.
78
of orchestrating the hearing process.
4. The Expert Remedial Formulation Model
A fourth approach to remedial formulation in the public law context is the
72. PARC v. Pennsylvania, No. 71-42 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 11, 1977) (order granting motion of
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers to intervene). SEAC included representatives of the plaintiff
class, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Philadelphia School District, the teachers' union,
the Philadelphia Association of School Administrators, community groups interested in special education reform, a member of the black community, and a member of a task force responsible for
identifying and enrolling children previously excluded from public schools. Rosenberg & Phillips,
supra note 70, at 434-35.
In addition to being used in an advisory capacity, representative committees have been used in
some cases to oversee implementation of the remedy. This process frequently involves resolving
disputes concerning the meaning and precise requirements of the remedy. For example, in the
Boston school desegregation litigation, the court "appointed as broadly representative a group as
...possibl[e]." Smith, supra note 33, at 108. The court also created community councils that were
to consist of: "(1) five parents of children attending schools in the district, to be elected by district
parents; (2) two students attending the district high school, elected by district high school students;
(3) a representative of the district teachers; (4) a representative of a business organization working
with the district high school; (5) a representative of a college or university paired with a district
school; (6) a representative of a labor union paired with a district school ...; (7) a representative of
the Boston Police Department of the district. .. ; [and] (8) the superintendent of schools for the
district." Id. at 88-89. See also Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 376 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Note,
The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a JudicialDecree OrderingInstitutional Change, 84 YALE L.J.
1338, 1361 (1975).
73. Rosenberg & Philips, supra note 70, at 435.
74. Id at 436.
75. Id. at 437.
76. Id. at 435-37.
77. Id. at 436, 444.
78. Id. at 437.
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appointment of either an individual expert or a panel of experts to develop a
remedial plan. 79 The court may either unilaterally select the individual or
panel or may base its selection on the recommendation of the parties.
Although the individual or panel has the authority to develop a proposed
remedy independently, frequently they use their position to develop both expertise and consensus in support of the plan they propose to the court.8 0
This approach was used by the special master appointed by Judge Jack
Weinstein in Hart v. Community School Board,"' to develop an integration
plan for the Mark Twain School in Coney Island, New York, and the surrounding community. In addition to affording the master the power to take
evidence, consult with the parties, and engage legal aids and other experts,
and ask each party to supply him with all relevant data within their control,
the Order of Reference directed the master to "solicit the views of commu79. In a prison case employing this approach, the panel included a representative of the Department of Corrections as well as an expert chosen by plaintiffs and defendants. See Janger, supra note
35, at 6. In litigation involving the conditions in two New York City jails, the parties agreed to the
creation of the Office of Compliance Consultants, an independent monitoring unit created by New
York City and the Legal Aid Society. Storey, When Intervention Works: Judge Morris Lasker and
the New York City Jails, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 138,
159.
In the Willowbrook case, a consent decree was approved that ordered the creation of a panel,
approved by the court, consisting of "two persons chosen by the defendants, three chosen by the
plaintiffs, and two 'recognized experts in the field of mental retardation... to be agreed upon by the
parties, if possible, or appointed by the court in the event of a dispute." Lottman, Enforcement of
JudicialDecrees: Now Comes the Hard Part, 1 Mental Disability L. Rep. (A.B.A.) 69, 72-73 (1976)
(quoting NYSARC and Parisi v. Carey, No. 72-C-356/357 (final judgment), at 5 (E.D.N.Y. April
30, 1975), approved, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). This committee structure resembles the
tripartite panel used in labor arbitrations consisting of one member selected by the union, one by
management, and a third who is neutral. See Fuller, Collective Bargainingand the Arbitrator, 1963
Wis. L. REv. 3, 36.
80. The special master in the Boston Harbor Litigation focused less on producing a consensus
plan, instead seeking to develop his own expertise on the operation of the Boston sewage system and
propose remedies with realistic and feasible performance standards that would encourage agency
cooperation. Little, supra note 40, at 446, 474. He hired a lawyer to act as deputy special master,
consulted with environmental and financial experts, reviewed a vast number of documents, studies,
and articles, conducted informal hearings, toured the existing treatment plants, and consulted with
public officials. Id. at 446-47. Based on all of this information, he prepared a report that evaluated
the problems in the sewage system, assessed the status of previous efforts to address them, and
proposed and justified remedies for each of the identified problems. A substantial component of his
recommendations included the establishment of a planning process involving the defendants, experts, and the court to develop implementation plans that addressed specific issues defined by the
court. Id. at 466, 475. Ultimately, the court, with the consent of the parties, constructed a collaborative process placing remedial responsibility squarely on the parties, and adopted the master's
recommendation to create an independent authority with autonomous funding power responsible
for creation and operation of the sewer system. See OF JUDGES, POLITICS, AND FLOUNDERS, supra
note 8, at x-xi.
81. 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (liability decision and order appointing special master),
supplemented, 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (remedial order), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.
1975). This case has been the subject of extensive commentary, including an article by the special
master describing his experience. See Berger, supra note 30.
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nity groups within District 21 and the advice of staff professionals within the
'82
various governmental agencies."
The master set out to "mobiliz[e] . . . a consensus" leading to a school
' 83
desegregation plan "that the community could live with." He saw himself
as "engaged in a joint venture with key agency personnel."' In an effort to
develop a consensus, the master met with a wide range of individuals and
groups to solicit their views of his role and the desegregation plan, including
the community school board, the Mayor and his staff, the elected officers of
85
the district schools' parents' associations, and a group of black leaders.
The master also organized a team of housing and planning agency specialists
to meet weekly with an architect who authored a study of Coney Island's
physical future. The team included staff from the relevant government agenUrban Development Corporation, the
cies as well as a top executive of the
6
Island.
Coney
on
builder
principal
In the course of these meetings, the master developed his own views on
how integration should be achieved and attempted to build a consensus
among the various groups in the community around his ideas. He also
worked with the housing and planning team to develop a consensus plan for
urban redevelopment. 87 Based on views formed through his research and
consultations, as well as what he perceived to be the consensus developed by
the agency planning group, the master developed and submitted a remedial
plan that recommended the development of Mark Twain as a magnet school
and the establishment of an array of housing, relocation, and neighborhood
development programs. 88 The court held hearings on the proposed plan,
89
which was opposed by virtually every group the master had consulted. After the hearings, the court rejected the neighborhood renewal plan proposed
by the master, and instead instructed the school board to design its own magnet plan.90
5. The Consensual Remedial Formulation Model
Finally, courts and parties have developed structures that involve the interested actors in a process of developing a consensual remedy through joint
82. Berger, supra note 30, at 711.

83. Id at 712.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 712-21.

86. Id. at 722.
87. Id. at 721-27.
88. Id. at 728-30.

89. Id at 731-32.
90. Id. at 733; see Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 769, 774 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
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fact-finding and collaborative decisionmaking assisted by a third party. 91
One example of this approach is the mediated resolution of the dispute in
United States v. Michigan, involving the right to fish in the treaty waters of
the Great Lakes. 92 The court was called upon to allocate the waters between
the Indian tribes, who had an unfettered right to fish in the treaty waters, and
Michigan sport and commercial fishers. Judge Richard Enslen appointed a
special master, selected jointly by the court and the parties, to explore the
possibilities for settlement and to prepare the case for trial in the event a
settlement was not achieved. 9 3 The participants in the negotiations included
the named parties-three Indian tribes, the United States on behalf of both
the tribes and the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the State of Michigan-and
94
several groups of commercial and sport fishers named as litigating amici.
The focus of the negotiation process was on "assisting the parties to develop their own allocation plans in accordance with classic integrative bargaining." 95 The first step of this process was "to develop a scorable game
that would mimic the actual dispute. The task involved identifying each
party's interests, selecting all feasible elements to any allocation plan, stating
the parties' priorities, and determining the variety of systems that could be
used to organize these interests and elements."' 96 The parties' priorities were
quantified, fed into a computer, and analyzed by a program that identified
the solutions that satisfied the minimum interests of the individual parties.
In addition to providing possible solutions, the game served "to teach the
'9 7
parties how to negotiate.
91. I refer to this judicial approach as the catalyst approach to remedial intervention. Sturm,
supra note 26, at 856-59.

92. United States v. Michigan, File No. M26-73CA (W.D. Mich. May 7, 1985) (pretrial order in
bifurcated allocation trial). For the original suit, see United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192
(W.D. Mich. 1979), remanded, 623 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1980), modified, 653 F.2d 277 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981). In this case, the district court ruled that an 1836 treaty between the
United States and the Ottawa and Chippewa Tribes gave the tribes the right to fish the Great Lakes
free from regulation by the State of Michigan. This led to increased competition with commercial
and sport fishers and a reduced catch. McGovern, supra note 41, at 457. The tribes then petitioned
the court to allocate the Treaty Waters. Id. (citing Indian Tribes' Amended Motion to Allocate

Resource, United States v. Michigan, Civil Action No. M26.73 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 25, 1984)). The
mediated resolution grew out of this petition. This procedural innovation is described by Francis
McGovern, the Master who conducted the mediation, in McGovern, supra note 41, at 456-68. See

also L.

SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO

RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 73-76, 165-68 (1987) (describing a hypothetical dispute resolution
process based on the fishing rights mediation).
93. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 410 (1986).
94. McGovern, supra note 41, at 462-63. These groups "had a participatory role in discovery
and at trial, but could not veto a potential settlement." Id. at 463.
95. Id. at 461.

96. Id.
97. Id. at 462. The participants ultimately agreed to a plan that closely paralleled one of the
solutions identified by the scorable game. Id. at 465-66.
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The master then asked the parties to propose management plans that they
would support at trial. 98 He undertook "an intensive educational effort...
to broaden the horizons to include additional issues suitable for negotiation." 99 The master "met with the leaders and sometimes virtually all the
members of the tribes, officials of the [United States] Department of the Interior, and Michigan's Governor, Attorney General, and the Director of its
Department of Natural Resources" to explore their interests and apprise
them of the progress of both the negotiations and the litigation.l °° The
master also suggested cooperative methods for sharing and acquiring information that led to the development of a joint computer run analyzing the
critical variables.10 1 Finally, representatives of several parties to a parallel
litigation that resulted in a court-managed remedy addressed the participants
concerning the court's management of their resources. The negotiations
culminated in a settlement reached four weeks before the scheduled trial.' 02
Collaborative remedial processes need not follow judicial determinations
of liability. An example of a voluntary collaborative approach to public remedial decisionmaking is the mediated resolution of litigation concerning
conditions and overcrowding in the Pennsylvania juvenile justice institutions.' 0 3 The mediation was convened at the initiation of the Juvenile Law
Center, counsel to children in two class action law suits challenging the conditions in Philadelphia's juvenile detention center, and, in a third suit, the
adequacy of aftercare programs for juveniles in Pennsylvania training schools
and residential programs. 04 With the exception of the district attorney, who
declined to participate, the mediation involved representatives of all of the
key actors in the Pennsylvania juvenile justice system. 105 The actors participated directly in the mediation and were for the most part unassisted by
98. Id at 463.
99. Id. at 464.

100. Id. at 463.
101. See id. at 464. A neutral expert in computer modeling assisted in this process.
102. Id. at 465.
103. Unlike the fishing rights case, the juvenile mediation was conducted voluntarily by the participants outside the supervision of the court. Although there was an outstanding decree in the
juvenile detention conditions litigation, it was the product of agreement by the parties, without an
adjudication of liability by the court. See Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, No. 74-2589 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 11, 1988) (consent decree).
104. Schwartz, Philadelphia Solves Juvenile Crowding by Mediation, OVERCROWDED TIMES:

1, 16 (1991).
105. The participants included a Family Court judge, the Commissioner of Human Services, the
Executive Director of Juvenile Justice Services, the Deputy Secretary for the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare's Office of Children Youth and Families, the Executive Director of the
Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Judges' Commission, the Special Master appointed in Santiago v. City
of Philadelphia, and attorneys from the City Law Department, the Defender Association, and the
Juvenile Law Center. Minutes, Juvenile Justice System Negotiations I (Feb. 5, 1990) (copy on file
at The Georgetown Law Journal); Schwartz, supra note 104, at 16.
SOLVING THE PRISON PROBLEM
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counsel during the negotiations. 106 The attorneys who did participate in the
mediation agreed to appear not in their traditional advocacy capacity, but
instead as part of an effort to develop a comprehensive solution to the
10 7
problems underlying the cases.
The Juvenile Law Center, with the agreement of the other participants,
retained the services of a mediator to facilitate the development of a plan
acceptable to all the participants.1 0 The mediator met with all of the participants individually to learn more about their interests and concerns, prompt
their thinking about issues and alternatives, and orient them to mutual interest-based negotiations. 109 The mediator's role was defined as assisting in the
process and "developing an agenda for monitoring the process in accordance
with established values." 110 The participants agreed to work from a single
text rather than from separate, competing proposals, and to circulate community minutes of the sessions. Arrangements were then made for a threeday negotiating session. 1 1
The session began with a discussion of the terms and ground rules for
participation in the negotiations. Next, the participants developed an agenda
defining the scope of the negotiations. 11 2 The substantive discussions were
begun by identifying mutual interests and concerns. The participants then
engaged in a brainstorming session on the design of an ideal juvenile justice
system and developed priorities concerning the objectives that a remedial
plan should meet.' 13 Finally, the participants agreed on a short-term plan to
address systemically the overcrowding problem in the Youth Study Center
and to develop an ongoing process "to design, plan and implement program
11 4
and systems changes."
The participants in the mediation then "sold" the agreement to the parties
whose approval was necessary for the plan's adoption and implementation.
Ultimately the agreement was approved by the Mayor, the Family Court,
and the Commissioner of the Department of Public Welfare.' 1 5
106. Id.; Interview with Robert G. Schwartz, Executive Director of Juvenile Law Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Sept. 28, 1990.)
107. Interview with Robert G. Schwartz, Executive Director of the Juvenile Law Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Sept. 28, 1990).
108. Schwartz, supra note 104, at 16-17.
109. Juvenile Justice System Project Interview Synopsis 1 (Jan. 29, 1990) (copy on file at The
Georgetown Law Journal).
110. Minutes, supra note 105, at 3.
111. Schwartz, supra note 104, at 16.
112. Id. at 17.
113. Id.
114. Agreement with Regard to Overcrowding at the Philadelphia Youth Study Center 4 (copy
on file at The Georgetown Law Journal).
115. Schwartz, supra note 104, at 9. The juvenile detention center mediation produced an agree-

ment that was entered into the federal court record in Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, No. 74-2589
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C. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC REMEDIAL
DECISIONMAKING: A REPRISE

The expanded roles and novel processes that have evolved in the context of
public remedial decisionmaking represent an attempt to respond to the challenges posed in developing an affirmative plan to redress ongoing constitutional and statutory violations involving complex institutions. They deviate
substantially from the roles and processes involved in traditional adjudication. In this section of the article, I have identified several characteristics of
public law remedial decisionmaking that explain this tendency to employ
nonadversarial, participatory mechanisms:
1. Because the relevant liability norms consist of generally articulated, aspirational norms to be implemented in differentiated contexts, they do not
6
dictate the content of the remedy in particular cases;'
2. The type of fact-finding needed to devise remedial judgments is predictive and aimed at problem solving rather than at determining truth and
7
responsibility; 1
3. The targets of remedial activity tend to be organizations and systems
involving participants with differing perspectives on, and interests in, the
remedy;" 18 and
4. Participation in the formulation of a remedy serves an independent
value because of the importance of cooperation and respect for the authority
of public entities in achieving compliance. "9
These characteristics help to explain the emergence of new forms of judicial process that challenge existing conceptions of the judicial role. They also
provide a set of criteria for determining the situations in which a distinct
normative theory of the judicial role is needed. For the reasons described in
this section, public remedial decisionmaking tends to satisfy each of these
criteria and is thus the focus of the normative theory developed in this
article.
I am not suggesting that every remedy in a public law case deviates from
the traditional model of judicial decisionmaking.1 20 Nor is the public law
remedial context unique in its tendency to exhibit these characteristics; bank(E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 1978) (consent decree), but is not enforceable in federal court against the Department of Public Welfare, which was not a party in that action.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
119. See supra text accompanying note 34.
120. For example, a statute may clearly and specifically delineate the standard of conduct required as well as the consequences of failing to comply. Similarly, the fact that the defendant is a
bureaucracy does not in and of itself require a distinct model of the judicial role. In some situations,
the remedy is clear, but the coercive force of the court is necessary to institutionalize it because of
the parties' unwillingness to implement it. There may be discrete violations, such as the use of strip
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ruptcy and certain other private law contexts share many of these characteristics.121

Determining the liability norm may also require the court to engage

in predictive fact-finding and to develop specific standards from general, ambiguous norms.1 22 These characteristics, however, tend to converge in the
public remedial context, prompting the proliferation of novel judicial forms
and processes. The current debate over the legitimacy of these novel forms
1 23
and processes focuses on public remedial decisionmaking.
II. BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE
LEGITIMACY DEBATE AND THE NORMS OF
PUBLIC REMEDIAL PROCESS

Although the innovative remedial techniques devised by courts in public
law litigation depart from conventional models of adversary litigation, the
legitimacy of the court's exercise of coercive power to eliminate ongoing public law violations rests on a solid jurisprudential foundation. The legitimacy
of these techniques derives from the widely accepted principle that rights
should find vindication in an effective remedy. 124 Damage awards and negative injunctions do not provide adequate relief in the context of much public
law litigation.1 2 5 In the absence of affirmative judicial intervention, the
wrongful conduct is likely to continue; and the injuries caused by ongoing
public law violations-intangible, dignitary harms and deprivation of public
1 26
norms--cannot adequately be redressed through monetary compensation.
cells in prison or the explicit assignment of students by race, that can be eliminated through a
negative injunction.
121. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 9; Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 647, 669 (1988).
122. See D. HOROWrrz, supra note 9, at 45-51; Diver, supra note 9, at 50-53. For a discussion of
the factors to be taken into account in assessing whether the model developed in this article should
be applied in determining liability, see infra text accompanying note 455.
123. See infra Part II.
124. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
163 (1803); Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1532, 1533-34 (1972); Ziegler, Rights Require Remedies. A New Approach to the Enforcement of
Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 665, 666-67 (1987).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 17-26.
126. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946); supra note 20 and accompanying text; cf Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 531-32 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring). In theory, damages awards could play an important role in reducing constitutional violations
by forcing officials to internalize the costs of their wrongful conduct and deterring illegal conduct
when the expected costs exceed the expected benefits. Cf G. CALAHRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-75 (1970); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 147-97 (3d ed. 1986). However, there are several factors limiting the potential of damages awards as a mechanism for reducing
ongoing public law violations. The injuries caused by public law violations frequently are intangible, symbolic, and difficult to measure. See Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law
Enforcement Officialv Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REv.

247, 284 (1988). Even when the resulting injuries are substantial, fact-finders tend to undervalue
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Thus, the need to fulfill the court's remedial duty justifies the use of struc127
tural injunctions to remedy public law violations.
The theory of remedial duty that supports the court's use of structural
injunctions is the foundation of the legitimate exercise of judicial power in
the public law remedial context. However, it leaves open the question of how
the court can legitimately develop such a remedy. The court's dynamic and
activist role in formulating public law remedies has triggered a heated debate
among academics, judges, and politicians concerning the proper role of the
court. Four major criticisms of the role of the courts have developed:
1. The courts' public remedial activities fail to conform to the standards of
28
legitimate judicial decisionmaking;1
2. The courts violate principles of federalism and separation of powers in
129
carrying out their public remedial function;
3. The courts are not competent to perform the role of public remedial
formulation;13 0 and

4. The courts are abusing their power and acting unfairly in the execution
of their public remedial function.13
Each of these areas of debate is based on identifiable norms of legitimate
judicial process that are widely accepted within both scholarly and judicial
discourse. These norms-participation, impartiality, reasoned decisionmakdamages suffered by many public interest plaintiffs. Id. Thus, payment of damages awards for
ongoing violations is likely to be viewed as considerably cheaper than efforts to achieve compliance
with legal norms. The immunity doctrine and indemnification practices further limit the deterrent
potential of damages awards. Officials are shielded by broad official immunity, and recent studies
indicate that "individual defendants virtually never pay damages to plaintiffs." Id.; see Eisenberg &
Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641, 686 (1987) (recent
study of all § 1983 cases in one federal district found no case in which the individual officer personally bore cost of adverse constitutional tort judgment).
127. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 392 (1986) (justifying the court's "unusual judicial trespass on administrative functions" by the "traditional view" that "judges have a duty to enforce
constitutional rights right up to the point at which enforcement ceases to be in the interests of those
the rights are supposed to protect"). Although the view presented here is the accepted wisdom, it is
not without challenge. For example, a recent report by the Office of Legal Policy advocates a return
to what it refers to as "the first principles" of the Anglo-American tradition of equity. Although
the report never specifies what this would mean, one can infer from its earlier, historical section that
such a return would limit courts to issuing negative injunctions against private persons. The authors of the report support their position by advocating an originalist interpretation of the Constitution. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW: A RECONSIDERATION OF THE "BROAD
EQUITABLE POWERS" OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 19-35, 41-46, 156-59 (1988) [hereinafter OFFICE
OF LEGAL POLICY]. Although a response to this argument would go beyond the scope of this
article, the argument highlights the need for a thorough analysis of the normative and doctrinal
underpinnings of the conventional wisdom concerning the duty to provide remedies for legal
violations.
128. See infra Part II.A.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 257-68.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 269-87.
131. See infra text accompanying notes 288-90.
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ing, respect for state and local institutions, and efficacy-reflect the qualities
generally viewed as essential to fair and legitimate judicial process. The debate is also based on a set of shared assumptions about the processes and
roles necessary to achieve these basic requirements of judicial legitimacy.
These shared assumptions are derived from the adversary model of decisionmaking used in making liability determinations. The debate's underlying assumption is that departures from the adversary prototype necessarily
compromise the legitimacy of the judicial process.
This section of the article draws on the various strands of the legitimacy
debate to parse out a coherent set of aorms that properly influence our judgments about the legitimacy of public remedial decisionmaking. At the same
time, the section identifies a gap in the existing legitimacy discourse: the
absence of a theory of public remedial process. Each of the four categories of
criticism fails to take into account the implications of public remedial decisionmaking's distinctive character for the significance and meaning of the
norms that define fair and legitimate remedial process. Each category also
ignores the possibility that structures and processes other than those prescribed by the traditional adversary model can satisfy basic legitimacy
norms.
This section attempts to fill this theoretical gap by rethinking the norms of
judicial legitimacy in light of the goals and demands of the public remedial
context. The section demonstrates how general process norms assume a particular meaning and dimension when applied to postliability decisionmaking
aimed at implementing general aspirational norms in complex organizational
environments. In addition to applying insights derived from observing public remedial practice, this analysis is informed by the developing body of
literature addressing the issue of process norms in contexts that overlap with,
or are analogous in important respects to, public remedial decisionmaking.
132
The most notable of these areas are public consensual dispute resolution
and regulatory negotiation.1 33 As in public remedial decisionmaking, these
132. This term refers to the resolution of controversies involving at least one governmental party
that concern the distribution of public resources, the setting of public priorities, or the setting of
standards through ad hoc, informal processes directly involving the stakeholders in attempting to
reach consensus. L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 17, 76-79; see also Susskind &
Ozawa, Mediated Negotiation in the Public Sector, 27 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 255, 255 (1983). It can,
although it need not, involve the determination of appropriate remedies in a case in which liability
has been established. It has been used to resolve public controversies over the allocation of social
services block grants, developing affordable housing, and situating waste disposal plants and group
homes. See L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra, note 92,passim. It is described in greater detail
in Part III.B.5.
133. "Regulatory negotiation" refers to negotiation among representatives of directly affected
parties, including administrative agencies, as an alternative procedure to the agency rulemaking
process. See Smith, Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution: Practices and Possibilitiesin the Federal Government, 1984 Mo. J. OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 9, 11-12; Harter, Negotiating Regulations:
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areas frequently involve disputes among multiple actors over the proper interpretation or application of public norms. The successful resolution of
these disputes often depends on developing standards and plans that will be
understood, accepted, and acted upon by interested individuals and groups.
Scholars and practitioners in these areas have begun to develop both normative theories and processes of collaborative decisionmaking to guide these
activities. 13
Another perspective that informs the development of a normative theory
of public remedial process derives from social psychologists who have studied perceptions of fairness in the resolution of disputes. 135 Finally, there are
general normative theories, such as civic republicanism 136 that emphasize
the link between process and outcome, and develop the theme of dialogue as
a critical aspect of this linkage. 137 These theories, however, have been developed at a level of abstraction that makes it possible to avoid grappling with
A Curefor Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 28 (1982); Perritt, NegotiatedRulemaking Before FederalAgencie" Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74
GEo. L.J. 1625, 1627 (1986); Susskind & McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 passim (1985).
There are several important differences between regulatory negotiation and public remedial decisionmaking. First, regulatory negotiation produces a rule, not a bottom line result. Enforcement is
a separate process. Second, in regulatory negotiation a policy is formulated without a prior adjudication of liability. Third, regulatory negotiation is supervised by an administrative agency charged
with effectuating public policy, rather than a court charged with eliminating legal violations. In
both contexts, however, the decisionmaker is structuring ad hoc processes to give meaning to vague
substantive norms, and the results of that process are subject to review by the court.
134. See, eg., R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN passim (1981); L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 16-34; Harter, supra
note 133, at 42-112; Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 760-61 (1984); Susskind & Weinstein, Towards a Theory of
Environmental Dispute Resolution, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311, 336-46 (1980).
135. See, e.g., E. LIND & T. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE passim (1988); J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSISpassim (1975); Levanthal, What Should be Done With Equity Theory? New Approaches to the Study of
Fairness in Social Relationships; in SOCIAL EXCHANGES: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH
27-55 (K. Gergen, M. Greenberg & D.R. Willis eds. 1980); Levanthal, Karuza, & Fry, Beyond
Fairness: A Theory of Allocation Preferences; in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 167-218 (G.
Mikura ed. 1980).
136. See.

eg.,

B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE

152 (1984); Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493, passim (1988); Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival 97 YALE L. J. 1539, 1548 (1988). This revival of civic republicanism has stimulated a critical response. See, e.g., Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 15911724 (1980); Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A PoliticalParty Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the
Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 passim (1988) [hereinafter Fitts, Vices of Virtue]; Fitts,
Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in PoliticalInstitutions, 88
MICH. L. REV. 917, 934-39, 966-81 (1990) [hereinafter Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss?].
137. See R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS 124-43 (1979); Spiegel, The New Model Rules
of Professional Conduct" Lawyer-Client Decision Making and the Role of Rules in Structuring the
Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1003, 1010-14; Tribe, StructuralDue Proces;
10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 303-10 (1975).
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the critical issues of implementation that arise in the public remedial context.
Moreover, these theories are distinguishable from public remedial decisionmaking in important respects, including their source of legitimacy. Nevertheless, the debate over the merits of theories such as civic republicanism is
instructive in developing a normative theory to guide a remedial process that
aspires to values of participation and reasoned decisionmaking.
Before turning to the legitimacy debate it is important to put to one side
the challenges to the court's remedial role that in actuality reflect dissatisfaction with the underlying substantive norms. At least some of the debate over
the court's proper remedial role is a thinly veiled attack on the prevailing
interpretation of the Constitution. 138 Although the scope of the liability
norm is at times controversial and bears profoundly on the scope of the remedial enterprise, this article focuses on the issues generated by the court's
public remedial role, and therefore assumes the legitimacy of the court's role
in finding constitutional violations.
A. THE PROCESS CRITIQUE: THE NORMS OF PARTICIPATION,
IMPARTIALITY, AND REASONED DECISIONMAKING

The process critique embodies the concern that public remedial decisionmaking necessarily departs from the norms of legitimate judicial process.
Two competing models frame the debate over the propriety of the court's
role in public remedial decisionmaking: the traditional or dispute resolution
model and the structural reform or public law model.' 39 These two models
are based on different conceptions of the social context and the purpose of
138. See, e.g., G. McDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 101-10 (1982) (challenging
Brown I); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 127, at 109-16, 132-35 (challenging a variety of
constitutional determinations leading to broad remedies). At least one commentator sympathetic to
the court's role in public law litigation has addressed the connection between a narrow conception
of constitutional entitlement and an effort to limit the court's remedial role. See Goldstein, A
Swann Songfor Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
57 (1978).
139. These two models are widely described in both the academic literature and casebooks as
framing the debate over the proper role of the courts in public law litigation. The literature generally cites Fuller as the exemplar of the dispute resolution model and Fiss and Chayes as the exemplars of the public law model. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS, THE ROLE OF
COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 83-94 (1984) [hereinafter COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS]; R.
FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE

280-81, 322-30 (6th ed. 1990); R. MARCUS, M. REDISH & E. SHERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A
MODERN APPROACH 16-17 (1989); M. MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, Ex-

CLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 357 (1990); 0. FISS & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 805-26 (2d
ed. 1984); Chayes, supra note 1, at 1282-83; Fiss, Two Models of Adjudication, in How DOES THE
CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS? 36 (R. Goldwin & W. Schambra eds. 1985) [hereinafter Fiss, Two
Models of Adjudication]; Diver, supra note 9, at 47; Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 9, at 474; Fiss,
supra note 1, at 18, 39-44; Mamlet, Reconsideration of Separation of Powers and the Bargaining
Game: Limiting the Policy Discretion of Judgesand Plaintiffs in InstitutionalSuits; 33 EMORY L.J.
685, 685-86 (1984); Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process; 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 937-38 (1975).
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adjudication, and draw opposite conclusions about the propriety of continued judicial involvement in developing and implementing public law
remedies.
Yet, these two apparently contradictory models of the judicial role share a
basic strength and limitation as a foundation for constructing a normative
theory of public remedial process. Both models provide the building blocks
for a theory of remedial process by identifying the norms of participation,
impartiality, and reasoned decisionmaking as integral to the assessment of
for the cenpublic remedial process, and by offering persuasive justifications
4
0
process.
judicial
legitimate
to
norms
tral importance of these
At the same time, the two models are limited by their commitment to the
adversary system as the only appropriate framework for defining "the roles
that should be played by advocates and by judge and jury in the decision of a
controversy."' 4' According to these models, the functions of the judge and
the advocates must be kept distinct. The judge is the decisionmaker, and
proceeds based on partisan presentations by surrogates arguing on behalf of
their clients. ' 42 To protect her objectivity and impartiality, the judge must be
excluded from any partisan role and reserve judgment until all of the facts
14 3
and arguments have been presented.
Both the dispute resolution and structural reform models fault public remedial practice for failing to conform to the roles and processes of the adversary system.' 44 Both of these models, however, evaluate the proper role of
the judiciary in relation to the processes designed to interpret and apply liability norms. Neither model provides for a theory of public remedial decisionmaking that grounds the norms of participation, impartiality, and
reasoned decisionmaking in the distinctive purpose, context, and values of
the public remedial process. The resulting insistence on an adversary process, and adherence to the principles and roles developed to structure that
process, lead both models to reject the possibility that public remedial practice can satisfy the norms of participation, impartiality, and reasoned
decisionmaking.
One response to the process critique of public remedial activity has been to
challenge its implicit assumption that courts generally adhere to the requirements of the adversary process. Commentators have persuasively argued
that the legal system employs "many detailed, coercive, and intrusive techniques ... to deal with intransigent litigants before, during, and after tradi140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See infra Part II.A.3.
Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34 (2d ed. 1971).
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 382 (1978).
Fuller, supra note 141, at 36-37; Resnik, supra note 36, at 380-81.
See supra notes 16-43 and accompanying text.
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tional litigation."1 45 Moreover, in a variety of other judicial contexts, such as
bankruptcy, probate and trusts, family law, administrative law, and sentencing, courts perform roles that deviate considerably from the traditional adversary ideal. 46 However, although this argument challenges a significant
aspect of the process critique-that the courts are doing something entirely
new-it does not meet the process critique on its own terms. That courts
deviate from the adversary model in a range of other contexts does not justify
such a departure in the public law context.1 47 Nor has there been any meaningful attempt to provide a normative theory of judicial process that justifies
the court's role in bankruptcy, sentencing, and pretrial process. 1 48 Thus, it is
important to address the legitimacy challenge posed by the process critique
of public remedial decisionmaking.
The process critique's concern regarding the departure of public remedial
practice from the roles and processes of the adversary system underlies all
four categories of legitimacy challenges. For this reason, considerable attention is devoted to the process critique. This section first summarizes the dispute resolution and structural reform critiques of public remedial practice. It
then exposes and analyzes the absence of a normative theory of remedial
process in either model. Finally, the section demonstrates that the process
critics' insistence on the adversary process as the only method of realizing
legitimacy norms is misplaced, and offers a conception of participation, impartiality, and reasoned decisionmaking grounded in the goals and demands
of public remedial decisionmaking.
1. An Overview of the Dispute Resolution and Structural
Reform Critiques
Lon Fuller provides the most coherent exposition of the dispute resolution
critique of public remedial decisionmaking. 149 Fuller's vision of adjudication
145. Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 8, at 475.
146. See id. at 481-86; COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS, supra note 139, at 40-44. The analogy to areas such as bankruptcy has significance not only as an example of courts' current performance of nontraditional roles, but also as a potential model for structuring public remedial
decisionmaking. See infra notes 317 & 402.
147. As Eisenberg and Yeazell point out, it does, however, raise the question of why the debate
has centered on the court's role in public law litigation. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 9, at

516.
148. See Resnick, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedures in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494,
546 (1986) ("The 'alternatives' to [the adjudicatory mode] have yet to articulate how we might
assess the legitimacy of the outcomes achieved."); Interview with Professor Frank Zimring (Sept.
10, 1990) (criminal law expert reports that sentencing scholarship is dominated by substance, and
that procedural jurisprudence of sentencing remains largely unexplored).
149. Fuller's work has been applied by both critics and proponents in the context of public law
litigation, and serves as the intellectual foundation for the dispute resolution critique. See, e.g., D.
HORowrrz, supra note 9, at 59; Diver, supra note 9,at 47; Eisenberg, Participation,Responsiveness,
and the Consultative Proces" An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV.410, 426-31 (1978); Fiss,
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is based on the traditional private dispute: two individuals have a dispute
that implicates the legal rights of one party and the legal responsibilities of
the other. 150 They turn to a neutral third party-the court-for "an authoritative determination of questions raised by claims of right and accusations of
guilt."' 5' According to Fuller, "the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of
participation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor."' 152 Although the judge may, and often
should, play an active role in assuring that the parties fully address the issues
raised by the dispute, her role remains limited to facilitating adversary presentation and issuing a binding ruling. 153 In Fuller's view, the legitimacy of
process or
the court's role in dispute resolution turns on whether a5 particular
4
participation.
party
destroys
or
enhances
issue
of
type
Fuller argues that polycentric problems-those involving "interacting
points of influence"' 55 requiring "spontaneous and informal collaboration,
shifting its forms with the task at hand,"1 56-are unsuited to resolution by
adjudication. 157 Although Fuller does not define polycentricity precisely, he
illustrates the term with examples: the division of valuable paintings be58 and the building of a strucqueathed to two museums in "equal shares,"'
tural steel bridge that requires consideration of the structure as a whole,
rather than angle by angle determinations. 59 No one disputes that public
remedial decisionmaking, with its multiple parties and complex character,
meets Fuller's characterization of polycentricity1 6° Although Fuller does
supra note 1, at 39-44; Fletcher, supra note 9, at 645-49 (1982); see also supra note 139. Fuller
himself never explicitly addressed the problems of public law litigation. This type of litigation and
the academic debate concerning its legitimacy came to fruition twenty years after Fuller first wrote
The Forms andLimits ofAdjudication. The application of his argument to public law litigation may
help explain the posthumous publication date of the piece.
150. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1285; Fiss, Two Models ofAdjudication, supra note 139, at 3738.
151. Fuller, supra note 142, at 368.
152. Id. at 364.
153. Proponents of the public law model frequently portray the dispute resolution model as insisting on a passive role for the judge. This does not accurately describe Fuller's position. See
Fuller, supra note 79, at 41. In fact, the issue of the appropriate degree of passivity for the judge
under the traditional adversary model is the subject of some dispute. Compare id. (judge may
intervene in a trial to ensure orderly resolution of issues) with Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1043 (1975) ("Within the confines of the adversary
framework, the trial judge probably serves best as a relatively passive moderator.").
154. See Fuller, supra note 79, at 41.
155. Fuller, supra note 142, at 395.
156. Id. at 371.
157. For a discussion of the reasons behind Fuller's view, see infra text accompanying notes 196
& 240-41.
158. Fuller, supra note 142, at 394.
159. Id. at 403.
160. See, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (describ-
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not argue that courts should never undertake polycentric problems,1 6 1 he
concludes that the inevitable departure from the form of participation characterizing traditional adjudication results in the forfeiture of the moral force
of the judicial role.1 62 Adherents to Fuller's model use this reasoning to
63
challenge the legitimacy of public remedial decisionmaking.
Fuller is properly credited with articulating an enduring justification for
the roles and processes of the adversary system. Yet, the adequacy of
Fuller's conception of adjudication as a framework for structuring and assessing the legitimacy of public law remedies is open to question. Fuller developed his theories with traditional private law litigation in mind. As Owen
Fiss has persuasively argued, Fuller's conception of adjudication is "rooted
in a world that no longer exists." 64

The structural reform model, 165 which Fiss advocates, 166 builds on the
perception that large-scale organizations, particularly government bureaucracies, define to a substantial degree our social existence, 167 and that the
victims of illegal social conditions can best be identified by their status within
an organization or their membership in a group.1 68 To insist on a model of
adjudication that ignores these social realities leaves individuals at the mercy
of large-scale organizations and thus deprives them of their constitutional
rights-ostensibly in the interest of protecting the individual's right to participate formally in adjudication. 169
ing problem of constructing desegregation plan as polycentric); Fiss, supra note 1, at 41 ("The
reconstruction of a prison, or for that matter the reconstruction of a school system, a welfare
agency, a hospital, or any bureaucracy, is as polycentric as the construction of a bridge."); Fletcher,
supra note 9, at 645-47 (using prison reform and school system resource allocation as examples of
polycentric problems).
161. See Fuller, supra note 79, at 34 (court intervention in polycentric problems may be warranted in some cases, such as when there is clear constitutional direction to do so).
162. See infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
163. Fletcher argues for the presumptive illegitimacy of judicial intervention in the public remedial context that may be overcome "when there is a structural defect in the political process as a
whole" and a political body is "in such serious or chronic default that it clearly cannot or will not
remedy that violation itself." Fletcher, supra note 9, at 693. Given that this requirement of institutional failure is also imposed by current interpretations of constitutional norms, I question whether
Fletcher's presumption places any additional limits on the court's remedial role.
164. Fiss, supra note 1, at 44.
165. Scholars writing in the public law tradition use different terms to describe the counterpoint
to the private law or traditional model. Chayes uses the term "public law litigation," Fiss uses
"structural reform litigation," and others use "institutional reform litigation." Although Chayes
presents the attributes of the public law model in his classic article, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, supra note 1, at 1288-1304, Owen Fiss is unique in his effort to propose a normative
theory of the judicial role that justifies the structural reform model of adjudication. See Fiss, supra
note 1, at 17-44.
166. Fiss, supra note 1,passin.
167. Id. at 18.
168. Id. at 19.
169. Id. at 43.

1991]

PUBLIC LAW REMEDIES

1387

Fuller's conception of adjudication also fails to account for the increasing
significance of the court's role in enforcing constitutional and statutory
norms. Here, as well as in the common law context, the courts frequently
address polycentric problems.170 Fuller's view of the limits of adjudication
renders illegitimate much of what courts do today. According to Fiss,
Fuller's view excludes the court's crucial adjudicative function: "to give
meaning to constitutional values in the operation of large-scale organizations."1 71 Fiss bases the judiciary's unique capacity to perform this role on
judge's obligation to participate in a
two aspects of the judicial office: "the
17 2
dialogue... and his independence."
Thus, the structural reform model offers a powerful critique of the dispute
resolution model and presents a normative theory intended to address and
give legitimacy to the court's role in public law litigation. However, as Fiss
acknowledges, the remedial stage also poses a thorny problem for the structural reform model, which he never adequately resolves. Fiss recognizes that
the remedial stage is a substantial component of the court's involvement in
structural reform and is responsible in large part for the procedural transformation he is attempting to justify.1 73 He also views the court's role in actualizing rights as necessary to "the integrity of the meaning-giving enterprise
itself." 74 For Fiss, however, the remedial stage necessarily threatens the
characteristics of dialogue and independence that justify the court's role as
interpreter of public values. 17 5 Although Fiss and Fuller draw opposite conclusions concerning the appropriateness of continued judicial involvement in
public remedial decisionmaking, they share many of the same concerns about
the dangers of the court's departure from the adversary model.

170. Id.; see also Eisenberg, supra note 149, at 424 ("[Mjany legal problems seem nonpolycentric
only because the common law solves them by treating as irrelevant a number of circumstances and
ramifications that might be considered perfectly relevant at other times or places.").
171. Fiss, supra note 1, at 5.
172. Id. at 13.
173. Id. at 46.
174. Id. at 53; see also id. at 52 ("A constitutional value such as equality derives its meaning from
both spheres, declaration and actualization, and it is this tight connection between meaning and
remedy, not just tradition, that requires a unity of functions.").
175. See id. at 53-57; Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 761-62 (1982)
[hereinafter Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation]. Fiss expresses concern over the threat to judicial
independence posed by judges' direct involvement in developing the remedy. He identifies additional problems stemming from judges' attempts to minimize their involvement in remedial decisionmaking by delegating authority to third parties or inducing the parties to settle. Fiss criticizes
these approaches for inappropriately removing judges' responsibility for interpreting and actualizing public norms. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 56-57; Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073,
1082, 1085 (1984) [hereinafter Fiss, Against Settlement]; Fiss, The Bureaucratizationof the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1456-57 (1983) [hereinafter Fiss, Bureaucratization].
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2. The Absence of a Jurisprudence of Remedial Process
Fuller does not directly address the court's remedial role and the extent to
which that role departs from his normative framework. Indeed, Fuller does
not even consider the implications of his theory for the court's role in equity
cases.1 76 The absence of a theory of remedial process in Fuller's work is most
likely attributable to the close conceptual linkage between right and remedy
that typifies the private law conception of adjudication. Because the remedy
is thought to flow ineluctably from the right, 77 or to be dictated by the same
purposes and processes, there is no need to develop a distinct theory of remedial process. One view generating the expectation of a close conceptual link
between right and remedy treats rights as linked definitionally and logically
to remedies. The linkage runs in both directions. Rights are simply an abbreviation for the connection between a set of conditioning facts and their
operative consequences.17 Or, as Holmes put it, "[tjhe duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you
do not keep it, -and nothing else."' 79 Reciprocally, the remedy follows logically and inexorably from the substantive right. The right or interest is defined to consist of a particular injury, and the remedy consists of redressing
that injury. 1 0 The common law writ system illustrates the close linkage between right and remedy. Under this system, "each writ, in principle, gave
rise to its own unique remedy. The pleader's claim was only a claim of a
18 1
right to a particular remedy."
176. The only reference to equity in The Forms and Limits of Adjudication is a passing reference
to Langdell's observation that there are no rights at equity because courts of equity proceed by
discretion. Fuller, supra note 142, at 370. Fuller does not follow through with the logical implications of his argument, namely, that equity courts act illegitimately. Similarly, in Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator,Fuller simply asserts, without elaboration, that courts perform functions that
are not "adjudicative in the usual sense of the word, as in supervising equity receiverships." Fuller,
supra note 79, at 34.
177. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1293-94.
178. See H. KELSON, A GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 61 (1945) ("If it is assumed
that the first norm which forbids theft is valid only if the second norm attaches a sanction to theft,
then the first norm is certainly superfluous in an exact exposition of law. If at all existent, the first
norm is contained in the second, which is the only genuine legal norm."); Ross, Tu-tu, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 812, 825 (1957) ("The concept of rights is a tool for the technique of presentation serving
exclusively systematic ends, and . . . in itself it means [nothing]."). This view of the instrumental
character of rights is shared by some modern lawyers. See Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a
Dispute: Conceptions of the Ideal Lawsuit Structurefrom the Field Code to the FederalRules, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1989) ("Mhe terms right and remedy are just handy conventions for
describing the form of protection that a court will provide to someone whose interests have been
harmed.").
179. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
180. See Chayes, Rights and Remedies in Public Law Litigation, at 4 (unpublished manuscript
on file at The Georgetown Law Journal) ("In the usual analysis, the right or interest invaded and the
appropriate compensatory payment are tightly interlocked and mutually defining.").
181. Id.
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A second view that closely links rights and remedies, which Fuller appears
to have embraced, 8 2 adopts a functional approach, consonant with the
teachings of the legal realists. 8 3 Under this view, the same policies and nor84
The court's
mative principles apply in determining rights and remedies.'
purposes
competing
role in the traditional remedial context is to assess these
and develop rules governing the assessment of damages, to be applied by the
jury. The same processes govern the adoption of the right and the remedy.
Thus, under both the logical and the functional conception of the right-remedy linkage, there is no need to develop a distinct theory of remedial
85
process. 1
right
Structural reform theorists challenge the notion of a tight fit between
1 6 These
litigation.
law
public
and remedy, particularly in the context of
theorists recognize that the characteristics of public remedial decisionmaking
the violation. 87
preclude the possibility of deducing the remedy solely from
Fiss does, however, acknowledge a loose connection between right and rem182. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46
52 (1936), 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937).

183. See L. KALMAN,

LEGAL REALISM AT YALE

YALE

L.J.

1927-1960 29-30 (1986) (describing legal real-

ists' functional approach as a shift in focus from legal rules to factual contexts).
184. Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed illustrate this approach to the relationship between
right and remedy in their classic article Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1089-98 (1972). They argue that considerations of
the
efficiency and distribution of wealth govern both the establishment of initial entitlements and
selection of the appropriate form of remedy. Id. at 1093-1105. Paul Gewirtz also seems to adopt
this view of the relationship of rights and remedies in Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585,
and
676-77 (1983) (arguing that considerations of practicalities, compromise, and strategy do
remedies).
as
well
as
rights
of
determination
the
govern
should
185. The Supreme Court has reasserted this close, formalistic linkage in some of its public law
not
jurisprudence. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (petitioner did
a
show
not
could
he
when
hold"
"choke
of
use
have standing to seek injunction against police
U.S.
418
Bradley,
v.
Milliken
future);
the
in
hold"
"choke
of
a
victim
be
would
he
that
likelihood
717, 745 (1974) (federal court may not impose multidistrict remedy for school segregation where de
jure segregation practiced in only one district); see also Chayes, supra note 180, at 47 ("Justice
Rehnquist has mounted a serious effort to reimpose the right-remedy linkage as a way of limiting
the power of judges.... [P]reoccupation with the right-remedy analysis has prevented the Court
from developing any other basis for effective supervision of the remedial discretion of trial courts.");
a
Goldstein, supra note 138, at 53-57 (identifying the apparent reassertion by the Supreme Court of
has
Court
The
remedy).
and
right
between
relationship
private law model adopting a formalistic
not consistently followed the private law model, however, and has approved injunctions that reflect
v.
only a loose, instrumental relationship with the underlying liability norm. See, e.g., Missouri
Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1663-66 (1990) (district court may require school district to levy taxes in
excess of state law limit in order to fund school desegregation plan); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
685-88 (1978) (district court may impose a 30-day limit on punitive confinement as proper remedy
for eighth amendment violations in Arkansas prisons); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 286-88
(1977) (district court may remedy past discrimination by adopting special education and remedial
programs). In many public law areas, the Court has spoken infrequently on the issue of the appropriate substantive or procedural standards governing the remedy.
186. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 47; Chayes, supra note 1, at 1293-94.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
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edy, noting that the violation of a constitutional or statutory norm "identifies
occasions for a strong independent use of judicial power,"188 and describes
the object of the remedy "in a prospective, dynamic and systemic sense."' 18 9
For Fiss, the relationship of right to remedy is instrumental:
First, the remedy exists for and is determined by some finite purpose, protecting the constitutional value threatened; second, the remedy actually
chosen is one among many ways of achieving that purpose; and third,
the remedy incorporates considerations that might not be rooted in any
direct and obvious way in the constitutional value that occasions the
intervention. 190
Given his recognition of the inadequacy of the liability norm as the determinant of the terms of structural injunctions, Fiss is confronted with the
issue of how the judge is to develop an appropriate remedy. On this issue,
however, Fiss' vision is blocked by the liability model of judicial process.
Fiss fails to extend his insights concerning the substantive relationship of
right and remedy in public law litigation to the processes of remedial formulation in these cases. His discussion of the range of possible judicial roles and
structures assumes that the judge or her delegate must unilaterally frame the
remedy through active involvement in the target institution, and that courts
which rely on party agreement as a substitute for judicial decision abdicate
their essential interpretive role.' 9 1 Fiss laments the fact that the judge's formulation of the remedy requires making instrumental judgments that bear no
connection to "the core processes of adjudication."' 19 2 This view ignores the
richness of recent procedural innovations in public remedial decisionmaking.' 93 More importantly, Fiss fails to explore the possibility that the values
he considers central to the court's special claim to competence-reasoned
dialogue and judicial independence-may be preserved through a reconceptualization of judicial role and process at the remedial stage of public law
litigation.
3. Process Norms in the Public Remedial Context
Three shared norms of judicial legitimacy underlie both the dispute resolution model and the structural reform model: (1) the preservation of party or
interest participation; (2) the maintenance of judicial independence and impartiality; and (3) the reliance on reasoned decisionmaking.
188. Fiss, supra note 1, at 9 (emphasis in original).
189. Id. at 47-48.

190. Id. at 50.
191. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 175, at 1085.
192. Fiss, supra note 1, at 52.
193. See supra Part I.B.
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a. Participation. Both Fuller and Fiss identify participation as central to
legitimate judicial process.1 94 The parties must have an opportunity to address the decisionmaker and offer proofs and arguments concerning the relevant issues.1 95 Fuller's work in particular raises the concern that public
remedial practice violates this participation norm. In Fuller's view, because
of the polycentric nature of remedial problems, "it is simply impossible to
afford each affected party a meaningful participation through proofs and arguments."' 96 Both Fuller and Fiss view formal adjudication as necessary to
preserve the value of participation.
The process critics' insight concerning the importance of participation to
judicial legitimacy is widely shared by legal scholars and supported by the
97 Fuller and Fiss
work of social psychologists and other dialogic theorists.
do not, however, consider how the participation norm can best be realized in
the public remedial context. The next step in building a normative theory of
public remedial process is grounding the participation value in the goals and
demands of the public remedial context.
The process critics' insistence on conformity to the formal adversary
model rests on a theory of the value of participation. Within the traditional
adjudicatory framework, participation serves two basic values. First, it re194. See supra note 152 and accompanying text; Fiss supra note 1, at 42. The importance of
participation to judicial legitimacy is widely acknowledged in the legal literature. See, e.g., Rhode,
supra note 29, at 1198; Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be Heard: The Significance of Old
Friends, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449, 451 (1974); Summers, Evaluatingand Improving Legal
Processes--A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORN. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1974).
195. Fuller notes that meaningful participation presupposes dialogue with and response by the
judge, and argues in favor of judicial intervention as a means of enhancing the parties' capacity to
participate meaningfully. See Fuller, supra note 142, at 41. Eisenberg identifies three norms that
emerge from Fuller's Forms and Limits, and shows that these norms do not all proceed from
Fuller's participation thesis, but instead assume an independent norm of "strong responsiveness."
Eisenberg, supra note 149, at 411-12.
Eisenberg's expanded view of participation comports with Fiss' concept of dialogue. Judges must
"listen to a broad range of persons or spokesmen" and "are compelled to speak back, to respond to
Judges must also justify their decisions." Fiss, supra note 1, at 13.
the grievance or the claim ....
Although Fiss contests Fuller's insistence on individual participation, he embraces the significance
of interest participation in promoting dialogue and reasoned decisionmaking. Id. at 42.
196. Fuller, supra note 142, at 394-95. Fuller's basis for this conclusion does not rest solely on
the "huge number of possibly affected parties," although that feature concerns him. "A more fundamental point is that [each possible solution] would have a different set of repercussions and might
require in each instance a redefinition of the parties affected." Id. at 395. Traditional adjudication
provides no mechanism for performing this function.
Fiss agrees that individual participation is seriously compromised by class representation in a
structural suit. Fiss, supra note 1, at 40-41. For Fiss, the value underlying Fuller's insistence on
individual participation is adequately served "through the arguments of the spokesmen for all the
interests represented and through the decision of the judge." Id. at 42. This response, however,
does not address Fuller's concern that the adversary form of presentation does not easily accommodate problems with "interacting points of influence." Fuller, supra note 142, at 395.
197. See supra note 194; infra text accompanying notes 198-205.
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spects the dignity of the individual by affording those "affected by the decisions which emerge from social processes . . . [a] formally guaranteed
opportunity to affect those decisions."' 198 The opportunity to introduce information and arguments, to have one's perspective heard, underlies this
value and enhances the perceived fairness of the decisionmaking process. 199
Second, participation serves the instrumental value of enhancing the prospect of a reasoned and accurate decision. 20 0 The adversary model emphasizes the importance of indirect participation through professional advocates
to achieve this goal. Lawyers possess the expertise in the technical rules necessary to conduct discovery, frame legal arguments, and narrow the issues
20 1
before the court.
The values of individual dignity and accurate decisionmaking both relate
to the court's function of determining rights and liabilities. The adversary
concept and structure of participation fails, however, to accommodate the
goals and demands of public remedial practice. At the remedial stage, with
its focus on institutionalizing the liability decision, participation also serves
broader values. Unlike the court's role in adjudicating liability or assessing
198. Fuller, supra note 79, at 19; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 364-65 (1970) (participation "foster[s] the dignity and well-being of all persons"); Rubenstein, ProceduralDue Process
and the Limits of the Adversary System, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 48, 48 (1976) (adversarial
participation lends legitimacy to justice system). In Formaland AssociationalAims in Due Process,
in DUE PRocEss: NoMos 18 127-28 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977) [hereinafter Formaland
Associational Aims], Michelman incorporates dignity values into participation: "to have played a
part in, to have made one's apt contribution to, decisions which are about oneself may be counted as
important." Michelman links the value of participation and revelation to informal processes, however. In The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights, 1973
DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172-73, Frank Michelman treats dignity values separately, and identifies both
dignity and participation values to be served by litigation. This apparent inconsistency may be
explained by Michelman's use of a broader, more psychologically linked conception of participation
in Formal and AssociationalAims.
199. See E. LIND & T. TYLER, supra note 135, at 4-5 (research shows that "people usually feel
more fairly treated when they have had an opportunity to express their point of view about their
situation."); Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 487, 526 (1980)
("Theorists maintain that when a party is intimately involved in the adjudicatory process... he is
more likely to accept the result whether favorable or not."); Subrin & Dykstra, supra note 194, at
454-57 (noting the dignity values served by the right to be heard).
200. Fiss, supra note 1, at 42; Fuller, supra note 1, at 366-67; Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due
Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search
of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 28-30, 46-59 (1976); Subrin & Dykstra, supra note
194, at 452. Justice Frankfurter identified these two values in the oft-quoted statement from his
concurrence in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951):
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and the opportunity to meet it. Nor has
a better way been found for generating the feeling, so important to a popular government,
that justice has been done.
Id. at 171-72 (Frankfurter, J.,concurring).
201. Fuller, supra note 142, at 383-84; Landsman, supra note 199, at 495-96.
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damages, its role in implementing a public law remedy depends upon the
cooperation of the actors who must live with it.202 Participation in the formulation of the remedy serves the instrumental goal of increasing the likelipromoting a higher level of acceptance
hood that the remedy will succeed by
20 3
of and commitment to the remedy.
Participation at the remedial stage also serves an integrative function by
2 4
defining the community that is responsible for implementing the remedy. 0
Participation charges them with a common goal: the development of a plan
to eliminate ongoing illegal conditions and practices. The process of involvement serves the value of identifying the group of parties responsible for a
particular social problem and involving those parties in the problem solving
enterprise. 20 5
The instrumental value of producing better substantive outcomes is also
served by participation at the remedial stage, but the dynamics of realizint
this value differ from those at the liability stage. The goal of the remedial
stage is not to determine where fault lies, but rather to develop a plan that
fairly and effectively realizes the substantive norm. This process often requires taking account of and integrating differing perspectives on the causes
of the problem and the impact and feasibility of proposed solutions. The
various actors often possess different information and perspectives that influence their views of the practicability and fairness of a remedy.2 06 Participation affords an opportunity to obtain and synthesize these varying
perspectives and insights, and thus to shape the views of both the partici202. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
203. See C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY 33 (1970); L. SUSSKIND & J.
CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 27; J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, supra note 135, at 94; Elmore,
Organizational Models of Social Program Implementation, 26 PuB. POL. 185, 215, (1978); Kirp &
Babcock, supra note 25, at 329.
204. See C. PATEMAN, supra note 203, at 33 (discussing integrative function of participation).
205. For example, the process of developing a remedy for prison overcrowding often involves
actors such as the governor, prosecutors, legislators, and sentencing judges who might otherwise
disclaim responsibility for addressing prison conditions.
206. Curtis Berger offers a vivid example of this phenomenon that arose in the development of
the Coney Island desegregation plan. Through consultation with black parents, Berger learned of
their concern that integration would lead to the brutalization of minority youngsters in public
schools. Berger notes:
This is one of the ironies about integration of which few whites seem aware. Too many
assume that blacks welcome the chance to attend all-white schools and to reside in allwhite neighborhoods and that those blacks who break the color barrier gain only benefit in
doing so. We do not see the sacrifice involved in leaving congenial neighbors or the emotional trial that often accompanies minority status. In the name of racial desegregation
whites expect blacks to accept permanent minority status; yet few whites are willing to
accept that same status for themselves or their children.... Social scientists may easily
explain this white man's double standard, but it took this session [with black parents] to
force me to see it through the black man's eyes.
Berger, supra note 30, at 718.
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pants and the court. 207
Participation also serves an educative function at the remedial stage.20 8
Involvement in remedial formulation educates those responsible for implementing institutional reform about obstacles and potential solutions to
problems. 20 9 Participation also educates the plaintiffs about the workings of
complex institutions and the skills and approaches necessary to effectuate
210
change in such institutions.
Finally, the autonomy and dignity values served by participation at the
remedial stage may be broader than at the liability stage. The direct, informal, and collaborative nature of remedial participation serves the values of
promoting the self-respect and autonomy of the participants. 2 11 Participation in the remedial process assumes a particularly significant role in situations involving public institutions because self-determination and
2 12
institutional autonomy are independently valued in those contexts.
The adversary model is ill-suited to serve the participation values that are
so important at the remedial stage. The type of party participation contemplated by the adversary model-indirect and formal submissions through
counsel-is not designed to promote either effective communication and acceptance of legal norms or identification with the remedial enterprise. In
fact, adversary participation tends to produce the opposite effect: hostility
and resistance. 2 13 Lawyers' control over the process tends to detract from
207. This emphasis on shaping views and preferences is in contrast to the bargaining model,
which seeks only to maximize preferences. See infra text accompanying notes 327-29.
208. Cf B. BARBER, supra note 136, at 152 (noting that "civic activity educates individuals how
to think publicly as citizens").
209. See Sturm, supra note 26, at 878.
210. See White, Mobilization at the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak
16 REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 540 (1987-88).
211. Cf. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims, supra note 198, at 127-28 (dignity values
served by participation in decisionmaking process).
212. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1663 (1990) ("[One of the most important
considerations governing the exercise of equitable power is a proper respect for the integrity and
function of local government institutions."); supra note 34 and accompanying text.
213. See B. BARBER, supra note 136, at 175 ("speech in adversary systems is a form of aggression, simply one more variety of power"); Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 660 (1976) ("The prospect of subjection
to [an adverse] judgment, coupled with the lack of control over the process leading up to the judgment, tends both to generate a state of tension and to drive the disputants irreconcilably apart,
whatever the outcome."); Felstiner, Influences of Social Organizationon Dispute Processing,9 LAW
& Soc'y REV. 63, 70-71 (1974) (adversarial adjudication's focus on disputant's behavior may alienate losers); Harter, supra note 133, at 19-22 (noting propensity of adversary system to drive parties
to extreme positions); Landsman, supra note 199, at 529 ("Adversary procedure may exacerbate
rather than resolve tensions and may not foster the kind of compromise essential to the restoration
of harmony."); Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 134, at 319-21 ("the adversary system introduces
an unfortunate 'gaming' aspect to the judicial process that discourages the search for 'win-win'
solutions to a dispute").

1991]

PUBLIC LAW REMEDIES

1395

the client's sense of autonomy and responsibility. 214 Similarly, the stylized
interaction and win-lose character of the adversary process prevents the exchange and integration of multiple perspectives necessary to produce effective and fair remedial decisions. 21 5 Dialogue mediated exclusively through
lawyers dilutes, and in some instances prevents, the sharing and challenging
of perspectives by those who must live with the remedial outcome. Lawyers
cannot help but filter the discussion through the lens of their own perspecpronounced when the lawyer's intive. 216 This phenomenon is particularly
21 7
client.
the
of
those
with
terests clash
Exclusive reliance on lawyers to communicate among the parties and the
court is unnecessary at the remedial stage. The principles and considerations
likely to govern the determination of the remedy do not derive solely from
legal norms and argumentation. The parties' perspectives are likely to bear
directly on the workability and appropriateness of a particular remedial approach. The adversary mode of fact-finding, largely controlled by lawyers
through discovery, is not structured to produce the comprehensive, prospective factual record necessary for remedial decisionmaking. 218
A fair assessment of the capacity of public remedial practice to preserve
participation requires that the criteria of meaningful participation be recast
to reflect the broader remedial values of promoting cooperation; defining,
214. S. OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS, SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS 140
(1984) ("norms of legal advocacy inhibit client autonomy and responsibility by imposing the authority of a supposedly neutral expert on the client"); Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative
Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U.L. REV. 213, 215 n.3 (1990)
("in practice the attorney often shapes the litigation without much input from her client"); Hensler,
Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 92-97 (tort plaintiffs in
survey perceived a lack of communication with their lawyers and little personal control over their

law suits).
215. Cf. B. BARBER, supra note 136, at 179, 193; Aubert, Competition and Dissensus: Two Types
of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 7 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26, 32-36 (1963); Pruitt & Lewis,
The Psychology of Integrative Bargaining in NEGOTIATIONS: SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 181 (D. Druckman ed. 1977).
216. See Eisenberg, supra note 213, at 658-60 (lawyers in litigation tend to impose structure on a
lawsuit according to their understanding of adjudication, as opposed to through direct negotiation
in which the parties' understanding controls the progress of dispute resolution).
217. See, e.g., D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 106-16 (1974) (discussing conflicts of interest between attorney and client in large, lengthy suits); Mnookin, The Paradox of Child Advocacy, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN, supra note 44, at 51-55 (discussing
conflicts of interest between attorney and client when client is a child); Bell, Serving Two Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 482-93
(1976) (detailing conflicts of interest between civil rights bar and parents in desegregation cases);
Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 15, 28-31 (1967) (discussing general conflicts of interest between attorneys and
clients); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L.
REV. 29, 41 (same); Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION
52, 69-70 (1971) (same).
218. See D. HOROWITZ, supra note 9, at 45-51; Kirp & Babcock, supra note 25, at 320.
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integrating, and educating a community of responsible participants; facilitating the exchange and synthesis of competing perspectives; and preserving
autonomy and dignity. 219 Such an assessment must also take into account
the characteristics of public law litigation that affect the potential to realize
these broader participation values. In the public law context, participation is
important not only to the parties, but also to the range of individuals and
groups responsible for or in a position to disrupt implementation. 220 Consequently, the identity and diversity of participants assumes significance in a
normative theory of remedial process. 221 Moreover, because the relevant actors in this context frequently are groups or organizations, a theory of remedial participation must address the issue of how members of those
organizations or groups select representatives to articulate their interests and
perspectives, and how those representatives are held accountable to the con222
stituencies they represent.
Finally, participation can aid the various stakeholders in the public remedial process who lack the capacity to participate effectively in public remedial
decisionmaking. The plaintiffs frequently are poor, politically powerless, and
223
unorganized, and thus may be less able to influence the remedial decision.
Yet, the values served by participation at the remedial stage depend on some
direct involvement by those who must live with the results. An important
criteria of remedial participation, therefore, is the capacity of a particular
form of remedial practice to control for unequal power, resources, and
sophistication.
This reformulation of the concept and structure of participation in the
public remedial context expands our conception of the structures and
processes that are best suited to achieve meaningful participation, and
changes our assessment of the capacity of public remedial practice to con224
form to norms of judicial legitimacy.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 201-12.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
221. Cf L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 103 (discussing the importance of

diverse participation in resolving public disputes); Perritt, supra note 133, at 1637 (same).
222. Cf L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 101 (emphasizing the importance of

representatives' accountability to the legitimacy and effectiveness of public consensual dispute resolution); Hater, supra note 133, at 54-55 (same).
223. See White, Subordination, Rhetorical Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of
Mrs. G., 38 BUFFALO L. REv. 1, 4 (1990) (discussing conditions that undermine "the capacity of
many persons in our society to use the procedural rituals that are formally available to them."); cf
Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE L. J. 1651,
1660-61 (1988) (arguing that the poor are less likely to understand or participate fully in the debates
of social elites). The psychological literature on group process supports the conclusion that educational level is likely to affect the level and degree of participation in a diverse group. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 137-38 (1983) (noting that less educated

jurors participated less in jury deliberations).
224. See infra Part IV.B.
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b. Impartialityand Independence. Impartiality and independence are basic
norms of legitimacy under both the dispute resolution and structural reform
models of the judicial role. Both models require the judge's detachment and
distance from the participants in the controversy to ensure judicial impartiality and independence. 225 The models assume that the goal of adjudication is
to discover truth, and that the judge can best discover truth through
noninvolvement. 226 The requirement of impartiality follows, from Fuller's
participation thesis. If the judge is biased or interested, she will not properly
assess and respond to the parties' arguments and proofs. 227 Fiss adds the
concern that involvement will generate personal preferences and political
pressures that will compromise the judge's capacity to decide issues based on
228
principles and reason.

The dispute resolution and structural reform models both view the informality and interaction that characterizes the remedial process as a threat to
the court's impartiality and independence. For Fuller, active involvement by
the court in fact-finding and in the exploration of remedial solutions is likely
to lead to "premature cataloguing" that commits the decisionmaker to a set
perspective and filters all of the proofs and arguments accordingly. 229 This
preconception of the case on the part of the decisionmaker limits the effectiveness of the parties' participation because the decision flows not from the
parties' input but rather from the decisionmaker's preconceived theory of the
case.
For Fiss, the public law remedial process poses a threat to the ideal of
judicial independence because:
[t]he desire to be efficacious leads the judge to attempt the remarkable feat
of reconstructing a state bureaucracy ...and that ambition in turn forces
the judge to abandon his position of independence and to enter the world of
politics.

2 30

During the remedial process, the judge becomes involved in a network of
relationships and "is likely to lose much of his distance from the organization.

' 23 1

Fiss views this process of identification by the judge with the parties

225. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 14; Fuller, supra note 142, at 382-91; see also Resnik, supra note
36, at 376, 384, 445 (describing and embracing distance, disengagement, and detachment as the
appropriate model of judicial impartiality). In a subsequent article, Judith Resnik describes the
tensions between formal expectations and judicial practice regarding impartiality, and employs feminist methodology to question both the possibility and desirability of disengagement and detachment as the path toward fair and good judging. See Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations
of the Aspirationsfor our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988).
226. See Fiss, supra note 1,at 9; Fuller, supra note 142, at 366-67.
227. See Fuller supra note 142, at 365.
228. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 14.
229. See Fuller, supra note 142, at 386.
230. Fiss, supra note 1,at 46.
231. Id. at 53.
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as threatening to the ideal of judicial independence. The judge's dependence
on the cooperation of the parties for the practical success of the remedy leads
her to compromise the objective of the remedial process by "tailor[ing] the
232
right to fit the remedy."
Scholars and judges have questioned the adversary model's assumption
that judicial detachment and noninvolvement best serves the truth-seeking
function of adjudication. 233 Moreover, at the remedial stage, the assumptions that traditionally underlie the insistence on adversary process to preserve impartiality do not apply. The adversary model assumes that the
judge's role is to produce a binding decision that correctly interprets and
applies the law. This assumption does not apply to either the goal or the
structure of the decisionmaking process in the public law remedial context.
The court has defined the governing norms and determined the defendants'
failure to follow them prior to the remedial stage. Instead of truth seeking,
the goal in the remedial stage is to institutionalize these norms, a process that
properly-indeed, necessarily-presupposes a perspective concerning the
propriety of defendants' conduct.
If truth seeking is not the goal of remedial decisionmaking, what is left of
the process critique's concern that impartiality and independence will be
compromised? The concern about bias in the determination of retrospective
facts is unwarranted at the remedial stage. There remains at this stage, however, Fiss' concern that the judge will be biased in assessing an appropriate
solution-that she will favor (or be perceived to favor) the views of a particu234
lar party, or take into account her own interests, in structuring a remedy.
The potential for unfairness resulting from biased decisionmaking continues
to play a significant role at the remedial stage. Thus, the impartiality value
identified by the process critics remains operative in a theory of public remedial practice, albeit in a narrower form.
Fiss' response to the potential for bias in remedial decisionmaking is to
throw up his hands and admit conceptual defeat. 235 This response ignores
232. Id. at 54-55. Fuller shared Fiss' concern that a court engaged in informal activity "may
reformulate the problem so as to make it amenable to solution through adjudicative procedures."
Fuller, supra note 142, at 401. Fuller located the cause of this compromise in the polycentricity of
the problem at issue, rather than the court's dependency on others to achieve remedial success. Id.
at 394-404; cf Fletcher, supra note 9, at 658 ("The right of the legally protected party may be
vulnerable to modification or even redefinition because of the court's solicitude for the interests of
those who are not legally protected.").

233. See, e.g., G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 120-36 (1978); E. LIND & T.
supra note 135, at 25; Damaska, supra note 37, at 581-82; Frankel, supra note 153, at 105254; Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term: Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10,
45-46, 74 (1987); Resnik, supra note 225, at 1905, 1933-40.
234. Fiss, supra note 1, at 55; Fiss, Bureaucratization,supra note 175, at 1463.
235. Fiss resorts to an argument of necessity to justify the judicial role in remedial practice; the
judge must continue to assume responsibility for implementing constitutional norms "as a way of
TYLER,
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the possibility and desirability of procedural innovation as a means of preserving impartiality in the remedial context. What is missing from Fiss'
analysis is a recognition that impartiality may be achieved through processes
other than those contemplated by the traditional adversary model. Contrary
to Fiss' assumption, 236 the judge need not choose between developing a remedy based on her political perceptions of what will work and delegating the
task of structuring a remedy to a special master.
The goals of the remedial stage suggest the appropriateness of a more interactive division of function among the court, the parties, and the lawyers in
public remedial decisionmaking. Unlike the liability determination, which is
viewed as uniquely the province of the judge (or jury), responsibility for remedial decisionmaking may best be shared between the judge and the parties.2 37 By expanding our vision of possible remedial structures and roles, it
is possible to allocate responsibility for developing the remedy so as to both
preserve participation and minimize the incentives and opportunities for judicial bias.
c. Reasoned Decisionmaking. Finally, Fuller and Fiss share the concern
that the public law remedial process departs from the norm of reasoned decisionmaking. 238 Both identify the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication as its commitment to rationality: judicial decisions must be the product
of reasoned argument based on norms that are persuasive to others, 239 rather
than power, personal preference, or bargaining. 240
preserving the integrity of the meaning giving enterprise" despite the resulting compromise of the
court's legitimacy. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, supra note 175, at 761.
236. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 54-57.
237. There is research suggesting that processes which allow for some party control over decisionmaking enhance the perceived fairness of both the processes and their results. See S.
GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DisPuTE RESOLUTION 181 (1985) [hereinafter DISPUTE
RESOLUTION]; Brett, Managing Organizational Conflict, 15 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY RES.& PRAC. 664,

674-75 (1984).
238. Fiss persuasively refutes the argument that remedial decisionmaking fails to comport with
the dictates of consistency and "formal justice," as evidenced by the varying remedial patterns that
have emerged in implementing identical legal norms. "[T]here may well be differences between the
various communities that justify the different treatment. Neither formal justice nor the ideal of a
single, nationwide constitution requires that all communities be treated identically, but only that
similar communities be treated alike." Fiss, supra note 1, at 51 (emphasis in original).
239. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, supra note 175, at 754 (the results must be justified
"in terms that are universalizable"); Fuller, supra note 142, at 366 ("Adjudication is, then, a device
which gives formal and institutional expression to the influence of reasoned argument in human
affairs."); see also Resnik, supra note 36, at 378 n.13 ("When ruling, judges are obliged to provide
reasoned explanations for their decisions, and the parties, in turn, are obliged to obey.").
240. Fuller argues that "[w]e demand of an adjudicative decision a kind of rationality we do not
expect of the results of contract or of voting." Fuller, supra note 142, at 367. Although reason may
play a role in deciding elections or the terms of a contract, "there is generally no formal assurance"
that it will. Id. at 366. In contrast, adjudication "assumes a burden of rationality not borne by any
other form of social ordering." Id. Fiss, among others, concurs in this assessment of the impor-

1400

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 79:1355

For Fuller, the problem with public remedial decisionmaking is the difficulty of reaching reasoned decisions through formal party participation in
polycentric situations.
There is no single solution, or simple set of solutions, toward which the
parties meeting in open court could address themselves. If an optimum
solution had to be reached through adjudicative procedures, the court
would have had to set forth an almost endless series of possible divisions
and direct the parties to deal with each in turn. 24 1
Fuller's adherents extend this observation to the public law context. Because
the legal norm does not provide a basis for choosing between possible remedial approaches, "the conventional means of control within the judiciarylegal rule and principle applied through the traditions of judicial reasoning
and craft-are... unavailable as a base upon which to legitimate this exer' 242
cise of power.
Fiss' concern is with the court's involvement in the remedial decisionmaking process and its consequences for the quality of the dialogue concerning
public values. The demands of public remedial decisionmaking predispose
courts to rely on the parties' agreement, rather than on judicial interpretation, in formulating a remedy. This reliance fails to discharge the court's
duty "to interpret [constitutional] values and to bring reality into accord
with them. ' 243 Fiss appears to assume that the formal interactions of the
tance of rationality in adjudication. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 42 (Fuller "rightly celebrates the role
of reason in human affairs, and sees the important connection between reason and adjudication");
see also Diver, supra note 9, at 46, 48 (contrasting adjudication's emphasis on "principled elaboration of authoritative norms" with politics' emphasis on power and bargaining).
241. Fuller, supra note 79, at 33. Eisenberg clarifies and elaborates on the limits of traditional
adjudication in situations involving multiple criteria:
Often, however, the criteria cannot be reduced to one or objectively weighted, except by
seriously impoverishing the solution. Where that is the case, and where the situation does
not lend itself to a negotiated outcome, an optimum solution can normally be arrived at
only by vesting a single decisionmaker with "managerial" authority-by which I mean
authority not only to apply relevant criteria, but to determine how much weight each
criterion is to receive and to change those weights as new objectives and criteria may
require.
Eisenberg, supra note 149, at 425. Eisenberg's approach fails to recognize that courts frequently
address issues governed by multiple standards and criteria, balancing their weight and applicability
in a given situation. See Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943
(1987).
242. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 694. This view idealizes the extent to which legal norms constrain
courts' exercise of discretion, even at the liability stage. It also fails to take into account that courts
can and do determine issues based on reasoning in relation to a norm, even in the absence of a
definitive legal standard. See Mnookin, A Dilemma: The Legitimate Role of Courts in IN THE
INTEREST OF CHILDREN, supra note 44, at 28-31 (arguing that framers of the Constitution intended
for future decisionmakers to interpret ambiguities in light of both precedent and contemporary

values).
243. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 175, at 1085; see also Resnik, Due Process" A Public
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adversary process constitute the only possible method of preserving the
court's reasoned involvement in remedial formulation.
Fiss also worries that judges' involvement in constructing an effective remedy predisposes the judge to "settle for something less than what he perceives
to be the correct interpretation" of the underlying norm. 2 " Although Fiss
acknowledges the risk that judges will enact their personal preferences into
law at the liability stage, 24 5 he looks to the institutional attributes of the judiciary--dialogue, independence, and the disciplining rules of the professionto enable the judge to be objective in determining liability. 246 In contrast, he
assumes that remedial decisions are not "constrained by the disciplining
rules that characteristically govern judicial interpretation, ' 247 and are thus
248
more likely to be the product of judicial self-protection and bargaining.
The process critics assume that the stylized discourse of the adversary process constitutes the only possible method of achieving reasoned decisionmaking in remedial formulation. Fuller and his adherents insist on formal
presentation in open court and dispositive legal standards to preserve reasoned decisionmaking in the remedial process. 249 Fiss assumes that "the
processes that give the courts their special competency" depend on the role
allocation and formal dialogue of the adversary process. 250 This equation of
reasoned decisionmaking with the adversary system is the basis of the
process critics' rejection of the norm-based character of remedial
decisionmaking.
Perhaps because the process critics did not develop their normative framework with the public remedial context in mind they do not consider whether
methods other than formal adversary process may in fact better promote reasoned decisionmaking in that context. Reasoned decisionmaking need not
251
proceed through traditional adjudication based solely on legal norms.
Other decisionmaking methodologies, such as structured negotiation, 252 may
Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405, 409, 417-18 (1987) (arguing that public norms are generated in
the course of interaction among disputants and adjudicator, and criticizing the literature of alternative dispute resolution for failing to provide a role for the public).
244. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,supra note 175, at 761.
245. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 11.
246. Id. at 12-13; Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, supra note 175, at 754.
247. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,supra note 175, at 761.
248. Fiss, supra note 1, at 54-55; Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,supra note 175, at 762.
249. See Fuller, supra note 79, at 33; Fletcher, supra note 9, at 694.
250. Fiss, supra note 1, at 51.
251. Eisenberg, supra note 213, at 639.
252. Negotiation has been defined as "communication for the purpose of persuasion." DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, supra note 237, at 19. It can take place with or without the assistance of third parties. Negotiation conducted with the assistance of a neutral third party who lacks the power to
impose a binding decision is referred to as mediation. Id. at 7. The academic literature presents
two different conceptions of negotiation. Adversarial, or distributive negotiations, treat negotiation

as a zero-sum game in which gains to one party constitute losses to the other. See H. RAIFFA, THE
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be better suited to generating reasoned public remedial decisionmaking when
legal norms alone provide an insufficient basis for choosing among possible
remedies. 253 The court's discretion can be effectively structured through the
development of norms of public remedial process that can be articulated by
the trial judge and reviewed by appellate courts.254 Moreover, the court's
interpretive role may be preserved by a model of remedial decisionmaking
255
premised on the view of the court as the enforcer of a deliberative process.
The foregoing analysis accepts the process critics' premise that the values
of participation, impartiality, and reasoned decisionmaking are important to
judicial legitimacy. Some supporters of public law litigation consider the importance of the substantive norms to be an adequate response to the process
critique.25 6 This response correctly highlights the important connection between substantive and procedural legitimacy. Unless a particular process is
reasonably calculated to produce compliance with basic constitutional princiART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1973). Problem solving or principled negotiation or integrative bargaining focuses on identifying the parties' interests and creating solutions which satisfy the
needs of both parties. See R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 134, at 9; Menkel-Meadow, supra note
134, at 794-829. As Carrie Menkel-Meadow points out, although any particular dispute may contain aspects of both models, behavior and results in any particular negotiation are likely to be a
product of the orientation one brings to the negotiation. Id at 759-60. This article proposes that
negotiation can be oriented toward solving problems on the basis of norms and develops a structure
designed to facilitate reasoned negotiation. See infra Part IV.A.
253. Dispute negotiation is in some instances more likely to be "principled":
"A stranger adjudicator is likely to treat as irrelevant some principles the disputants themselves regard as relevant, and consequently to have at his command less than the sum total
of principles potentially applicable to a dispute. In a real sense, therefore, traditional
adjudication may actually be a less principled process than dispute negotiation."
Eisenberg, supra note 213, at 657; see R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 134, at 85-98 (detailing
concept of principled negotiation); Susskind, EnvironmentalMediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. Rv. 1, 16 (1981) (Joint net gains in environmental mediation require that parties
"attempt to understand the complex ecological systems involved and to generate appropriate compromises that go beyond their self-interests."). Eisenberg draws a distinction between dispute negotiation, which he defines as directed toward settling disputes arising out of past events, and rulemaking negotiation, directed toward establishing rules to govern future conduct. Eisenberg, supra
note 213, at 638. However, as Eisenberg realizes, many cases actually involve a combination of
these two functions. Public remedial decisionmaking is not taken into account in either of Eisenberg's categories. Although there is a dispute concerning the conduct of one of the parties, the
conduct or the resulting injury is ongoing and requires future-oriented intervention to resolve the
dispute. At the same time, remedial intervention is constrained by the scope of the legal norm and
the supervision of the court. The structure of the remedial process and the intervention of the court
can dramatically limit the significance of bargaining power in determining the outcome. See infra
text accompanying notes 419-20.
254. See infra text accompanying note 417.
255. See infra Part IV.
256. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1316 ("IT]he ability of a judicial pronouncement to sustain
itself in the dialogue and the power of judicial action to generate assent over the long haul become
the ultimate touchstones of legitimacy .... [T]he American legal tradition has always acknowledged the importance of substantive results for legitimacy and accountability of judicial action.").
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ples, it fails to fulfill the court's constitutional role and therefore lacks legitimacy. Thus, remediation constitutes an important element of a theory of
public remedial process.
However, the equation of substantive outcomes with procedural legitimacy
ignores the importance of process in maintaining institutional legitimacy.
Continued respect for and acceptance of the exercise of judicial power depends on preserving the perceived and actual fairness and integrity of the
processes by which decisions are made. The absence of an affirmative vision
of the judicial role that responds to concerns about fairness and proper allocation of governmental power fuels the political and theoretical attack on
legitimacy, which in turn contributes to a public perception of judicial illegitimacy. The court's capacity to bring about compliance with substantive
norms-the linchpin of the competency defense of judicial activism-suffers
as a result. Moreover, like the process critics, I believe that process values
such as fairness and participation bear independent significance as indicators
of the court's legitimacy. Thus, process as well as outcome assume importance in the normative theory of public remedial process taking shape in this
article.
B. THE ALLOCATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER CRITIQUE: THE NORM
OF RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF LOCAL AND STATE

GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS

A second strand of the debate over the legitimacy of public law remedial
process concerns the proper allocation of functions and power between the
federal and state governments and among the three branches of government.
Critics charge that the court's role in public remedial process exceeds the
boundaries of judicial authority. 257 The courts express this same concern in
terms of federalism and the limits of equity power. District courts are frequently admonished by appellate courts for intruding on the legitimate discretion of state and local executive branches, and assuming functions that
exceed the appropriate judicial role. 258 Neither the Supreme Court nor the
257. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 9, at 648-49; Frug, supra note 24, at 742, 748, 750; Mamlet,
supra note 139, at 685-86; Nagel, Separationof Powers and the Scope ofFederalEquitable Remedies
30 STAN. L. REv. 661, 723-24 (1978). For a summary of the legitimacy arguments concerning the
proper boundaries of the judicial role in public law litigation, see M. MINOW, supra note 139, at
356-72; Mnookin, supra note 242, at 25-42.
258. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) ("principles of federalism which play such an
important part in governing the relationship between federal courts and state governments ....
have applicability where injunctive relief is sought . .. against those in charge of an executive
branch of an agency of state or local governments."); Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828,
844 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("In this setting of institutional conditions litigation, courts must, as the
Supreme Court has said time and again, craft remedies with extraordinary sensitivity. Here, courts

work in an arena that represents a crossroads where the local political branches of government meet
the Article III branch and the higher commands of the Constitution."); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d
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United States courts of appeals, however, have provided much elaboration or
direction beyond these general admonitions.
Some academic critics of public remedial decisionmaking have attempted
to provide doctrinal and normative support for the allocation of governmental power critique. These critics argue that state and local governments are
the repository of governmental authority in areas such as education and
criminal justice and that federal court intervention through the public law
259
remedial process interferes with this local decisionmaking prerogative.
The focus of their concern, however, is on the proper division of responsibil26 °
ity among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of government.
They argue that the court's current role in public law remedial process departs from the core judicial function and intrudes into the functions of the
legislative and executive branches. 26' They base their insistence on defined
functional spheres on a traditional conception of the judicial role, the constitutional preference for democratic decisionmaking, and the judiciary's insu262
lation from political accountability.
Although the allocation of governmental power debate generally focuses
on whether the court's public remedial role is legitimate, 263 the disagreement

1115, 1145 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) ("As a matter of respect for the state's role and for the allocation
of functions in our federal system.., the relief ordered by federal courts must be 'consistent with
the policy of minimum intrusion into the affairs of state prison administration that the Supreme
Court has articulated for the federal courts.'" (quoting Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 571 (5th Cir.
1981))), vacated in part, amended in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982).
259. See Frug, supra note 24, at 743-49; Nagel, supra note 257, at 663.
260. Commentators recognize the current doctrinal limitations on applying separation of powers
analysis to vertical government relationships between federal and state or local government. See
Frug, supra note 24, at 749; Mamlet, supra note 139, at 688; Nagel, supra note 257, at 666. Some
commentators argue that current interpretations of the separation of powers doctrine are wrong and
should be changed. See Mamlet, supra note 139, at 694-702; Nagel, supra note 257, at 666-81.
Others take the position that the concerns underlying the separation of powers doctrine can be
addressed through equitable principles. See Frug, supra note 24, at 787. For a critical response to
these arguments, see Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 9, at 495-506.
261. See Frug, supra note 24, at 740-42; Mamlet, supra note 139, at 686; Nagel, supra note 257,
at 662. Even scholars critical of the court's remedial activities in enforcing constitutional norms
have recognized that their arguments lose much of their force when courts act pursuant to statute.
See Frug, supra note 24, at 784 ("Most complaints about unwarranted judicial interference with
democratic decisionmaking would not survive an explicit congressional decision to authorize the
judicial action in question.").
262. See, eg., Frug, supra note 24, at 732-50; Mamlet, supra note 139, at 694-702.
263. Proponents of public law litigation offer several arguments in response to the allocation of
governmental power critique. First, they argue that the judiciary's constitutional role in interpreting and enforcing public norms requires and justifies an expansive judicial role, see M. MINOW,
supra note 139, at 358; Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 9, at 509; Fiss, supra note 1, at 6-11, and
that the failure of the court to perform this function will compromise its legitimacy by depriving the
disempowered of their constitutional rights.
Second, proponents challenge the assumption that courts are necessarily intruding on the functions of other branches, pointing to the court's emphasis on achieving agreement concerning the
remedy. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 1, at 1308; Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 9, at 492-93, 506.
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actually concerns how courts should exercise their public remedial role.
Both the courts and academic critics acknowledge that the Constitution permits, indeed requires, continued judicial involvement in enforcing constitu2
tional and statutory norms. 64 Their concern is that trial courts go too far.
Yet, they have been unable to come up with a satisfactory theory of the ap265
propriate limits of judicial involvement in the remedial process.
Thus, the allocation of governmental power critics identify an important
attribute of legitimate public remedial decisionmaking: respect for the integrity of state and local governmental institutions. Yet, they fail to provide

either guidelines for pursuing this value or standards for assessing whether it
has been satisfied. This failure is attributable, at least in part, to a view of the
judicial role that ignores the remedial stage. The allocation of governmental
power critique incorporates the process critique, with its assumptions and
Scholars who are more concerned with the separation of powers issue concede that courts tend to
act with more restraint than the critique typically acknowledges. See R. Mnookin, supra note 242,
at 521; Fletcher, supra note 9, at 649.
Finally, proponents challenge the functional conception of separation of powers that assumes
clear boundaries between the branches of government. They argue that this conception ignores the
role of checks and balances, that each branch of government necessarily exercises a mix of functions
under our constitutional scheme. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1307; Sargentich, The Contemporary
Debate About Legislative-ExecutiveSeparation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 430, 433-44 (1987);
Shapiro, Stability and Change in JudicialDecision-Making: Incrementalism or State Decision?.2 L.
TRANsrrION Q. 134 (1965). They offer a more dynamic conception of separation of powers that
focuses on "whether the branches all remain able to participate in the process of mutually defining
their boundaries." M. MINoW, supra note 139, at 362; see Chayes, supra note 1, at 1316; Eisenberg
& Yeazell, supra note 9, at 495.
264. See, eg., Fletcher, supra note 9, at 696 (court may use remedial discretion "when there
exists no practical alternative for the protection of the constitutional right at stake"); Frug, supra
note 24, at 748 (federalism-based "bar to federal judicial power must be strictly interpreted in light
of the established federal judicial power to provide a remedy for proven state violations of individual rights"); Mamlet, supra note 139, at 689 (acknowledging that "affirmative judicial intervention
is appropriate.., when state officials oppose a substantive constitutional right").
265. Diver, supra note 9, at 91-92; Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 9, at 509-10; see, e.g.,
Fletcher, supra note 9, at 694-95 (proposing that a court should assume a remedial role in a public
law suit only when the legislature or other relevant political body has shown unwillingness or incapacity); Frug, supra note 24, at 787 (proposing standards of "practicality," "workability," and "feasibility" to be exercised to "avoid excessive federal judicial invasion"); Nagel, supra note 257, at
707-12 (proposing "breadth" and "depth" standards). Diver proposes measuring the value of judicial intrusiveness "by considering the process rather than the substance of judicial intervention.
Under this approach, whether intrusiveness is excessive depends upon the degree to which the court
has left room for the exercise of governmental choice in the remedial process." Diver, supra note 9,
at 92. This approach fails, however, to provide a normative theory of the judicial role that reconciles the value of effective implementation of constitutional norms with the value of respecting governmental choice. Diver argues that although a political model of litigation is best suited to
realizing these dual values, it necessarily compromises the legitimacy of the judiciary. This conclusion shares the assumptions of the process critique, which I challenge for failing to take into account the distinct character of the court's role in public remedial decision making. See supra notes
176-93 and accompanying text.
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limitations, as a crucial step in its reasoning. 266 It assumes that the role of
the judiciary is to decide cases through the adversary process. When judges
depart from this role, they are not acting as judges. Instead, they are exercising powers that belong to other branches of government, without the restraints imposed by either the political accountability of the other branches
or the internal discipline of legal norms and the adversary process traditionally associated with the judiciary.
Like the process critique, however, the allocation of governmental power
critique fails to account for the widely accepted judicial role of providing
remedies for legal wrongs. 267 This failure in turn prevents the development
of meaningful standards for limiting the court's exercise of remedial power.
It also blinds allocation of governmental power critics to the possibility that
a theory and practice of public remedial process can be developed which
comports with the requirements of legitimate judicial decisionmaking and
preserves the legitimate role of state and local institutions in remedying pub268
lic law violations.
C. THE COMPETENCY CRITIQUE: THE REMEDIATION NORM
AND JUDICIAL CAPACITY

A third strand of the legitimacy debate concerns the court's capacity to
perform the functions called for by the public law remedial process. Critics
of the court's public remedial role argue that the attributes of adjudication
disable courts from resolving issues of "social policy" and that courts neces269
sarily perform a policymaking function in developing public law remedies.
The competency critique characterizes judicial processes as necessarily fo271
cused and piecemeal, 270 "ill-suited to the ascertainment of social facts,"
266. See Jennings, The Chancellor's Foot Begins to Kick- JudicialRemedies in PublicLaw Cases
and the Need for ProceduralReforms, 83 DICK. L. Rlv.217, 229 (1979) (noting critics of judicial
innovation in public law cases who focus on courts' departure from traditional role as neutral umpire). Also implicit in separation of powers analysis is a theory of judicial competence that reflects a
liability-based theory of judicial process. See D. HoRowITz. supra note 9, at 33-56; Shapiro,
Courts, Legislatures and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REv. 519, 551-55 (1988).
267. See supra notes 176-93.
268. See infra Part IV. By identifying a set of structures and processes that constrain courts
within a procedural framework, it is possible to develop effective limits on the court's exercise of
remedial power. This approach will not satisfy the critics who subscribe to a view of separation of
powers defining fixed and exclusive functions for each branch of government. This view of separation of powers is not widely accepted, however, and does not reflect the terms of the debate in the
public remedial context.
269. Donald Horowitz is the principal architect of the competency critique. See D. HoRowrrz,
supra note 9, passim. Horowitz does not distinguish between the court's role in determining liability
and formulating a remedy in public law litigation.
270. Id. at 34-36.
271. Id. at 45-51.
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27 3
lacking provision for policy review, 272 and inhospitable to negotiation.
Although the competency critics acknowledge that competency and legitimacy are separate issues, they quite properly assert that judicial competency
is relevant to the question of legitimacy because "[a] court wholly without
the relationship of judicapacity may forfeit its claim to legitimacy. ' 274 It is
275
here.
cial capacity to legitimacy that is of concern
Proponents of public law litigation concur that effective remediation-providing a remedy reasonably calculated to eliminate public law violations-is
276 Thus, the competency deessential to legitimate judicial decisionmaking.
bate provides an additional element of a normative theory of public remedial
process. The validity of the competency critique, however, has been challenged on several grounds. First, scholars have pointed out that courts have
attributes which empower them to perform the tasks of the public remedial
277
enterprise, such as insulation from narrow political pressures, the capacity
278
to tailor solutions to the needs of particular situations, access to formal
and informal incentives to alter conduct, 279 the ability to gather information, 280 a nonbureaucratic structure, 281 and the potential for a high degree of
participation. 28 2 Second, scholars charge that the competency critique ignores "the value of a successful performance, and the success rate of alterna272. Id. at 51-56.
273. Id. at 22-23.
274. Id. at 18; see Cavanagh & Sarat, Thinking About Courts." Toward and Beyond a Jurisprudence of Judicial Competence, 14 LAW & Soc'y REv. 371, 375 (1980).
275. Much of the debate over judicial competence takes place through competing case studies
that reach varying conclusions about the effectiveness of the court in a particular case. These studies, although extremely important, are unlikely to provide a definitive answer to the capacity question. As others have noted, each case involves a number of variables that could account for its
results and the studies typically fail to establish the linkage between the court's intervention and
particular outcomes. See Hanson, ContendingPerspectiveson Federal Court Efforts to Reform State
Instittions, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 289, 338 (1988); Zinring & Soloman, Goss v. Lopez: The Principle of the Thing in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN, supra note 44, at 491. Evaluations of compe-

tence will vary depending on the criteria of effectiveness used, the expectations of the researcher,
and the relative assessments of other agents of change. Moreover, as I point out in my earlier
article, judicial capacity is likely to vary with the context and strategies of judicial intervention. See
Sturm, supra note 26, passim.
276. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1315-16 (judicial legitimacy in public law context is measured
by achievement of substantive results); cf. Summers, supra note 194, at 2 ("If a process is a significant means of achieving good results, it is in that respect good as a process." (emphasis in original)).
277. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1307-08; Sturm, supra note 26, at 846.
278. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1308.
279. Sturm, supra note 26, at 846.
280. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1308; Sturm, supra note 26, at 898-99.
281. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1308. But see Fiss, Bureaucratization,supra note 175, at 1444-49
(criticizing the increasingly bureaucratic nature of the federal judiciary).
282. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1308; Sturm, supra note 26, at 891-92. For attempts to balance the
strengths and limitations of courts in public remedial implementation, see Diver, supra note 9, at
88-105; Sturm, supra note 26, at 861-910.
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tive institutions performing comparable tasks. '283
Finally, and for our purposes most importantly, scholars have noted the
failure of the competency critique to take into account the procedural innovations that enhance courts' capacity to find social facts, consider competing
solutions, and facilitate negotiation. 284 Most proponents of an activist judicial role have failed to discuss the values or consequences of the competency
critics' narrow view of the judicial role.28 5 The critics' view proceeds from
the now familiar assumption that courts necessarily operate within the
framework of the adversary system and that processes and norms developed
28 6
to determine liability can and should be transposed to the remedial stage.
Thus, the competency critique is subject to the same arguments developed
earlier concerning the failure of the process critique to address the goals and
28 7
demands of the public remedial process.
D. THE ABUSE OF POWER CRITIQUE:

THE IMPORTANCE OF FAIRNESS AND

A DEMONSTRABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEGAL
VIOLATION AND THE REMEDY IMPOSED
BY THE COURT

Critics of the court's role in the public remedial context also point to particular instances of injustice or unfairness caused by courts' undisciplined
exercise of power. These abuse of power arguments fall into several categories. Some critics express concern about the imposition by judges or their
agents of remedial requirements that do not relate to the underlying legal
violation and instead stem from the personal preferences of the decisionmaker.28 8 This concern introduces an additional element necessary for a
283. Fiss, supra note 1, at 32; see also M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 144, 194 (1982) (documenting
examples of legislatures' lack of capacity for systematic fact gathering and analysis); Yudof, Plato's
Ideal and the Perversity of Politics, 81 MICH. L. REV. 730, 738 (1983) (noting that testimony is often
entered in legislative hearings for the purpose of generating public reaction rather than for decisionmaking purposes).
284. See supra Part I.B.
285. But see Cavanagh & Sarat, supra note 274, at 377-86 (critiquing the "relatively fixed and
unchangeable" conceptions of court structure that underlie the competency critics' arguments).
286. See D. HORowrrz, supra note 9, at 34. Horowitz' description of the attributes limiting
judicial competence is fraught with the process critique's normative assumptions about the requirements of legitimate judicial decisionmaking. See id. at 33, 38-39, 59.
287. See Part II.A.3.
288. See, e.g., Baier, Framing and Reviewing a Desegregation Decree: Of the Chancellor'sFoot
and Fifth Circuit Control,47 LA. L. REV. 123, 125 (1986) (charging that in a school desegregation
case, the judge decided ex parte to close a neighborhood school, fashioned a plan outside the scope
of the evidence and the government expert's advice, and justified his plan by saying "I also feel I am
the best expert I know"); Brakel, Special Masters in InstitutionalLitigation, 1979 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 543, 554-55 (documenting unprecedented programs adopted at master's insistence in prison
litigation, and examining perception of prison officials that court impose its desires on the institu-
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theory of legitimate remedial process: a demonstrable relationship between
the remedy imposed by the court and the underlying legal norm justifying
some courts' exercise of coercive authority.
Abuse of power critics also challenge the failure of some judges to provide
an adequate opportunity for those affected by a proposed remedy to express
their views and some courts' failure to explain or justify remedial decisions. 28 9 The fairness of the process may also be compromised by an actual
or perceived conflict between the formal and informal roles performed by the
judge or her agent. 290 Each of these potential abuses of power contributes to
a public perception of judicial illegitimacy that threatens to diminish the
public's respect for the court. They also provide vivid support for the importance of the values identified by the process critics-participation, impartiality, and reasoned decisionmaking-to the fairness and legitimacy of the
public remedial process.
Instances of abuse and perceptions of illegitimacy are not, however, inevitable. They are a product of the current gap between the theory of judicial
process and public remedial practice. Without a normative framework, the
participants in public remedial practice lack the standards necessary to both
guide their own conduct and structure the conduct of others. Observers of
the public remedial enterprise currently have no basis for distinguishing between good and bad remedial processes and must base their legitimacy judgments on erroneous preconceptions of how courts operate.
III.

NORMS OF PUBLIC REMEDIAL DECISIONMAKING AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT PRACTICE

This section applies the norms of public remedial process to current practice. Part III.A summarizes the normative framework for public remedial
decisionmaking developed in the previous section. Part III.B then evaluates
current remedial practice in light of these norms to current remedial practice
to test both the power of the norms and the adequacy of current practice in
relation to them.
tion); Note, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062, 1083 n. 109, 1084 n. 115 (1979)

(same).

289. See Baier, supra note 288, at 138-42 (describing failure of a district court to hold a hearing
or otherwise provide parties with an opportunity to offer their views concerning the remedial plan
unilaterally formulated by the court and upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 721 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983)). Courts
often present their remedial orders without any explanation or justification for their terms. See Fiss,
supra note 1, at 52 n. 105 ("one of the most striking features of opinions in structural cases [is] the
failure to discuss the remedy with any specificity at all").
290. See Note, supra note 288, at 1082-85 (ambiguity and confusion over the master's role, the
inappropriate combination of formal and informal power, and the lack of accountability of master
create possibility of abuse and perception of illegitimacy of judicial process).
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A. THE NORMS OF PUBLIC REMEDIAL PROCESS

The analysis in Part II of the debate concerning the legitimacy of the public remedial process identified a set of norms and characteristics that properly influence our judgments about public remedial decisionmaking. These
norms and characteristics provide the basis for a coherent theory of the legitimacy of public remedial process-the standards against which to assess
the "goodness" of particular remedial actions. This theory does not specify
the particular form or structure that remedial processes must take; rather it
identifies the salient qualities that emerge from translating general process
norms to the public remedial context. These qualities can be summarized as
follows:
1. Participation: The decisionmaking process must afford a meaningful
opportunity to participate to those affected by or responsible for a remedial
decision. 29 1 Meaningful participation requires that:

a. Individuals, groups, and organizations directly affected by, responsible
for, or in a position to block implementation of the remedy are involved in
292
the process;
b. Representatives of groups or organizations directly involved in the decisionmaking process are accountable and responsive to the constituencies they
293
represent;
c. The forms of interaction used in the decisionmaking process promote
involvement, cooperation, education, and

consensus;

29 4

d. The process mitigate the unequal power, resources, and sophistication

29 5
of the participants; and

e. The process respect the integrity of local and state governmental
296
institutions.
2. Impartiality: The court must strive to ensure that its decisions are fair,
unbiased, and based on reason supported by fact, rather than on factors unrelated to redressing the legal wrong at issue, such as personal preferences or a
desire to terminate judicial involvement in the controversy. 297
3. Reasoned decisionmaking: The process by which a remedy is formulated must employ reasoned analysis and the results of that process must be
291. See supra notes 194-224 and accompanying text.
292. This norm follows from the characteristics of the public remedial context. See supra text
accompanying notes 220-21. The extent of a particular actor's participation may vary depending on
her responsibility for or interest in a particular remedial issue. At a minimum, meaningful participation requires the opportunity to present facts, respond to factual submissions by others, and to
offer and comment on proposed remedial solutions. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 221-22.
294. See supra text accompanying note 219.
295. See supra text accompanying note 223.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 265-66.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 234, 288 & 290.
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justified by reasoned argument. 298 Reasoned decisionmaking requires that:
299
a. Decisions are supported by a reliable factual foundation;
b. Discussions and decisions concerning the appropriateness or desirability of a proposed solution are based on reasoning in relation to identified,
3°°
persuasive norms;
c. The process takes into-account the range of perspectives and concerns
that are likely to affect the fairness, effectiveness, and practicability of a par30 1
ticular proposal.
4. Remediation: The remedy that emerges from the process must be reasonably calculated to produce compliance with the30 3underlying substantive
norm30 2 and must relate to that underlying norm.
These norms provide a framework for assessing the legitimacy of public
remedial practice and a guide for structuring the remedial process in a particular case. At least in current practice, some of these norms may be in tension. For example, structures and processes designed to promote reasoned
decisionmaking may give short shrift to the norm of participation. Conversely, structures that afford broad participation may complicate the effort
to proceed through reasoned processes. Exclusive concern for the value of
respect for state and local government may also tend to compromise the values of participation, reasoned decisionmaking, and remediation.
The existence of these tensions does not undercut the utility of developing
norms of public remedial process. Similar tensions among competing values
exist in any procedural system. 304 Rather, their existence illustrates the role
that legitimacy norms can play in structuring and assessing public remedial
practice. They provide a set of aspirations to be pursued in developing structures of remedial process. A legitimate model is one that takes each of these
norms into account, strives to satisfy all of them, and strikes an appropriate
balance among them given the demands and constraints of the particular
remedial problem before the court.
B. PUBLIC REMEDIAL PRACTICE REVISITED: AN ASSESSMENT OF
CURRENT REMEDIAL DECISIONMAKING

This section evaluates the models of remedial practice identified in Part I
in relation to the norms of public remedial process. The purpose of this dis298. See supra text accompanying notes 238-40 & 288.
299. See id.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 239-40.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 252-54.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 256, 274-75.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 258 & 288.
304. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 194, at 42-43 (describing clashes of process values within
traditional adjudication).
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cussion is not to provide an in-depth evaluation of each model, but rather to
identify tendencies of various forms of remedial practice to comply, or fail to
comply, with the norms of public remedial legitimacy. This analysis reveals
that many of the current structures of public remedial decisionmaking focus
on satisfying one or two of the basic legitimacy norms at the expense of the
others. The failure to account for and pursue the full range of legitimacy
norms compromises the perceived legitimacy of the public remedial enterprise. New structures and processes are emerging, however, that offer the
potential for accommodating the full range of legitimacy norms.
1. Processes Attempting to Adhere to the Traditional Adjudicatory Model
Models of public remedial formulation that are based on the traditional
adversary model of adjudication do not adequately accommodate the range
of remedial legitimacy norms. The deferrer model of remedial process--delegating the task of remedial formulation to the defendants--emphasizes the
value of respect for state and local decisionmaking. 30 5 It also avoids the risk
of compromising the court's impartiality by assuming responsibility for developing and implementing a remedy, and becoming committed to its success. This approach, however, undermines the court's legitimacy in other
important respects. Deference to defendants does not afford all of the relevant participants an opportunity to participate in development of the remedy. It may also create the appearance of favoring the interests of the
defendants at the expense of those entitled to relief. Furthermore, such deference does not provide courts with an adequate basis or opportunity to evaluate the defendants' proposed remedies using reliable factual support and
identified normative standards. It does not allow for the integration of the
multiple perspectives that bear on the development of an appropriate remedy. It also frequently fails to produce a remedy that promises to redress the
3°6
underlying legal violation.
The director model strikes a different balance between the remedial process norms in its effort to use traditional adversary methods for remedial
formulation. 30 7 The court's willingness unilaterally to impose a remedy reflects a commitment to the norm of remediation. The hearings preceding the
court's imposition of a remedy under this model afford the opportunity for
305. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. This approach was used in Holt v. Sarver,
309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), when the court assigned the defendants exclusive responsibility
for remedying unconstitutional prison conditions. See Sturm, supra note 26, at 851.
306. See Shane, supra note 19, at 558-59; Sturm, supra note 26, at 864-67. The ineffectiveness of
the deferrer approach leads many judges to abandon it in favor of a more directive posture. See id.
at 853. Thus, the short-term success of the deferrer in satisfying the norm of respect for state and
local governmental decisionmaking must be reconsidered in light of the likelihood that deference
will give way to more intrusive measures imposed by the court.
307. See Sturm, supra note 26, at 851-54.
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formal participation by a wide variety of interested groups and organizations.
The court's reliance on the adversary form of participation, however, prevents the realization of the participation values critical to the remedial
stage. 30 8 The court's imposition of requirements over the objections of the
defendants also generates the perception of intrusion into the domain of state
3 °9
and local institutions.
The director court's unilateral formulation of the remedy also threatens to
compromise judicial impartiality. As the process critics have noted, this approach places the court in the position of developing and evaluating the adequacy of its own plans.3 10 In addition to creating an appearance of
unfairness by merging these two roles, the remedy fails to adhere to the norm
of reasoned decisionmaking because courts that are charged with evaluating
the remedies they devise typically fail to articulate the normative assumptions underlying the adoption of a particular remedy and rarely offer a reasoned basis for their remedial decisions. This failure is not surprising in light
of the inadequacy of the adversary process as a mechanism for either developing an adequate factual record to guide remedial decisionmaking or providing a persuasive justification for the adoption of particular remedial
311
requirements.
Finally, the director court's failure to afford meaningful participation and
use reasoned decisionmaking processes contributes to the perception, if
not the reality, that the remedy is unrelated to the conditions underlying the
legal violation. This perceived illegitimacy, along with the limited information available to the court and the inadequate participation by the affected
individuals and organizations, undermines the court's remedial
31 2
effectiveness.
2. The Bargaining Model
The bargaining approach to remedial decisionmaking employs negotiations among the lawyers, sometimes under the supervision of the court, as
the means of producing an agreement that the court adopts as the remedial
plan. 31 3 Although this model in theory can account for the norms of participation, impartiality, reasoned decisionmaking, and remediation, there are
308. See supra text accompanying notes 219-24.
309. See Sturm, supra note 26, at 268-69.
310. See id., at 901; Note, supra note 288, at 1084.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31 & 253. Eisenberg points out that a neutral third
party typically has little "standing" to dictate behavior based on person-oriented norms, which
usually depend upon intimate familiarity with the parties. Eisenberg, supra note 213, at 656-57.
Similarly, a stranger "typically lacks the moral authority to order a person-oriented remedy even
when he believes it would be efficacious." Id. at 658.
312. See Sturm, supra note 26, at 868-69.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 51-67.
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structural and procedural factors that limit the realization of each of these
norms in practice.
The bargaining model affords the parties, through their counsel, a substantial amount of control over the process and outcome of remedial decisionmaking. The involvement of lawyers also reduces the impact of unequal
sophistication, familiarity with the system, and power by interposing the lawyers' skill, expertise, and emotional distance. 3' 4 Particularly when the lawyers have substantial experience and expertise in remedial implementation
and the techniques of collaborative decisionmaking, they can structure a process that overcomes many of the limitations of the adversary model. The
reliance on agreement of the parties also appears to both give due respect to
state and local government institutions and eliminate the concern that the
court will impose a remedy unrelated to the violation. Moreover, dispute
resolution through negotiation can be norm-based. 31 5 Supervision of the bargaining process by a special master, as in the St. Louis case, can enhance
both the quality of the negotiations and the likelihood of reaching an agreement. 31 6 Finally, in theory, a remedy produced by agreement is more likely
to reflect the expertise of those who must implement it and to be accepted
and implemented by those who must live with it.
However, as the examples in Part I illustrate, in practice the bargaining
31 7
model tends to compromise each of the norms of public remedial process.
First, the bargaining model frequently compromises the participation value
because there is no guarantee that the range of people and organizations with
a stake in the remedial outcome are included in the negotiations. Indeed,
those participants interested in achieving agreement frequently attempt to
314. See Eisenberg, supra note 213, at 660-61.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 252-53.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
317. The bankruptcy reorganization process shares many of the features and limitations of the
bargaining approach to public remedial formulation. In Chapter Eleven reorganizations, a structure is established to encourage the consensual development of a reorganization plan by the debtor
and one or more creditors' committees. See generally M. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 243 (1987).
This system appears to provide for meaningful participation by relevant stakeholders in the process of developing a consensual remedy. However, the system in operation fails to meet that expectation. Frequently, the members of the creditors committee negotiate through their lawyers and
insulate the negotiations from exposure to the constituents of the committee. In large bankruptcies,
a group of bankruptcy lawyers that are repeat players in the system manage the negotiations and
create pressures, incentives, and constraints toward agreeing to the proposed plan. See LoPucki &
Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 156-57 (1990). In some instances, the judge creates additional
pressures to accede to the proposed plan. Id. at 157. Although all of the impaired creditors are
entitled to vote on a proposed plan, they are faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice, and the consequences of rejecting the plan may be more damaging than the confirmation of an inadequate plan.
Id. at 158. Thus, the bankruptcy system in practice fails in significant respects to satisfy the re-

quirements of meaningful participation.
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limit the involvement of actors perceived to have hostile interests. 318 For
example, in the St. Louis school desegregation case, the State of Missourithe primary source of funding for the desegregation plan-was not included
in the negotiations. 31 9 It subsequently objected to the settlement agreement
320
and became a major obstacle to compliance.
Second, the bargaining model fails to provide a mechanism for fostering
the accountability of the participants in the negotiations to those they represent. Although bargaining is conducted informally, the lawyers' role typically conforms to the adversary model of representation. Those individuals
and organizations whose interests are at stake are rarely involved in the ne321
gotiations, and lawyers control the agenda and the process of negotiation.
Group participants in public interest litigation face particular difficulties in
holding their lawyers accountable because of their group character, divergent

individual interests, and relative powerlessness. 322 The rules governing class
actions fail to provide processes, standards, or incentives for attorneys or
class representatives to solicit or take into account the views of class members.323 In the St. Louis school desegregation case, the clients were not involved in the process of remedial formulation until after the implementation
plan negotiated by the lawyers had been filed with the court, thus creating
324
substantial pressure on the clients to approve the plan.
Although members of government agencies do not typically confront these
obstacles to effective representation, they do face difficulties in holding their
bargaining representatives accountable. For example, they may be represented by elected officials, such as the attorney general, who have separate
318. See Harris v. Pernsley, 654 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (E.D. Pa.) (plaintiffs opposed, and district
court denied, motion of district attorney to intervene in jail litigation), appeal dismissed, 820 F.2d
592 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Castille v. Harris, 484 U.S. 947 (1987); Jones v. Caddo Parish
School Bd., 704 F.2d 206, 224 (5th Cir. 1983) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (by refusing to allow a
hearing on a proposed plaintiff intervenor in a school desegregation case, court is "acting more like
a child whistling in the dark than a court of justice, afraid to look out the window and see if the
mournful cries actually emanate from somebody or are just the products of a frightened imagination"); Rhode, supra note 9, at 1203-07.
319. See La Pierre, supra note 29, at 997 n.89.
320. See id at 1028.
321. See D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, supra note 33, at 63 (in class action suit on behalf of
patients in a state institution for retarded children, plaintiffs' lawyer, "not the clients or their guardians, set the terms of the suit" and "treated the [agreement] as a private treaty, not circulating it to
any of the other parties, not even the parents named as plaintiffs").
322. See J. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 25 (1978) ("Strong, rich

and confident clients direct their lawyers; on the other hand, lawyers dominate the relationship
when clients are poor, or deviant, or unsophisticated."); Rhode, supra note 29, at 1210-12 (class
counsel in Pennhurst litigation took the position that his obligations ran solely to residents of facility for the retarded, and made little effort to expose or express views of parents and guardians who
favored patients' institutionalization); supra note 223 and accompanying text.
323. See Rhode, supra note 29, at 1202-21.
324. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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and often conflicting interests. 325 Even if the head of a state bureaucracy is
directly involved in the negotiations, she is unlikely to articulate the interests
and perspectives of the internal and external constituencies comprising the
326
organization.
The negotiation process under the bargaining model also tends to prevent
meaningful participation by those who must live with the remedy. Because
of their limited direct involvement in and knowledge of the negotiations, the
stakeholders do not gather and exchange information, generate and consider
solutions, and thus become educated by and invested in the remedial process.
Their expertise and perspectives may never be tapped, and the remediation
values served by participation are therefore unfulfilled.
Third, the emphasis of the bargaining process is on reaching agreement.
Under this model, negotiations typically proceed according to an adversary
structure. The emphasis on "winning" the negotiation tends to narrow the
terms of the discussion and inhibit meaningful exchange. Frequently, the
result is a remedy that splits the difference between the parties' positions or
occupies the area of greatest overlap in a negotiation involving multiple parties. 327 This approach does not promote the type of substantive, problemoriented interchange necessary to fulfill the broad participation values of the
public remedial process. 328 In the absence of external pressure to proceed
based on reasoned, normative arguments, bargaining power can dominate the
negotiation process. This is particularly true when, as in the context of public remedies, the negotiations are directed at developing rules to govern future conduct. Furthermore, the participants need not have engaged in the
process of developing an adequate factual foundation and of considering the
range of possible remedial solutions in order to produce an agreement.
Finally, the bargaining model limits the court's capacity to conform to the
norm of the reasoned decisionmaking processes. The court is not equipped
to evaluate the remedy in terms of the process by which it was reached or its
325. See The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator for the United States, 6 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 47, 55 (1982) (acknowledging the inherent potential for conflict between client agencies
and the Attorney General).
326. See Sturm, supra note 26, at 835-37.
327. See Eisenberg, supra note 213, at 668; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 134, at 767-72. The
involvement of a third-party mediator with a substantive agenda can limit the impact of pure bargaining power and assure that normative considerations play some role in the outcome of the negotiations. The St. Louis case provides an example of the role third parties can play in injecting
reasoned decisionmaking into the discussions. In that case, the master used a law review article
that he wrote before his appointment as the framework for settlement negotiations. See La Pierre,
supra note 40, at 995.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 206-07. Lawyer dominated negotiations frequently
structure "solutions that are 'legal' rather than what the client might desire if the client had free
rein to determine objectives." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 134, at 782-83.
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substantive adequacy. 329 Therefore, agreement, rather than reasoned analysis, provides the justification for the remedy produced through bargaining.
Even if particular provisions result from reasoned consideration by the negotiating parties, the court typically is not privy to the substance of the dialogue leading to their adoption. Indeed, the secretive character of remedial
negotiations can contribute to perceptions of unfairness and illegitimacy on
the part of the public or those who have been excluded from participating in
330
the negotiations.
Judicial efforts to obtain substantial information concerning the content
and process of the negotiations by presiding over the settlement negotiations
threaten the norm of judicial impartiality. 331 Active involvement in promoting settlement creates the danger that the court will become excessively committed to the outcome of the negotiations, thereby compromising the
appearance or reality of the judge's fairness in assessing the adequacy of the
remedy.332

3. The Legislative or Administrative Hearing Model
The committee hearing form of remedial decisionmaking, which was used
in PARC v. Pennsylvania,333 affords the opportunity for direct and informal
participation by a wide range of interested parties. By creating an advisory
committee consisting of representatives of the groups affected by and responsible for remedial decisionmaking, the court assures diverse participation.
The value of participation is pursued, however, at the expense of the values
of remediation and reasoned decisionmaking. Moreover, the form and extent
of participation under the legislative or administrative model are not wellsuited to satisfy the norms of accountability and meaningful participation.
The narrow and unstructured role played by most of the participants
under the committee hearing structure dramatically limits the nature of their
participation. The role of the participants in the hearings and their capacity
329. See Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 175, at 1082. In the St. Louis litigation, the signatories to the settlement agreement submitted a joint memorandum and coordinated their testimony in
support of settlement. See LaPierre, supra note 40, at 1101. Thus, the court had only an after the
fact justification, without the arguments and facts that led to its adoption. The objectors to the
settlement did not have access to the counter-arguments considered and rejected during the negotiations. Id
330. See Baier, supra note 288, at 134; Resnik, FailingFaitk Adjudicatory Procedurein Decline,
53 U. CHi. L. REV. 494, 553-54 (1986); Schuck, The Role ofJudges in Settling Complex Cases.: The
Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337, 362 (1986).
331. Judge Weinstein's role in promoting the Agent Orange settlement is a prominent example of
this practice. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 18, at 143-167.
332. Schuck, supra note 330, at 361; see In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611
F. Supp. 1396, 1410 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (judge believed that the settlement was "the only reasonable
formula for distribution").
333. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (per curiam), approved and adopted, 343 F. Supp. 279
(E.D. Pa. 1972); see supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
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to influence the remedial decision remains ambiguous. This lack of clarity is
likely to limit the commitment of participants to the remedial process and
the quality of the exchange. 334 In the absence of shared responsibility for
remedial formulation or clear norms governing the interactions of the parties, the extent and effectiveness of participation is likely to be a function of
335
power.
The committee hearing structure also provides no mechanism for structur336
ing a reasoned dialogue among the participants. In PARC v. Pennsylvania,
as in many cases employing the use of participatory committees and panels,
the court never clarified the responsibilities of the advisory panel, or set forth
a structure or process for working collaboratively to produce and implement
a remedy. 337 Members of the committee and participants in the hearing typically lack experience with the roles they must play, and their lack of focus
undercuts the potential to produce positive results. 335
The flexible, open-ended hearing process is better at airing differences than
developing solutions or consensus. 339 It provides little opportunity or incentive to grapple with the arguments and proposed solutions of those with conflicting interests. Even in those situations in which the opportunity for broad
participation produces incentives to reach agreement, the process of remedial
formulation is likely to proceed through bargaining, rather than reasoned
decisionmaking. 340 Furthermore, in a situation in which there are hostile
relations or basic differences in perspective among the parties, the parties are
34 1
unlikely to be able to structure productive discussions without assistance.
Without a mechanism for confronting and channeling conflict, the participants are likely to bring to the hearings "the hardened perspectives of their
334. See W. PHILLIPS & J. ROSENBERG, ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

BY FEDERAL COURTS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES 23 (1990) (in

PARC v. Pennsylvania, participants in hearings lacked clearly defined roles and authority, causing
some groups to withdraw from participation).
335. See id. (panel's deliberations were "marked by continued conflict and its procedures became
a target of struggle for control among the major parties").
336. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (per curiam), approved and adopted, 343 F. Supp. 279
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
337. See, e.g., D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, supra note 33. In discussing a panel selected to
implement a consent decree regarding New York State's Willowbrook Hospital for the mentally
retarded, the authors wrote: "When the seven members of the Willowbrook Review Panel first met
together in June 1975, neither they nor plaintiffs' lawyers nor Judge Orin Judd had a coherent
design for action .... [How the panel was to [work] remained obscure." Id. at 127.
338. For a discussion of the limited success of particular committees in promoting compliance,
see Lottman, supra note 79, at 70-73; Smith, supra note 33, at 109.
339. Michael Fitts has exposed the likelihood that unstructured attempts to reach political consensus through deliberation in the legislative context are likely to delay or prevent the adoption of
any concrete program. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 136, at 1635-37.
340. See supra notes 327-28 and accompanying text.
341. See L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 136-37.
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constituencies. '' 342 Efforts by the court to produce results by imposing a de343
cision or pressuring agreements will present impartiality problems.
4. The Expert Remedial Formulation Model
The obvious strength of the expert remedial formulation model is its ca344
pacity for proceeding efficiently based on reasoned decisionmaking.
Court-appointed experts typically have the technical ability to gather and
345 In the
assess vast quantities of information in a short period of time.
course of gathering information, experts may consult with a wide range of
affected parties, thereby affording those parties the opportunity to present
34
their views and to react to the solutions under consideration. 6 The expert's
involvement also serves the norm of judicial impartiality by enabling the
court to maintain a disinterested posture with respect to the remedy ultimately proposed. In situations involving highly technical issues in which the
remedy can be implemented without extensive involvement by the affected
parties, expert remedial formulation may provide an effective remedy for the
underlying legal violation.
Expert remedial formulation tends to give participation values short shrift,
however, as the Coney Island case illustrates. Interested parties must depend on the master or court-appointed expert's initiative and openness for
access to the decisionmaking process, thus undercutting the representativeness of the remedial process. In the Coney Island litigation, the master developed closer relationships with white parent groups and government
34 7
officials than with black community groups and their legal representatives.
This created a perception of unfairness and exclusion that later surfaced in
the hostility to the master's proposals. 348 Because the consultations with the
master took place privately, there was also no mechanism for holding the
spokespeople for particular interests accountable to their constituencies.
The form of participation under the expert remedial formulation model
also detracts from the meaningfulness of whatever participation does occur.
Under this model, the expert, rather than the stakeholders in the dispute,
gets the benefit of integrating the range of information and perspectives on
342. Smith, supra note 33, at 109.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 309-12 & 331-32.
344. For a description and examples of expert remedial formation, see supra notes 79-90 and
accompanying text.
345. Curtis Berger produced a plan to integrate the Coney Island schools and redevelop the
neighborhood in three months. Berger, supra note 30, at 710. In the Boston harbor cleanup litigation, Charles Haar produced a report and proposed remedies in thirty days. Little, supra note 40, at

445-46.
346. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
347. See Berger, supra note 30, at 736.
348. See id. at 736-37.
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the remedy. The participants do not have the opportunity to hear and respond directly to the information and arguments of those with differing views
because they do not control the gathering of information, the development of
alternative solutions, and the selection of a remedial alternative. They are
dependent on the expert to create the agenda, frame the issues, gather the
information, propose solutions, and make decisions. 349 This lack of control
is likely to contribute to a perception of unfairness and to alienate participants from the remedial process and its outcome. The expert remedial formulation model also fails to control for unequal resources and power; the
degree of consultation by the expert is likely to reflect the technical sophistication and resources of the participant.
The parties' limited involvement in remedial decisionmaking also affects
the expert's capacity to justify particular remedial decisions. A unilateral
decisionmaking process may preclude the development of persuasive reasons
for the expert's recommended remedy. In the course of developing specific
approaches to realizing the underlying legal principles, the expert must in
some situations pursue goals and norms that are not dictated by those underlying principles. 350 These choices can be justified only by the expert's view of
the wisdom of those norms; 351 and those who must live with the remedy may
have a different perspective on the norms and how they should be implemented. In some cases there may be a reasoned basis for striking a particular
balance among competing norms and applications in a particular context.
Achieving and justifying this balance, however, requires a participatory process of exploring the interests of, and the factual bases and reasoned justifications offered by, the various participants. This process is bypassed by expert
remedial formulation.
Expert remedial formulation also affects the court's capacity to conduct a
meaningful review of the process and outcome of the remedial decisionmaking process. Because the judge is insulated from the development of the remedy and no record is kept of the expert's information gathering and
consideration of remedial alternatives, the court is hampered in its ability to
assess the fairness and adequacy of the suggested remedy.
Finally, remedies developed by experts may collide with the norm of re349. See Brazil, supra note 93, at 415. In the Boston Harbor case, the parties "had no control
over [the informal information gathering] process and apparently were not afforded an opportunity
to probe the reliability or balance of the sources, or to add materials to the informational hopper."
Id. The special master compensated for this initial lack of party control by recommending the
adoption of procedures of consensual decisionmaking to develop specific implementation plans. Id.
at 415-16.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
351. In Curtis Berger's description of how he arrived at a proposed remedy, he acknowledges
that his perception that "forced attendance should not be the preferred alternative" and his "preference for a magnet school" determined the remedial direction. Berger, supra note 30, at 715, 721.
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spect for state and local governmental decisionmaking. In the Coney Island
litigation, the master attempted to minimize the concern for local governmental autonomy by organizing an interagency council with representatives
from the relevant government agencies to aid in the development of a neighborhood plan. 35 2 Apparently, however, the staff who participated were not
in a position to bind their respective agencies, which subsequently objected to
the plan. 353 Moreover, the master's plan was presented to the court as the
master's recommendations, rather than as the parties' agreement. The
master's proposals to desegregate the schools and redevelop the Coney Island
neighborhood were in large part rejected by the court on the ground that
decisions concerning
local officials, not the court, should make basic policy
354
educational philosophy and neighborhood planning.
5. The Consensual Remedial Formulation Model
The forms of remedial decisionmaking that employ third-party facilitators
to assist the stakeholders in developing a consensual remedy grow out of the
developing area of public consensual dispute resolution. 355 Dispute resolution theorists have divided the process of consensus building into three
stages: prenegotiation, negotiation, and implementation. Prenegotiation begins with the decision to bring the participants in the dispute together to
attempt to negotiate a resolution. 356 The next step in the prenegotiation
phase involves identifying the individuals and groups to be involved in the
negotiations and "choosing representatives empowered to speak for the
groups they claim to represent. '357 The process identifies and involves the
individuals and groups directly affected by, responsible for, or in a position to
block implementation of the remedy. 358 The model considers the short-term
logistical advantages of limiting involvement in the negotiations to be outweighed "by the problems that arise if someone decides they have been un'359
fairly excluded.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Id at 722.
Id. at 732.
See Hart v. Community School Bd. 383 F. Supp. 769, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
See supra notes 132-33. Alternative dispute resolution, or ADR, encompasses many differ-

ent procedural mechanisms. See generally DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 237, at 7-13. This
article discusses only one aspect of ADR-processes used to promote consensual resolution of public disputes.
356. L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 94-97.
357. Id. at 101.
358. Id. at 103.
359. Id. The potential managerial problems that can accompany such broadly defined participation are addressed by setting up categories of participants with similar interests and providing a
mechanism for each of these groups to select representatives to participate directly in the negotiations. Id. This procedure was used in a negotiation for the distribution of social services block
grants. Each of four categories of participants selected twenty five representatives and a team
leader. These individuals then participated directly in the negotiations, through meetings with the
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The relevant groups or organizations select representatives, sometimes
with the assistance of a third party. 360 These representatives serve "to amplify the concerns of larger groups, to carry messages and information to
them, and to return with a sense of the group's willingness to commit to
whatever consensus emerges. ' 36 1 The representatives must have the authority to speak and to act authoritatively on behalf of their group or
organization.
Once the representatives have been selected, they establish the ground
rules and identify the key issues and concerns to be addressed by the negotiations. 36 2 The final step in the prenegotiation phase consists of joint fact-finding. The participants identify what they know, what they need to know, and
where the conflicts in their factual assumptions lie. They then obtain the
information and expertise necessary to inform their assessment of possible
363
solutions to their shared problem.
The parties then begin the negotiation process. 364 They first outline their
concerns and brainstorm about possible solutions that would address the
concerns identified by the group. Once the range of options is identified, the
parties attempt to reach a consensus on particular responses to each agenda
item. They attempt to establish objective criteria by which an ultimate agreement can be judged and determine the appropriate remedy based on those
criteria. 365 They may trade items that are valued differently by the participants. 366 If a consensus is reached, the next step is to produce a written
mediator, involvement on subcommittees assigned to generate possible responses to agenda items,
and structured discussions with other participants. See id. at 101, 172-74.
360. Id. at 103, 105. Each group caucuses to select its own spokespeople to enhance the credibility of the representation. Existing organizational leadership may be the appropriate representative.
Depending on the issues under discussion, ad hoc representatives of the complete range of affected
interests may be warranted.

361. Id. at 105.
362. Id. at 108-13. Ground rules include such issues as scheduling meetings, maintaining minutes, establishing a discussion format, and developing a policy governing press coverage and public
attendance at meetings.
363. Id. at 113-16. Susskind and Cruikshank identify several joint fact-finding processes that
may be utilized simultaneously. Their example below refers to a hypothetical dispute resolution

between advocates and opponents of the construction of a dam.
The participants might commission an independent forecast of the impacts the project is
likely to have on future utility rates. They might also jointly select a consultant to prepare
an environmental impact assessment ....They could hire mutually agreed-upon experts
to prepare brief case histories of similar situations in which mitigation efforts were
attempted.
Id. at 116.
364. This process may proceed initially by a subcommittee or series of subcommittees with diverse representation responsible for a particular aspect of the problem.
365. Harter, supra note 133, at 88.
366. See L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 120-21, 146-47.
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agreement, 367 which must then be ratified by the groups or organizations
represented. 368 Finally, the implementation stage involves linking the ad hoc
and estabagreement to the formal decisionmaking processes of government,
369
implementation.
its
monitoring
for
structure
a
lishing
Consensual public dispute resolution usually requires the assistance of a
370
The level of activism of
third party who acts as the keeper of the process.
of the particular
requirements
the
on
depending
the third party may vary,
371
for
responsibility
assumes
party
In many instances, the third
situation.
helpconvening the deliberations, assisting groups in choosing spokespeople,
ing to establish ground rules and an agenda, identifying and obtaining expert
assistance, facilitating fact-finding, coordinating subcommittees, facilitating
the process of collaboration, assuring meaningful participation, preparing de37 2
The third
tailed minutes of the sessions, and helping to build consensus.
party does not, however, have independent substantive responsibility for deciding on a plan.
The two examples of consensual public remedial formulation described in
Part I are attempts to apply this model of consensual dispute resolution in
373
In both cases, the range of stakeholdthe context of public law remedies.
had the opportunity to participate in
outcome
ers interested in the remedial
374
Some effort was also made in both cases to assure the
the negotiations.
367. Harter, supra note 133, at 93, 97-99; L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 123.
Consensus is used here to mean "general agreement"; no party dissents significantly from the
shared position.
368. L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 127. One participant or a small group of
participants prepares a single draft, which is then molded by the group.
369. Id. at 130-31.
370. See i.d at 93-94.
371. The third party may act as a facilitator, whose role is essentially to aid the process of meeting, investigation, and communicating. Id at 152. In more complicated or problematic cases, the
third party may act as mediator, whose role includes helping the parties devise and present options.
Id. at 162; Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms andFunctions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971); see W.
SIMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

77-106 (1971) (describing

three different functions of the mediator: procedural, communicative, and substantive).
372. See L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 142-43; Susskind & McMahon, supra
note 133, at 146.
373. See supra notes 92-115 and accompanying text. Robert Schwartz, the plaintiffs' counsel
who initiated the Philadelphia juvenile justice system negotiations, explicitly attributed his interest
and successful involvement in the mediation to his participation in a negotiation simulation developed by the Harvard Program on Negotiation dealing with prison overcrowding and his reading in
the area of public consensual dispute resolution. Telephone interview with Robert G. Schwartz,
Sept. 28, 1990. The master in the fishing rights dispute "studied extensively the various theories
and strategies of dispute resolution," Brazil, supra note 93, at 412, and worked directly with the
Harvard Program on Negotiation. McGovern, supra note 41, at 461.
374. See supra text accompanying notes 94-102 & 105-15. In the juvenile justice system mediation, the district attorney declined to participate. See supra text accompanying note 105. Although
his absence may in fact have eased the process of reaching agreement, it also posed the risk that the
agreement would fail to reflect his legitimate concerns or would be thwarted by his lack of coopera-
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accountability of the actual participants to their constituencies. The design
of public consensual dispute resolution explicitly provides a process to identify and include the relevant stakeholders. The provision for selecting representatives and ratifying any remedies proposed by the negotiating group
yields some basis for holding the direct participants in the negotiations accountable to the larger group.3 75 The form of involvement in these cases was
designed to facilitate meaningful participation. The stakeholders participated directly in the process and had access to counsel, but they did not rely
on their lawyers to negotiate for them.
Direct involvement by stakeholders in informal processes does create the
potential that parties' power and sophistication will define their success in
the negotiations.3 76 Three factors, however, minimize this concern in the
consensual dispute resolution model. First, if the stakeholders are not in a
position to be able to articulate their own interests, they may be assisted or
represented by attorneys in the negotiations. Lawyers' involvement does
present concerns about the impact of lawyer dominated negotiations on
meaningful participation.3 77 Lawyers involved in consensual remedial formation, however, may self-consciously adopt a problem solving, rather than
an adversary approach to representing their clients' interests. 378 Second, the
mediator can control for the impact of inequalities in skill or bargaining
power by assuring that the concerns of each participant in the negotiation are
effectively communicated and addressed. 379 Third, the remedial negotiations
tion in the remedial endeavor. However, it may well have been that the only politically safe way to
"participate" for the district attorney was to allow the negotiations to go forward without his involvement or his public opposition.
375. In the fishing rights case, accountability was fostered directly by the mediator, who assisted
the tribes in selecting representatives, keeping them apprised of the progress of the discussions, and
setting up a procedure for ratifying any proposed agreement. See L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK,
supra note 92, at 165-66. In the juvenile mediation, steps were taken by both the participants and
the mediator to assure that the representatives of the participating agencies had adequate knowledge and authority to engage in meaningful negotiations. See supra text accompanying notes 10610. However, no steps were taken to assure that plaintiffs' counsel was accountable to his clients,
the juveniles in preadjudication confinement.
376. See supra note 223 and accompanying text; cf. Steinzor & Strauss, Building a Consensus:
Agencies Stressing 'Reg Neg'Approach, Legal Times, Aug. 3, 1987, at 16 (in negotiations regarding
asbestos cleanup in schools, public interest stakeholders feared that industrial representatives would
"swamp" negotiations with better resources).
377. See supra notes 321-28 and accompanying text.
378. See Memo from Robert G. Schwartz, Nov. 19, 1990 (describing lawyers' role as stakeholders in juvenile mediation).
379. For example, in the fishing rights dispute, the mediator assisted the tribes in developing an
internal allocation plan and educating them in the use of negotiation. He also met regularly with
them to inform them of the progress of the negotiations and promote their involvement in them.
See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
There is a disagreement within the dispute resolution community over whether it is appropriate
for a mediator to take an active role in ensuring adequate participation and fair results. Compare
Susskind, supra note 253, at 13-18 (advocating that mediators prompt consideration of absent inter-
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occur in the wake of a liability determination by the court. Judicial recognition of legal entitlements elevates plaintiffs' status and the authoritativeness
of their claims. Moreover, the parties to the deliberation are not dependent
solely on their own resources to amass the information necessary to inform
the decisionmaking process because issues are jointly investigated, and the
compile a comprehensive shared
process offers the assistance necessary38to
0
decision.
factual basis for the remedial
The participatory process used in the consensual remedial formulation
model accommodates the value of respect for state and local institutions.
The process of negotiation under this model allows for the participation of
affected governmental agencies. Participation in the negotiations in no way
compromises the agency's authority to judge for itself whether to approve a
proposed agreement. Thus, the negotiation process preserves the legitimate
decisionmaking authority of state and local governmental officials, while enabling a remedy to emerge that redresses the underlying legal violation.
The informal but structured process of exchanging information, brainstorming, and attempting to reach consensus offers the potential to educate
the parties, develop working relationships, integrate differing perspectives,
1 The flexibility and variety of available
and generate creative solutions.3
ests, facilitate adequate participation, and encourage fair results) with Stulberg, The Theory and
Practiceof Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REv. 85, 97-106 (1981) (mediator
should only address process and promote agreement among parties to negotiations). Susskind looks
to mediation of international disputes rather than labor mediation as the appropriate model for
public consensual dispute resolution. In international mediation, the mediator plays a much more
active role in protecting the quality of the process and outcome. See Susskind & Ozawa, supra note
132, at 272-73.
380. The court or a third-party intermediary may obtain jointly selected experts, facilitate the
sharing of information, structure simulations, help the parties commission studies, and otherwise
assist in the fact-finding process. See L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 145-46.
381. In the fishing rights case, the mediator facilitated the joint fact-gathering process and enabled the participants to gather the information and expertise needed to reassess their own interests
and develop a solution that could accommodate all of the stakeholders. The parties agreed to pool
data concerning Great Lakes fishing. "A tripartite group of biologists from the tribes, the state, and
the United States had cooperated in developing consensus recommendations based upon shared
information. In addition, the tribes turned over all of their fish catch reports to the state so that the
data could be computerized and made available to everyone." McGovern, supra note 41, at 464
(footnote omitted). The biologists were then asked to develop a joint computer model of the five
critical variables. Negotiations over the model revealed that the biologists were generally in agreement. Thus, the process of developing the model resolved most of the biological issues. Id. at 46465.
Similar fact-finding mechanisms were not utilized in the juvenile mediation, in part because of
limitations of time and expense. The negotiations were conducted over a three day period. They
were preceded by a period of about two months of preparation and consultation with the mediator.
The participants attempted to compensate for this limitation by creating a long-term process that
would develop a shared information base. See Schwartz, supra note 104, at 6; Agreement with
Regard to Overcrowding at the Philadelphia Youth Study Center 3 (copy on file at The Georgetown
Law Journal). These limitations affected both the adequacy of the participation and the reasoned
quality of the decisionmaking process.
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forms of involvement of public consensual remedial formulation enhance the
3 2
opportunity for meaningful participation by a wide variety of participants.
It also provides a structure that can accommodate the effective involvement
38 3
of large numbers of people.
The process of collaborative decisionmaking used in both examples enables
the parties to develop a set of norms that can be used to evaluate the adequacy of any proposed remedy.3 4 These norms emerge from the process of
identifying the interests of the various participants in the process. They provide the basis for evaluating the information gathered through the process
and accommodating the varying perspectives of the participants. If the result is justified in relation to the norms identified and information gathered
by the parties, it satisfies the legitimacy norm of reasoned processes of
decisionmaking.
Finally, the consensual remedial formulation model accommodates the
norm of judicial impartiality by insulating the judge from the negotiation
process. At the same time, the mediators who do assist in the remedial
negotiations are not charged with the responsibility of recommending a remedy or assessing the adequacy of the participants' actions for the court, thus
protecting the remedial process from some of the perceptions of unfairness
38 5
associated with the expert remedial formulation.
There are several aspects of the public dispute resolution model that detract from the reasoned character of the decisionmaking process. The process of reaching consensus may proceed based on pure bargaining rather than
through principled decisionmaking. Consequently, the result of the negotiation process may satisfy the participants in the negotiation and yet fail to
conform to the requirements of the particular statute or constitutional provision at issue. 38 6 The public and the court may not be informed of the basis
382. See White, supra note 223, at 40-41 (open-ended, informal procedures more accessible to
those outside professional, dominant culture than adversary, rule-bound processes).
383. See L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 175 (consensus building can take
place among large groups of participants). Although Hater proposes 15 to 25 as the limit on the
number of individuals who can successfully participate in a negotiation, Harter, The Role of the
Courts in Regulatory Negotiation-A Response to Judge Wald, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 51, 56
(1986), he provides no basis for this particular number. Susskind and McMahon disagree with this
limitation and describe several cases in which public consensual dispute resolution achieved consensus among groups of significantly more than 25. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 133, at 155-

56.
384. For example, in the juvenile mediation, the participants focused on the following major
interests: achieving a system that insures care for youth and public safety; reducing the Youth Study
Center population; integrating the courts into one system; developing objective criteria; matching
resources to needs; doing a better job with current dollars; and coming to agreement. Minutes,
supra note 105, at 7.
385. See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
386. See Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 175, at 1085; Resnik, supra note 330, at 554; cf
Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-EPA's
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upon which a particular option was adopted or rejected, or, even worse, the
interests of less powerful groups may be coopted or ignored in the process of
producing an agreement. 3 7 Parties who might otherwise insist on realization of substantive norms may be induced8 to compromise their interests by
38
the threat of confrontation with others.
The process of public consensual dispute resolution also fails to ensure that
the judge is in a position to determine whether the remedy emerging from the
negotiations adequately remediates the underlying substantive norm. As
with expert remedial formulation, the judge is insulated from the entire process of formulating the proposed remedy. Indeed, in the juvenile mediation
experiment, the agreement of the parties constituted the only basis for the
remedy's adoption. The court's minimal role in evaluating the adequacy of
the process and outcome of remedial development poses the risk that the
remedy will be rubber stamped, even if it was reached unfairly or fails to
effectuate the underlying norm.
Finally, the consensual remedial process provides no assistance to the
court in the event that the parties are unable to reach agreement. In this
event, the court must simply start from scratch, forced to adopt one of the
other remedial processes despite their legitimacy deficits. Thus, consensual
remedial decisionmaking fails to address adequately certain aspects of the
public remedial legitimacy norms.
IV. A MODEL OF PUBLIC REMEDIAL DECISIONMAKING
This section proposes a deliberative model of public remedial decisionmaking that builds on both the strengths of public consensual dispute resolution
and civic republicanism's celebration of deliberation as a mechanism for generating fair and just decisions. 38 9 Under this model, the court's role is to
structure a deliberative process whereby the stakeholders in the public dispute develop a consensual remedial solution using reasoned dialogue, and to
39
evaluate the adequacy of this process and the remedy that it produces. 0
Woodstoke Standards 18 ENVTL. L. REv. 55 (1987) (offering similar criticism of regulatory
negotiation).
387. See Amy, The Politics of Environmental Mediation, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1983); Delgado,
Dunn, Bron, Lee & Hubbert, Fairnessand Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1394-95; Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 175,
at 1076-78.
388. Cf Abel, The Contradictionof Informal Justice, in I THE POLIcs OF INFORMAL JUSTICE
267, 280-95 (1982); Delgado, Dunn, Bron, Lee & Hubbert, supra note 387, at 1370.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
390. Cf R. BURT, supra note 137, at 124 ("The touchstone for court interventions in these dis-

putes is to foster and even to provoke prolonged conversation between the immediate parties---not
to offer an apparently definitive resolution to the dispute which effectively shuts it off."); Spiegel,
supra note 137, at 1013 (advocating the creation of structures to create dialogue, rather than scripts
that prescribe remedies); Tribe, supra note 137, at 301 ("The judiciary's most important role be-

1428

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 79:1355

This model forces the court and the participants in the public remedial
process to take account of each of the norms of legitimate remedial
decisionmaking.
The deliberative model set forth in this section provides the outline of a
process that can serve as a template for structuring and evaluating the adequacy of the remedial process in cases exhibiting the characteristics of public
391
This section begins with an
remedial decisionmaking set forth in Part I.
overview of the deliberative model. It then explains and justifies the choices
reflected in the model, both in relation to the norms of public remedial decisionmaking and to possible objections to its adoption. This model is not intended as a blueprint that can be applied uniformly in every context, but
rather as a framework that can be adapted to the demands of particular remedial settings and a starting point for further study and elaboration.
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE DELIBERATIVE MODEL: STRUCTURE,
PLAYERS, AND ROLES

The deliberative model of remedial decisionmaking largely follows the
structures and processes used in public consensual dispute resolution, with
several important additions and modifications designed to address the limitations of the consensual model identified above. The model follows the three
stages of prenegotiation, negotiation, and implementation.3 92 As in public
consensual dispute resolution, the stakeholders participate in a process of
attempting to reach consensus about a remedy. Unlike public consensual
dispute resolution, however, the court plays a significant role in setting up
the deliberations, establishing their normative parameters and procedural
standards, and evaluating their substantive and procedural adequacy. The
deliberative model also addresses the court's role in the event that the parties
do not reach a consensual remedy.
1. The Structure
The deliberative process begins with the court's finding of liability. The
court then defines the structures and processes by which the remedy is to be
developed. The court's first step is to articulate the normative parameters of
the remedial enterprise, which are determined by the liability norms that
comes that of giving structure to the evolution, or rather participating in the structure of the evolution, of social norms and understandings as they come to find expression in the law.").
391. These characteristics include: (1) generally articulated liability norms that do not dictate
the content of the remedy; (2) predictive, problem oriented fact-finding; (3) multiple participants,
organizations, and systems; and (4) participation as an independent value. The deliberative model
need not be used in situations involving a simple negative injunction, such as the invalidation of a
statute or the reinstatement of an illegally discharged employee. See supra text accompanying notes
116-19.
392. See supra text accompanying notes 356-72.
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have been violated. This entails defining the targets of the remedial process. 393 Although these normative parameters do not provide the basis for
selecting among the remedial alternatives designed to realize the liability
norm, they do define the remediation norm as both the driving force and
constraint of the deliberative process.
The process then moves to the prenegotiation stage. The judge performs
several important functions at this stage. First, she introduces and endorses
the deliberative model as the method of remedial formulation. Second, with
the assistance of the parties, she performs an initial assessment of the individuals and organizations whose participation in the remedial stage is necessary
to developing and implementing a fair and workable remedy. 394 The judge
395
then invites these participants to join in the formulation of the remedy.
393. For example, a judge finding that the conditions of confinement in a prison violate the
eighth amendment may list the aspects of prison life that need to be remedied in order to eliminate
the violation, such as violence, environmental sanitation, medical care, and overcrowding.
394. Cf. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resource" The Efficiency ofFederal
Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REv. 701, 719-26 (1978); Rhode, supra note 29, at 1253. The issue
of the appropriate standards and processes for determining who should participate at the remedial
stage of public law litigation is an important one that has not been adequately addressed in the
literature and warrants further study. Under the deliberative model, the net is cast broadly to
include the range of individuals directly affected by, responsible for, or in a position to block implementation of a remedy. Instead of attempting to create a substantive standard to address the management problems inherent in broadly defined participation--an effort that has been notably
unsuccessful in defining a limiting principle for intervention-the deliberative model establishes a
process to identify the actual participants in the decisionmaking process and structure their involvement. For example, in situations involving groups or individuals with overlapping interests, a
facilitator can assist in identifying categories of interested participants, who then select representatives to participate directly in the deliberations. See supra notes 357-59 and accompanying text.
These participants are then accountable to the constituency they represent.
395. For example, in the fishing rights cases, the court determined that the State represented
competing interests: state commercial fishers, the sport fishing and tourism industry, Indian citizens living outside the reservations, and the public peace. At the outset of the negotiations, the
court named the groups of state fishers as litigating amici: they had a participatory role but could
not veto a settlement. McGovern, supra note 41, at 463. The issue of nonparty involvement in
remedial decisionmaking is addressed more fully below. See infra notes 442-43 and accompanying
text.
Several procedural mechanisms are available to enable the participation of actors who were not
involved in the liability determination. First, those actors can intervene as parties at the remedial
stage under FED. R. Civ. P. 24. See, e.g., United States v. Crucial, 722 F.2d 1182, 1190-91 (5th Cir.
1983) (allowing intervention to separate organization of parents and organization claiming that
county failed to fashion adequate educational program for minority students); Berkman v. City of
New York, 705 F.2d 584, 588 (2d Cir. 1983) (Firefighters' union allowed to intervene at remedial
stage in Title VII case to participate in design of nondiscriminatory firefighters' test). Second, FED.
R. Civ. P. 19(a) provides for the joinder of parties in whose absence "complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties." Courts can also retain parties absolved at the liability stage
to assist in the development of a remedy. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 400
(1982) (directing union to remain in litigation as a defendant "so that full relief could be awarded to
the victims of the employer's... discrimination"); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 582 n.4 (1st
Cir. 1974) (requiring statewide education officials who did not participate in local segregation to
remain as defendants to help devise remedies). Third, courts can appoint litigating amici, as in the
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Third, she oversees a process by which the participants select a third party
facilitator or mediator to assist them in structuring and engaging in the pro396
cess of consensual decisionmaking.
Fourth, the court outlines for the participants the characteristics of the
process by which they are to attempt to craft a remedy. These include: (1)
direct involvement by representatives of the stakeholders in the deliberative
process; (2) consideration of each proposed remedial alternative using reasoned argument supported by facts introduced in the deliberations; (3) development of a remedy that is reasonably calculated to redress the violations in
each of the areas identified by the court; (4) development of a remedy that is
acceptable to the participants in the remedial process; and (5) maintenance of
daily minutes, to be reviewed by the group. 397 The court also informs the
participants as to the standards it will use to assess the adequacy of the proposed remedy. Finally, the court, in consultation with the participants and
the facilitator/mediator, establishes deadlines for the completion of the delib398
erative process and the submission of a proposed remedy.
The facilitator/mediator then assists the participants in structuring the
decisionmaking process, educating themselves about the steps of the deliberations, defining the various roles of the participants and the third party, and
undertaking the deliberations. The stages of the deliberative process correspond to those identified in the description of public consensual dispute
resolution: identifying the relevant stakeholders, assuring adequate representation by participants in the deliberations, defining ground rules and an
agenda, engaging in joint fact-finding, identifying interests and norms, brainaccommostorming on possible solutions, and selecting a remedy that best
399
dates these interests and norms in light of the factual record.
If the participants reach a consensus, they then reduce the agreement to
fishing rights case described above. Fourth, the court can consult informally with various participants and include them in the deliberations without any formal status.
396. See supra note 93 and accompanying text; cf L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note
92, at 172 (in social services block grant dispute, mediator was selected by a mediator-selection
committee that included five of the initial organizers from each of four interest groups).

A facilitator or mediator is necessary in public remedial decisionmaking for several reasons, some
of which may not apply in other public dispute resolution contexts. First, the parties must overcome hostilities that are likely to carry over from the adversarial determination of liability and will
likely require assistance in interacting, at least initially. Second, the issues and number of parties
involved typically introduce a level of complexity that requires assistance. Third, many of the participants are likely to be inexperienced with the processes of consensual dispute resolution. Finally,
third-party involvement is necessary to ensure that the procedural requirements established by the
court are followed. For a discussion of the distinction between a facilitator and a mediator, see
supra note 371.
397. The justification for these instructions is discussed below. See infra Part IV.a.
398. Deadlines are important, both to provide a structure for the process and to limit the capacity of participants to use delay strategically. See infra note 432 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 356-72 and accompanying text.
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writing, often with the assistance of the facilitator/mediator. Remedies negotiated by representatives must be approved by their constituent organizations or groups. The agreement is then presented to the court, along with a
jointly filed supporting memorandum, the minutes of the deliberations, and
any factual reports or information considered by the participants in reaching
their decision. The court then holds a public hearing on the proposed remedy, at which objections to the remedy may be presented to the court, including challenges to the remedy's factual foundation. The court then evaluates
the remedy in terms of the adequacy of the deliberative process-its compliance with the principles articulated to the participants at the outset of the
deliberations, its responsiveness to the concerns raised through the deliberations, and its capacity to redress the underlying legal violation-and issues
an opinion justifying its conclusions. If the judge finds the process or outcome of the deliberations inadequate, she remands the remedy to the participants to address the bases for her concern. 40°
If the parties are unable to reach consensus through the deliberative process, they submit to the court a document setting forth the areas in which
they have reached agreement, the information gathered in the course of the
deliberations, the minutes of the deliberations, and the areas in which agreement has not been reached. The participants may also present the court with
separate factual submissions, arguments, and proposed remedial solutions.
The court then holds formal hearings on the disputed aspects of the remedy,
rules on the adequacy of any agreements produced through the deliberative
process, and formulates a remedy for the remaining areas, based on the information produced through the deliberations, the articulated views of the participants, and any additional information deemed necessary. 401
2. The Players and Their Roles
The players in the deliberative decisionmaking process include the judge, a
neutral facilitator/mediator, a recorder of the deliberations, the parties to the
litigation, representatives of the stakeholders, and the parties' lawyers.
The judge's role consists of structuring the decisionmaking process, defin400. The court's adoption of the remedy depends on the adequacy of both the process and the
outcome. Without an adequate process of fact-gathering and deliberation, the adequacy of particular remedial choices may be difficult to assess. More importantly, a remedy reached through unfair
or exclusive processes violates norms that are important to preserving the legitimacy of the remedial

process.
401. It is important that, in the event consensus cannot be reached, the court impose a remedy
based on the deliberations rather than attempt to produce an agreement among the lawyers through
pure bargaining. The traditional bargaining process is unlikely to produce a reasoned remedy. See
supra text accompanying notes 327-28. Moreover, the possibility that the parties may resort to
bargaining poses the risk of unraveling the central commitment to reasoned decisionmaking from
the outset of the deliberations.
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ing the principles for assessing the adequacy of the process and any proposed
remedy, overseeing the selection of a facilitator/mediator, evaluating the adequacy of the decisionmaking process and the proposed remedy, and deciding
4 2
upon a remedy in the event the stakeholders fail to reach a consensus. 0
Thus, the deliberative model does not eliminate the court's role in formulating an appropriate remedy; instead, it recasts the court's involvement into
the more familiar but still challenging tasks of establishing standards, structuring the process, and evaluating the process' conformity to substantive and
4 3
procedural norms. 0
The facilitator/mediator's role is to assist the participants in setting up the
deliberative process, adhering to the guidelines established by the court, communicating with one another, developing the necessary factual foundation
for the deliberations, identifying possible remedial solutions, and developing
a consensus. She may meet individually with the participants to assist them
in defining their interests and goals, selecting representatives, and dealing
with internal conflicts. 4°4 The role and intensity of involvement of the third
party varies depending on the demands of the particular case-the degree of
complexity of the issues, the number of parties, the level of hostility and
mistrust among the stakeholders, and the sophistication of the participants. 40 5 The facilitator/mediator always plays a crucial role in ensuring
402. The court's role in the deliberative process is analogous in important respects to the court's
role in bankruptcy reorganization. See generally M. BIENENSTOCK, supra note 317. The bankruptcy system establishes a structure supervised by the court that enables multiple parties with
diverse interests to achieve a consensus plan for reorganization. The court evaluates the adequacy
of a reorganization plan, both in terms of its conformity with the requirements of the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(2) (1988), and its feasibility. The court's feasibility determination involves a substantive evaluation of a negotiated plan involving a myriad of fact-specific issues and
predictions about how some actors, particularly the debtor, will behave in the future. If a consensus
plan cannot be reached, under certain circumstances the court undertakes the task of valuing the
firm for purposes of determining whether the plan is fair, equitable, and does not discriminate
unfairly. Id. § 1129(b). If a plan cannot be confirmed, then the case may be converted to a Chapter
7 bankruptcy, resulting in the liquidation of the company. Id § 11 12(b)(5).
Most reorganizations involving large, publicly held corporations are achieved through a consensual plan. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 317, at 157. Multiple parties with divergent interests work out a solution that is then assessed by the court in relation to the requirements of the
Bankruptcy Code. For a description of the aspects in which the bankruptcy reorganization process
deviates from the deliberative model, see supra note 317.
403. Cf Wald, Negotiation ofEnvironmental Disputer" A New Rule for the Courts, 10 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 17 (1985).
404. In a model negotiation developed by Susskind and Cruikshank based on the fishing rights
case, the mediator met with the tribes to negotiate an intertribal allocation plan. The mediator
perceived the intertribal negotiations to serve several functions. They resolved potential conflicts
between the tribes that would exist regardless of the results of the broader negotiations, educated
the tribal negotiators in their negotiation skills, and encouraged the state to "bargain seriously." L.
SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 166.
405. See id. at 149-50. Susskind and Cruikshank distinguish between different roles depending
on the degree of the third party's procedural involvement. A facilitator focuses almost entirely on
process, taking care of the mechanics of negotiation and promoting communication and under-
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that the process abides by the standards articulated by the court, that participants have the opportunity to communicate their views, and that the process
proceeds based on reasoned argument. 4°6
The recorder's role is to prepare minutes reflecting the issues, data, proposals, and progress of the deliberations, and to revise those minutes in light
of corrections offered by the deliberating group. 40 7 The identity of the recorder may vary, but it is important that the individual be perceived as neutral by the participants. In some situations, the facilitator/mediator may be
able to perform this role.
The stakeholders include parties and nonparties responsible for, directly
affected by, or in a position to block implementation of the remedial outcome. Their role is to work with the facilitator/mediator and, when appropriate, their lawyers 40° to identify appropriate representatives to conduct the
discussions, identify ground rules for the deliberations, develop a factual
foundation for the discussions, facilitate their participation in the deliberations through their representatives, and determine whether to approve any
agreement reached through the deliberations. The extent of the stakeholders'
involvement will vary. Some may be involved only with respect to discrete
issues. If there are numerous stakeholders, the group may designate representative subcommittees to develop remedial options to present to the larger
group. 40 9 Factors relevant to determining the scope of participants' involvement include whether they have legal interests that may be affected by the
remedy, the degree to which they are responsible for or affected by a particular aspect of the remedy, their knowledge of particular aspects of the remedy,
and the extent to which their agreement is a necessary component of an effective solution.
The deliberative model revises the concept of legal representation develstanding. Id. at 152. A mediator takes a more active role in the substantive development of the
agreement without removing control of the outcome from the parties. Id. at 162-63.
406. This role conflicts with a vision of the facilitator's role as simply serving the interests of the
parties and promoting an agreement that satisfies those interests. See Stulberg, supra note 379, at
97-106. This approach would undercut the court's capacity to promote reasoned processes of decisionmaking and to control for unequal political power. Moreover, because the deliberations take
place under the supervision of the court, some of the concerns underlying the insistence on mediator

agnosticism concerning the quality and substance of the deliberations are less pressing. It is the
court, rather than the mediator, that sets the terms of the negotiations. Moreover, the mediator is
accountable to the court as well as to the participants in the negotiations.
407. The minutes are not verbatim transcripts of the discussions. In fact, they need not reflect
the identity of the proponents of various positions. Their importance is to reflect the interests,
values, factual information, proposed solutions, and justifications for particular decisions by the
group.
408. Nonparty participants need not be represented by counsel to participate in the deliberations.
409. See, e.g., L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 172-73 (in dispute over social
service block grant allocations involving over one hundred participants, subcommittees with two

people from each area of interest were assigned to generate possible responses to agenda items).
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oped under the adversary model. 410 Under the deliberative model, the lawyer's role is to facilitate her clients' effective participation in the process of
remedial decisionmaking. This role may involve assisting individuals or
groups in organizing and selecting representatives. 411 In some instances,
such as when the client has the capacity to articulate her own interests and to
participate fully in the dialogue, the lawyer may simply monitor the progress
of the discussions, provide ideas, and draft proposals implementing the
agreements reached.4 12 In other cases, when the client is unable to participate fully in the deliberations, the lawyer may play a more substantial role in
the deliberations. 41 3 She may act as the representative of the clients' interests
and perspective in the deliberative process. Lawyers acting in this capacity
are subject to the accountability requirements governing any representative
speaking on behalf of a group or organization under the deliberative model.
B. EXPLANATION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE DELIBERATIVE MODEL

The deliberative model is designed to enable the process of remedial decisionmaking to satisfy the basic norms of legitimate public remedial process.
It incorporates the strengths of the public consensual dispute resolution
model-the emphasis on meaningful participation by the stakeholders, the
flexible but structured decisionmaking processes, the maintenance of judicial
414
impartiality, and the involvement of state and local governmental actors.
There are several important differences, however, between public consensual
dispute resolution and the deliberative model that enhance the capacity of
the decisionmaking process to satisfy the norms of legitimate public remedial
process.
First, the model serves the norm of reasoned decisionmaking by requiring
that the participants base any agreement on reasoned argument in relation to
identified norms. Pure exchange is not sufficient. 415 This does not mean that
410. See supra text accompanying notes 213-17.
411. See Hoffman-LaRoche Inc. v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482, 485 (1989) (counsel assisted employees in forming a group to challenge the legality of employers' reduction in force).
412. For example, in the fishing rights mediation, the lawyers were "assigned the task of drafting
a document consistent with the commitments the parties had made to each other." L. SUSSK1ND &
J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 167-68.
413. The Pennsylvania juvenile justice system mediation is a good example of such a situation.
See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text. In that mediation, members of the plaintiff classjuveniles incarcerated in the Youth Study Center-were both unavailable for the negotiations because of their incarceration and limited in their capacity to participate because of their youth and
relative unsophistication.
414. See supra notes 374-85 and accompanying text.
415. Some have argued that insistence on reasoned decisionmaking may complicate the process
of reaching consensus. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 136, at 1636-37 (arguing that ideologically tinged discussions tend to make compromise and consensus more difficult among elite political
actors and the public). Others express more confidence that sharing competing perspectives can
bring about important shifts and enable us to become less rigidly attached to our own perspective.
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agreement and parties preferences can play no role in the deliberations.
Agreement can be an independent value in the remedial context if it is
needed to achieve implementation of the remedy. Moreover, there may be
situations in which the only bases for selecting among several remedial solutions are the preferences of the parties. In these situations, agreement may
appropriately be used to distinguish among remedial solutions, provided that
the remedy adopted effectuates the liability norm and meets the other process
requirements of the deliberative model.
This insistence on reasoned decisionmaking disciplines the participants
and the judge to reach results based on the merits of particular remedial
proposals, rather than on considerations of power or convenience. Moreover, the deliberative model provides a normative dimension to the remedial
formulation process. The process and outcome are not purely private; their
adequacy must be publicly assessed by the court in relation to substantive
norms. The deliberative model produces a record of the deliberations, which
provides a basis for assessing the adequacy of a proposed remedy. Indeed,
the deliberative process informs the judge's normative assessment, and thus
fulfill its interpretive function at the remedial stage
better equips the court to
41 6
in public law litigation.
The deliberative model further serves the norm of reasoned decisionmaking by structuring the current practice of informally involving multiple actors in remedial development to provide the opportunity for all participants
to respond to all of the arguments presented. The model also provides a
mechanism for exposing the court's role in structuring the remedy to review
by both the public and the appellate courts. The procedural and substantive
standards articulated by the trial court at the outset of the deliberations, and
a basis for
the conformity of the remedial process to those standards, provide
4 17
decisionmaking.
meaningful appellate review of public remedial
Over time, courts' decisions assessing the adequacy of particular remedial
efforts may reveal patterns of effective remedial processes and outcomes in
particular institutional contexts. These decisions have the potential to contribute to the normative development of remedial process. They may also
See Lesnick, A Perspective on Perspectives, 1991 DuKE L. J. (forthcoming). One's view of the transformative potential of deliberation appears itself to be a product of perspective. In any case, the
range of ideological debate in the remedial context is constrained by several factors. First, the court
has determined the normative framework for the enterprise, which is not open for negotiation.
Second, the goal of the process is implementing rather than establishing legal norms. Third, agreement is itself an independent, although not dispositive value. Finally, the precedential value of the
remedial decision is limited.
416. See L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 170.
417. The issue of the role of appellate courts in public law litigation is the subject of a forthcoming article.
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produce greater clarity concerning the substantive norms informing the remedial decisionmaking in particular contexts.
Second, the deliberative model avoids many of the hazards of informality
by locating the informal interactions of the participants within a framework
of judicially established standards and oversight. As in formal jury deliberations, the participants become part of the judicial process, and are thus induced to act based on reason rather than bias. 418 The deliberative model,
like formal adjudication, recognizes and accounts for inequality by requiring
reasoned responses to the views of all participants. 4 9 Disagreements about
the appropriate means of realizing values are not concealed, but rather provide the mechanism for forging an informed consensus. 4 20 The combination
of formal and informal processes minimizes the risk that informality will
leave inequality unchecked. Furthermore, because participants in the process are accountable both to their respective constituencies and to the court,
the deliberative model minimizes the risk of cooptation.
It is the judicial supervision of informal decisionmaking processes that enables the deliberative model to strike a balance that accommodates the legitimacy norms of participation, impartiality, reasoned decisionmaking, and
remediation. This juxtaposition of collaborative and coercive structures and
processes, however, raises a number of potential challenges to the propriety
and viability of the deliberative model.
How can the court ensure compliance with norms such as meaningful participation and reasoned decisionmaking if it does not participate directly in
the deliberations and is involved only at the outset and the conclusion of the
deliberations, and in the event of breakdown of the remedial process? In
fact, no system or set of rules can ensure compliance with these norms, and
attempts to achieve fairness and equality by instituting rigid rules and standards only enhances the possibility of strategic manipulation, perversion of
421
the process, and reemergence of inequalities in new and less visible forms.
Instead of a rule-based approach, the deliberative model utilizes actors,
processes, and incentives to promote compliance with the norms of legitimate remedial process. The court introduces incentives for the participants
418. See S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 185 (1988); Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee, & Hubert, supra note 387, at 1370.
419. But see Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 passim (1974) (showing that adversary system systematically
favors repeat players).
420. See supra text accompanying notes 365-69.
421. See Galanter, supra note 419, passim (showing the long-term advantages of "repeat players"
in the adversary system); cf R. BURT, supra note 137, at 134 (a fixed hierarchy of authority is

destructive of reasoned, effective, and dynamic decision making); Spiegel, supra note 137, at 101014 (rigid ethical rules tend to stifle rather than expand attorney-client communication); Tribe, supra
note 137, at 286, 306-08 (rule-oriented adjudication avoids important societal discourse about
changing norms).
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to aspire to norms such as meaningful participation and reasoned decisionmaking by making it clear that the process and results will be evaluated in
relation to them. 422 The facilitator/mediator plays a crucial role in setting
up and monitoring a process that conforms to these norms. She takes steps
to assure that the views of less powerful participants are addressed. The
facilitator/mediator injects into the ongoing discussion the importance of
reasoned decisionmaking and prompts the participants to offer persuasive
justifications for their views. Lawyers may also play an important role in
protecting the fairness of the process. 423 Finally, the requirement that each
stakeholder accept the result of the process plays a critical disciplining role.
No interest can be effectively excluded from the process without jeopardizing
the success of the proposal.
Perhaps the most fundamental objection to the deliberative model is the
argument that it just will not work. People will refuse to cooperate, will
abuse the process, and will never reach consensus. The court simply cannot
force the parties to cooperate, and yet cooperation is essential to the success
of the deliberative model.
The most powerful response to these challenges is the emerging remedial
practice itself. The deliberative model has worked, at least to the extent of
producing consensus on a public law remedy among diverse stakeholders
who were themselves skeptical about the process and its prospects for success. 424 Thus, stakeholders can and do reach consensus in situations in
if
which their involvement in a cooperative process is required, particularly
425
they have independent incentives to participate in the process.
Such incentives are often present in the remedial context, where the parties
face certain imposition of a court-ordered remedy if they are unable or unwilling to deliberate. The defendants have an interest in maintaining some
control over the remedial process and avoiding the imposition of a remedy
designed unilaterally by the court. The plaintiffs have an interest in involving the defendants in the remedial process because it enhances the likelihood
of developing a workable remedy that will be promptly implemented. Nonparties have an incentive to participate lest they be frozen out of a process
that will dramatically affect their interests. In contrast, even limited experience with the adversary process at the remedial stage teaches that the parties'
422. If the deliberative model were widely adopted, the seriousness of the court's monitoring role
would be easier to convey, because it would be reflected in judicial decisions assessing the adequacy
of public remedial processes.
423. See supra notes 410-13 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 92-115 and accompanying text (Great Lakes fishing rights dispute and
Pennsylvania juvenile justice mediation).
425. Cf. Sullivan, The Difficulties of Mandatory Negotiation (the Colstrip Power Plant Case), in
RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY DISPUTES 56, 73-74 (1983) (comparing a successful
mandatory negotiation with one that failed to produce an agreement).

1438

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 79:1355

interests are unlikely to be served through the adversary model. 426 The

threat of formal adjudication predisposes participation in deliberation.
There are additional factors favoring the successful marriage of deliberation and judicial supervision. The deliberative process identifies and brings
to the forefront the interdependence of interests of the participants. Some
participants must deal with each other regularly over a long period of time
and depend on each other's cooperation to satisfy personal and institutional
objectives. To the extent that the participants share the desire to reduce or
eliminate judicial involvement in their institution, they are dependent on
each other's willingness to cooperate in the formulation of an acceptable
remedy. Yet, factors such as their formal institutional positions, lack of
structured contact, and fragmented authority reduce their capacity to act on
this interdependence in the absence of the type of supplementary structure
4 27
provided by the deliberative model.
Involvement in the deliberative process also enhances the possibility of cooperation in the implementation of the remedy by initially reluctant participants. By involving the participants in setting up a procedural mechanism
for establishing the remedy, the deliberative model enhances the perceived
428
legitimacy and acceptance of the remedy ultimately adopted by the court.
The process of trying to develop a consensual resolution of the remedial dispute increases the participants' identification with the problem-solving
group, their commitment to the process, and their desire to reach a consensual resolution. 429 The existence of hostile relations between the parties does
not prevent their productive involvement, although it may bear on the particular form of the deliberations. 430 The deliberations also offer such tangible
benefits as expertise and resources that induce involvement. As the delibera426. Cf Scholtz, Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement, 18 LAW
& Soc'y REV. 179, 185-86 (1984) ("the expected rewards for both agency and firm... from mutual
cooperation exceed the punishment.., that an evading firm and deterring agency can expect to
receive when they confront each other in legalistic battles"); Winter, BargainingRationality in Regulation, 19 LAW & Soc'y REV. 219, 236-37 (1985) ("Cooperation, negotiation, bargaining, bartering are not only the rule in regulatory law enforcement, but given the reality of social life, they
are the preferred way of dealing with regulatory problems.").
427. See Sturm, supra note 26, at 837-46.
428. Cf Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss?, supra note 136, at 967-68 (identifying procedural advantages to having people agree to procedure up front, before they can predict substantive outcome).
429. See Eisenberg, supra note 213, at 679-80. For a discussion of the conditions fostering the
evolution of cooperation in a two-party setting, see R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). However, the opportunities for strategic behavior increase dramatically in a multiparty setting. For a discussion of the features of the deliberative model that limit the opportunity
for at least some forms of strategic behavior, see supra notes 431-32 and accompanying text.
430. L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 92, at 188 ("Many disputants assume that
because relations between the parties are hostile, productive negotiations cannot take place. Negotiation researchers have shown that this is not true. Negotiations can proceed even when the parties
have no trust in each other at all.").
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tive process unfolds and the parties devote time and energy to it, they are
likely to become committed to its success. Thus, the deliberative process has
the potential to counteract the polarization created by the adversary system
and the liability determination.
Furthermore, the deliberative model does not assume or require that consensus be reached. The model provides the backstop of a judicially-imposed
remedy in the event the participants are unable to reach agreement.
Although a court-imposed remedy may undermine norms of remedial legitimacy, the court's adoption of this role derives support from the parties' failure to reach agreement. Moreover, the court's remedial decision following
unsuccessful deliberations retains some of the values of the deliberative
model. Prior to the issuance of a court-ordered remedy, the participants will
have had a substantial opportunity to express their views both informally
through the deliberations and in formal hearings. The court's remedial decision, therefore, will be informed by the data, diversity of perspective, and
reasoning produced by the deliberations.
Another possible objection to the deliberative model is the possibility that
the participants may either attempt to use the process as a tool for delay, or
attempt to formalize or subvert the deliberations. The possibility of strategic
manipulation of the remedial process, however, exists under all forms of remedial decisionmaking. 4 31 Under the deliberative model, the facilitator/mediator and the court can minimize the opportunity for these tactics by
4 32 If it becomes
establishing and enforcing deadlines for the negotiations.
clear that the deliberations are being stonewalled by a particular participant,
the other participants may seek the court's assistance in either enforcing the
requirements of deliberation or, if necessary, imposing a remedy based on the
record produced by those who were involved in the deliberations.
The deliberative model calls upon the court to establish a supplemental
structure to formulate the remedy. This poses the question of the source of
the court's authority to establish and manage this process. This aspect of the
model, however, is neither novel nor problematic. The court's well-established authority to use its coercive powers to provide meaningful remedies433
the foundation of the court's involvement in public law remediation -justifies the imposition of supplemental processes designed to remedy legal
431. For a discussion of how defendants act strategically when the court assumes the director
approach to remedial formulation in prison cases, see Sturm, supra note 26, at 887-89.
432. The ability to prevent sustained delay and subversion of the deliberative process depends on
the court's willingness to use its coercive sanctions. Although judges have been reluctant to use
their coercive powers to enforce their decrees, many judges have used their contempt power to
prompt defendants' compliance. See Sturm, supra note 26, at n.353. Judicial reluctance to enforce
orders will limit the potential success of any remedial endeavor. See M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER,
supra note 53, at 20.
433. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
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violations. 434
The deliberative model also raises the related issue of the court's authority
to order direct involvement by the stakeholders in the deliberative process.
Does the requirement of stakeholder participation unduly interfere in the attorney/client relationship? Does it subject participants to the risk of further
litigation? Does it coerce parties into settlements? Although these concerns
are legitimate, they can all be adequately addressed within the framework of
the deliberative model. First, there is support for the court's inherent authority to require direct party appearance at court-ordered settlement negotiations as early as the pretrial stage. 435 Second, the deliberative model does
not prescribe the precise form or extent of the stakeholder's participation.
Because the lawyer and client are free to determine the division of roles in
the deliberations, the autonomy of that relationship is preserved. Finally, the
risk of adverse legal consequences flowing from direct involvement is less
pressing at the remedial stage because liability has already been determined.
Moreover, the court can take steps to minimize this risk by limiting the use
or admissibility of the record of the deliberative process to remedial
43 6
formulation.
The deliberative model's insistence that different branches or sub-groups
within a hierarchical governmental system participate separately in the remedial process presents another area of concern. Can the court, consistent with
the norm of respect for state and local government, insist that the government speak with other than one voice? Is there a justification for deviating
from the traditional hierarchical model of governmental authority? 437 There
434. Indeed, even in the pretrial context, the Supreme Court has recognized that courts have
inherent authority, buttressed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "to manage their own affairs
so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Hoffman-La Roche v. Sperling,
110 S.Ct. 482, 487 (1989) (quoting Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).
435. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989) (en
banc) (district court had power to order represented litigant to appear in person at pretrial conference); In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1974) (to compel appearance of party's insurer at
pretrial conference and to enforce order was well within scope of district court's authority). There
were a number of dissenting opinions filed in Joseph Oat. Part of the dissents' concern was the
majority's reading of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the possibility of abuse
and unfairness presented by the court's active involvement in pressuring pretrial settlements. Id. at
661-62 (Coffey, J., dissenting). This concern is much less weighty at the remedial stage.
436. Judge Becker used this approach in PARC v. Pennsylvania. See supra text accompanying
note 74.
437. This model of governmental authority is reflected in the statutes, executive orders, and opinions vesting litigating authority for all cases in which the United States is a party in the Attorney
General. See 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (1988); The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator for the
United States, supra note 325. As of 1978, however, "some 31 Executive Branch and independent
agencies have been granted litigating authority independent of the Department of Justice." Id. at
53. Moreover, this authority has been interpreted to reserve to the agencies substantial control over
policy judgments in areas in which the agency has developed special expertise and "in which the
agency is vested by law with flexibility and discretion to make policy judgments." Id. at 55. The
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are several responses to this concern. First, it is important to remember that
the deliberative process occurs in a limited set of circumstances-when an
organization's normal institutional processes and roles have failed. Deferwould
ring to the formal organizational leadership under such circumstances
438
process.
remedial
public
compromise the basic norms of legitimate
Second, the empirical premise that state and local governments can and do
present a unified front in public law litigation is not necessarily accurate.
The formalistic conception of a completely organized and centralized governmental structure with a single spokesperson at the top has broken down
in the public law litigation context. Different governmental entities have different and sometimes conflicting political and legal interests that frequently
lead them to take divergent positions in litigation and regularly prompt
judges to provide for separate representation of governmental departments
within the same executive branch. 439 Even within a particular institution,
such as a prison, groups may have independent interests that are not taken
0
into account by existing structures of government." Moreover, the leaders
of governmental agencies held liable for public law violations may lack the
formal authority over other branches of government whose involvement is
necessary to achieve implementation of the remedy. Under these circumstances, the top-down model of remedial implementation is unlikely to work.
Finally, this concern fails to take account of a fundamental premise of the
deliberative model. The deliberative decisionmaking process does not replace the formal governmental structure; it only supplements it for purposes
of developing a meaningful remedy. The deliberative structure is both temporary and focused. The court is in effect deputizing the participants in the
process as agents of the court to develop and propose a consensual remedy.4 1 The decision to approve a consensual remedy remains in the hands of
deliberative model is not necessarily inconsistent with those cases in which the Attorney General

retains sole litigating authority because the Attorney General has the authority to approve or reject
the proposed remedy.
438. See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text.
439. See R. BURT, supra note 44, at 315-22 (detailing differences between Department of Justice
and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in Pennhurst litigation).
440. See Sturm, supra note 26, at 813-46. Indeed, these groups have themselves sued the leadership of their organizations for failing to alleviate illegal conditions and practices in the organizations. For example, guards have brought suit against the commissioner of the department of
corrections challenging overcrowding in prisons. See Council 13, Am. Fed. of State, County and
Mun. Employees v. Pennsylvania, Petition for Review, Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
(Apr. 3, 1990) (guard union seeking injunctive relief "to ameliorate life-threatening working conditions at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford") (copy on file at The Georgetown Law
Journal).
441. Thus, the deliberative model builds on the current practice used in both jail and school
desegregation cases of calling upon the staff of the defendant organizations to investigate and develop remedies for the court. See Smith, supra note 33, at 73 (describing the appointment of a
special department of the school board to develop a desegregation remedy for the court); Storey,
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those with official power to act for the government. Thus, the court is not
ordering the restructuring of governmental decisionmaking; it is only requiring that governmental parties fulfill their responsibility to assist the court in
developing a fair and workable remedy.
The involvement of nonparties in remedial decisionmaking under the deliberative model presents another potential problem: what if important nonparty stakeholders are unwilling to participate voluntarily in the
deliberations? One possible response is to join or retain these actors as parties whose involvement in remedial formulation is necessary to provide complete relief to the parties.44 2 Although parties not subject to liability may not
be subjected to the same remedial responsibilities as those imposed on a liable
party, they may "be retained in the lawsuit and even subjected to such minor
and ancillary provisions of an injunctive order as the District Court might
'4
find necessary to grant complete relief." "

3

Another possible approach to increasing third-party involvement in the
deliberative process is to extend the opportunity to participate to all stakeholders, and to preclude those who refuse to participate from challenging
either the process or the resulting remedy. Although this approach avoids
the difficulty of coercing participation in the deliberative process, it may result in the exclusion of significant perspectives and information.
Another concern regarding the deliberative model applies equally to any
collaborative process involving lawyers: the inconsistency between the collaborative model and the traditional adversary conception of the lawyers'
role.444 The deliberative model, like other forms of collaborative decisionmaking, casts lawyers in a somewhat unfamiliar role. Not only is the lawyer
charged with the responsibility of facilitating a collaborative decisionmaking
process, in at least some contexts she also takes a back seat to the client's
direct involvement in the deliberations. Implementation of the deliberative
supra note 79, at 159 (describing the creation of a monitoring and enforcement panel including two
staff from the department of corrections).
442. Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the joinder of parties in
whose absence "complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties." FED. R. Civ. P.
19; see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 400 (1982) (directing union to remain in
litigation as a defendants "so that full relief could be awarded to victims of... discrimination");
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 356 n. 43 (1977) (same); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F. 2d
580, 582 n.4 (1st Cir. 1974) (requiring statewide education officials who did not participate in local
segregation to remain as defendants to help devise remedies), cert denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
443. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 399 (1982) (citing Zipes,
455 U.S. at 399-400).

444. See generally Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 Mo. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 25, 32-33; Riskin,

Mediationand Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 43-48 (1982). The Code of Professional Responsibility shares this exclusive focus on the lawyer's adversarial role. See generally, Note, The MediatorLawyer: Implicationsfor the Practiceof Law and One Argument for ProfessionalResponsibility Guidance-A Proposalfor Some Ethical Considerations,34 UCLA L. REv. 507, 511-15 (1986).
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model requires a reasonable expectation that lawyers will be able or willing
to perform this nonadversarial role.
There are several responses to the concern about lawyers' involvement in
the deliberative process. First, the vision of lawyer as gladiator does not apply to a number of areas, such as client counseling, bankruptcy, and in-house
corporate representation, in which the lawyer's role has already begun to
evolve in this nonadversarial direction. 445 Second, in public law litigation,
lawyers have already begun the process of reconceptualizing their roles to
incorporate a more collaborative aspect to their involvement, particularly at
the remedial stage. For example, in some prison cases, lawyers encourage
their clients and the experts their clients select to assume direct responsibility
for remedial fact-finding and development. The lawyers' role in such situations is to help establish the agenda, provide data, and assess the adequacy of
the result in relation to their clients' legal interests. 4 ' Third, this problem
could be addressed by bringing in new lawyers at the remedial stage with
particular skills in the area of remedial development and mediation." 7 Fito
nally, law schools have begun expanding and reworking the curriculum 448
role.
lawyers'
the
of
aspects
solving
problem
collaborative,
more
reflect the
Lawyers and clients must begin to look at their roles differently if the deliberative model is to succeed. Although much work in this direction is needed,
the evolution of the lawyer's role has already begun.
A final concern about the deliberative model involves its potential cost and
efficiency. The process of involving substantial numbers of stakeholders,
lawyers, experts, mediators, and the court in the remedial formulation is
likely to be expensive and time consuming. 449 Is the time and expense entailed by the deliberative model justified? First, there is some evidence suggesting that although the deliberative model is costly it may compare
favorably to the expense and delay associated with litigation.450 Second, it is
445. See generally K. MACKIE, LAWYERS IN BUSINESS: AND THE LAW BUSINESS (1989); L.
PATrERSON & E. CHEATHAM,THE PROFESSION OF LAW 131 (1971); Gilson, Value Creation By
Business Lawyer" Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,94 YALE L.J. 239, 249-56 (1984); Schwartz, The
Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 669, 675-77 (1978).
446. Interview with Claudia Wright, National Prison Project, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

(Mar. 5, 1990).
447. Cf. Mode & Steiner, The Litigation Partnerand the Settlement Partner,LITrGATION, Summer 1986, at 33 (discussing the private law development of the practice of appointing a litigation
partner and a settlement partner to a case). There are, of course, disadvantages to this approach.
Lawyers often develop substantial expertise in the course of preparing a case for trial that may be
useful at the remedial stage. Moreover, the plaintiffs' power to resort to the adversary process if
necessary may be an important component of the defendants' willingness to take the deliberations
seriously.
448. See Riskin, supra note 444, at 49-50.
449. In the fishing rights case, direct expenses totalled approximately $200,000 for masters, experts, and expenses. McGovern, supra note 41, at 466-67.
450. Id. at 467 ("On balance there was a trade-off between identifiable additional expenses associ-
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important to look at the remedial formulation process as the first step in the
process of implementing the remedy. 4 51 Even if other forms of remedial development proceed faster than deliberation, the overall remedial process may
be more efficient and less costly because of the initial investment in collaborative, informed decisionmaking. Finally, the cost of the deliberative model is
a price that we must be willing to pay for a legitimate judicial process. Unless the costs of deliberation undercut the court's capacity to pursue the
norms of legitimate public remedial decisionmaking, they fail to provide a
4 52
persuasive argument for rejecting the deliberative model.
I do not claim that the deliberative model will be successful in achieving a
consensual remedy in every case. However, there are several reasons for resisting the temptation to limit the applicability of the deliberative model, at
least at the outset, to a narrow subset of the general class of cases exhibiting
the characteristics of public remedial decisionmaking. First, the model addresses the valid concerns raised by the legitimacy debate and offers a structure that accommodates the norms of legitimate public remedial
decisionmaking. Second, it is very difficult to identify in advance those cases
in which the model will not work.4 53 Third, in the absence of a participatory
process of remedial formulation, public law remedies have a tendency to fail
and to violate norms of procedural legitimacy. Fourth, the deliberative
model offers several mechanisms for minimizing the costs and risks of abuse,
such as the establishment of deadlines, the involvement of the mediator, and
the oversight of the judge. Finally, even if the deliberative process is unsuccessful in producing a consensus, it enhances the legitimacy of a subsequent
court-ordered remedy.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article proposes a normative theory of public remedial process.
Building on existing practice, the legitimacy debate about that practice, and
process theories in analogous areas such as public consensual dispute resolution, it provides a coherent normative framework to guide the performance
and assessment of current public remedial practice. It develops a deliberative
model of remedial decisionmaking that is tailored to the goals and functions
ated with the master's work and unidentifiable savings because of the expedited trial preparation
process and the abbreviated trial.").
451. This conception of remedial formulation also provides an argument for placing the costs of
the facilitator and experts on the defendants.
452. Due process under the adversary model can be extremely costly and inefficient. We tolerate
those burdens, however, because of the importance of fairness, individual dignity, and other important values that would be compromised under a more efficient system.
453. In many of the reported disputes resolved through public consensual dispute resolution, the
participants at the outset were extremely skeptical about the possibility of achieving consensus. See
supra notes 424 & 430 and accompanying text.
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of the remedial stage, and yet remains in keeping with the norms of judicial
legitimacy.
The legitimation of a deliberative model of the judicial role is a response to
a basic concern over the role of the court in public law litigation. The model
suggests a legitimate judicial role of effective restraint. It is the actors responsible for and affected by the legal violation, rather than the court, who
develop remedial priorities and plans. Yet this form of judicial restraint also
fulfills the court's constitutional obligation to develop remedies that will institutionalize public norms.
Both the normative theory and the deliberative model of remedial process
may have applications beyond the public remedial context. Areas such as
bankruptcy and antitrust exhibit many of the characteristics of the public
remedial context. They too may involve the implementation of open-ended,
aspirational norms requiring predictive and remedial fact-finding, and the
cooperation of diverse parties and organizations. These areas may profit
454
from the remedial approach developed in this article.
It is also important to consider the ramifications of the deliberative model
for liability determinations in the public law context. Public law liability
determinations exhibit some of the characteristics that predispose courts to
depart from traditional adversary process. They sometimes call upon the
court to develop and apply standards effectuating general, aspirational norms
in particular contexts, and to make sense of competing social facts and theories of causation. Indeed, some constitutional provisions have been interpreted to require the court to divine the community's "evolving standard of
decency" or "community morality. '455 The deliberative model may be useful in aiding the court in performing these adjudicatory roles.
Application in the liability stage would, of course, dramatically expand the
reach of the normative approach suggested in the model. Before proceeding
in this direction, careful consideration must be given to the factors that distinguish the liability and remedial roles of the court. The nature of the
court's liability task-interpreting norms and determining parties' responsibility-differs in important respects from the remedial task-implementing
those norms in a particular context. We insist on developing uniform, general rules at the liability stage, but recognize that different contexts may require different remedial approaches to implement those norms. The court's
role in determining liability does not depend on the parties' acceptance and
cooperation, as it does in developing an implementing a remedy. Retrospec454. The analysis may also be useful in remedial disputes primarily involving private parties in
situations requiring cooperation by a range of interdependent parties, such as family law and
partnership.
455. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 344, 346 (1981) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
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tive, adjudicative fact-finding plays a much more significant role in determining liability than in developing a remedial plan to eliminate legal violations.
These differences bear on both the need and justification for adopting a judicial role of structuring deliberation. They only begin, however, to identify
the range of considerations that must be taken into account in assessing the
relevance of the deliberative model to public law liability determinations.
Another important area for future inquiry is the implication of the deliberative model for the legitimacy and processes of consent decree negotiations.
Settlement of public law litigation prior to a finding of liability constitutes an
important area of activity. Yet consent decrees are viewed with skepticism
by both courts and legal theorists because they lack a theory that adequately
justifies their vigorous judicial enforcement. 456 The deliberative model may
provide such a theoretical justification. Consent decrees reached through
processes that conform to the deliberative model may satisfy basic requirements of legitimate judicial intervention. Indeed, the consent decree context
avoids one of the potential limitations of the deliberative model, namely, the
unwillingness of the parties to cooperate. At the same time, however, the
consent decree context lacks the normative check on the process that constiof the deliberative model. These issues
tutes a critical legitimating element
457
examination.
further
warrant
The courts continue to play a vital role in remedying violations of public
law norms. Thus far, the challenges to the legitimacy of this role have proceeded without a normative conception of the public remedial process. This
article aspires to bridge the gap between theory and practice by constructing
a normative theory of public remedial process and a deliberative model of
public remedial practice. Hopefully, it will provoke deliberation by the legal
and academic community about an area that continues to require our
attention.

456. See generally Symposium, Consent Decrees" PracticalProblemsand Legal Dilemmas, 1987
U. CHI. L. FORUM 1.

457. The issue implications of the deliberative model for the legitimacy and structure of consent
decrees is the subject of a forthcoming article.

